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A bstract
This thesis investigates the effects of competition in settings where agents are motivated 
primarily by reputational concerns. This is typically the case when explicit contracts 
are difficult to write due to the lack of verifiability of the task performed by the agent, 
or of output quality. Such situations are widespread in the case of expert advice or 
professional services. Competition can generate interesting effects when interacting with 
reputational incentives. The first chapter contains a selective review of the hterature on 
reputational incentives and on the market for expert advice. The second chapter analyses 
how competition affects the incentives to report truthful information of experts competing 
to infiuence a decision maker. The complex interaction between reputational incentives 
and competition provides important implications for organisational design, and there 
are situations when delegating decision powers, or adopting forms of favouritism improve 
upon letting experts communicate their information and compete to infiuence the decision 
maker. The third chapter contains an analysis of the effect of competition on the incentives 
of an important class of experts, financial analysts. A theoretical model is developed to 
highlight how the behaviour of sell side analysts is affected by the presence of non - sell 
- side analysts. The predictions of the model are then tested on a dataset of financial 
analysts recommendations. The main result is that stronger competition decreases the 
degree of optimism of sell side analysts. Finally, the fourth chapter investigates the effect 
of entry in a market for experts where customers have different valuation for the service 
and there is positive sorting, so that higher valuation clients prefer to be served by more 
reputable experts. The main result is that entry decreases effort incentives for more 
reputable agents, unless the type of customers also affects the likelihood of successful 
provision of the service.
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Preface
The role of experts has become progressively more important in modern economies. Firms, 
consumers, investors, pubUc organisations increasingly rely upon experts to acquire in­
formation or professional services. Correspondingly, the economic analysis of the market 
for experts and for information transmission developed greatly. Most transactions involv­
ing experts reporting information or performing a professional activity are characterized 
by the impossibility to explicitly contract the content of the performance. Sometimes, 
experts provide an experience good whose value for the client becomes known after the 
transaction took place. Often experts may have a vested interest to induce the client to 
make a decision and conflicts of interest may arise. In all such situations reputational 
concerns play a critical role in providing incentives for experts to offer a service or spe- 
ciahstic information at their best and in the interest of their “principal”. The impact 
of competition on the incentives created by reputational concerns is an important ele­
ment in the analysis of the workings of markets for experts. Experts interact not only 
in the market place, but often also within organisations. The flow of information inside 
organisations relies upon the reports of agents specialized in performing speciflc tasks who 
acquire private information important for the decision making of the whole organisations. 
It is seldom possible to provide explicit incentive schemes to motivate such agents to re­
port their information truthfully, and they are often motivated by reputational concerns. 
Then, the investigation of the interaction among experts competing to influence a decision 
maker is relevant also for the optimal design of institutions and decision rules.
This thesis investigates the effects of competition on the incentives of experts, motivated 
by reputational concerns, and possibly having conflicts of interest with their principal, to 
report information truthfully or to provide a high quahty service. The thesis investigates 
the activity of experts in both market and non market settings. The first chapter contains 
a brief overview of the literature on reputational incentives and on the market for expert 
advice, especially underlying results that are not examined in detail in the main chapters 
of the thesis. The second chapter investigates the interaction between competition and 
reputational incentives and derives implications for organisational design, showing that
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delegation and favouritism can arise to improve the flow of information within the organ­
isation. The third chapter contains an application of some of the results derived in the 
second chapter to the market for financial analysts recommendations. A model is derived 
to investigate how the behaviour of analysts (experts) who can have a stronger conflict of 
interest with investors (decision makers) is affected by competition from other analysts 
who are less informed but have more tenuous conflicts of interest with investors. The pre­
dictions of the model are empirically tested on a sample of recommendations about Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) in the United States during the period January 1995 to June 2002. 
The empirical evidence shows that analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO 
(who can be expected to have stronger conflict of interests with investors) tend to issue 
less optimistic recommendation when analyst not affiliated with the lead underwriter of 
the IPO cover the same stock. The chapter also provides evidence suggesting that the 
optimism shown by affiliated analysts cannot be attributed to psychological biases, and is 
thus hkely to be induced by the incentive system in place. The fourth chapter investigates 
the effect of entry in a market for experts who provide consumers with a service whose 
quahty depends upon the unobservable talent and costly effort of experts. Increased entry 
of experts induces heterogenous consumers to sort, and this impacts the equihbrium fees 
both in the current period, and, cruciaUy, in future periods. The latter impacts reputa­
tional incentives to provide a high quality service in the current period. Sorting of clients 
can also affect the informativeness of a successful provision of the service as a signal of 
experts’ talent. Finally, sorting of chents can also affect the degree of complexity of the 
service to be provided, and thus the marginal efficiency of effort. These are additional 
channels through which entry, by inducing changes in chents’ sorting, can affect incen­
tives to exert effort. The model shows that in most cases increased entry of new experts 
reduces incentives to exert effort to provide a high quahty service and identifies situations 
in which competition can instead be beneficial in fostering the provision of high quahty 
services.
The main message of the thesis is that competition can have an ambiguous impact on 
the incentives of experts motivated by reputational concerns. The thesis shows situations 
in which competition may be beneficial in spurring incentives for “good” behaviour, and 
other situations in which it is detrimental. The thesis highhghts the main forces generated 
by competition in its interaction with reputational concerns, and it may therefore pro­
vide guidance for regulators and policy makers interested in identifying situations when 
competition should be fostered and situations when it should be constrained.
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Chapter 1
R eputation  and C om petition: a 
B rief O verview o f the Literature
The literature on reputational incentives and that on the economics of expert advice 
and services are very large. However, the interaction between the incentives created by 
competition among experts and the incentives created by reputational concerns have been 
left largely unexplored. This interaction is very important in practice as it is often the case 
that experts compete to provide a service or information to other uninformed parties, both 
within organisations and on the marketplace. The way competition impacts the incentives 
to build, or keep, own reputation has critical implications for the incentives of experts 
to provide their advice or service at the best standard for final users. This introduction 
briefly overviews the existing literature trying to highlight the issues that represent the 
starting point for this thesis. I firstly discuss the most relevant contributions on the 
effects of competition on incentives. Secondly, I present a short review of the literature 
on reputational concerns. Thirdly, I outline a brief description of the main issues in the 
economics of markets for expert advice. Finally, I discuss how the analysis of the thesis 
relates to the literature. Each chapter of the thesis contains a more detailed review of the 
literature relevant for the topics treated within the chapter.
1.1 C om petition  and Incentives
This thesis is related both to the literature on incentives and product market competition, 
and to that on tournaments as incentive schemes. Strictly speaking, the latter involves 
competition among agents, while the former involves competition among principals, and.
11
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indirectly, among agents working for each different principal^. However, the insights 
of the early literature on incentives and product market competition are applicable to 
competition among agents (e.g. managers) inside an organisation.
The first contributions to this literature focused on the role of competition or tournaments 
as providers of information that allows principals to use relative performance evaluation 
to incentivise agents. Lazear and Rosen (1981) showed that tournaments, which provide 
a stark form of relative performance evaluation, are efficient when agents are risk neutral. 
However, Green and Stokey (1983) proved that this result does not hold when agents 
are risk averse and tournaments are typically not even second best in this case. Another 
drawback of tournaments is that fostering competition among agents may undermine co­
operation and induce various kinds of “dysfunctional” behaviour like destroying or hiding 
output produced by other competing agents. Itoh (1991) shows that reducing competition 
among agents may be beneficial when cooperation is necessary to generate output. Holm- 
strom (1982 - I) underhned that relative performance evaluation may be useful in filtering 
out noise from a performance measure, thus reducing the costs of providing incentives in 
a standard moral hazard model with a risk averse agent. Competition may be useful 
in providing such information. Hart (1983) shows that competition may reduce man­
agerial slack in a somewhat special environment. However, Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), 
Scharfstein (1988) and Hermalin (1992) argue that the effects of competition in provid­
ing incentives in agency problems are ambiguous. All these contributions mainly stress 
the role of competition in enhancing the information available to principals to evaluate 
the performance of agents. The main focus is on the design of optimal explicit incentive 
schemes. Most of these results can be applied to competition among agents within an 
organisation and are not specific to product market competition.
Schmidt (1997) enlarges the focus. In his work, more competition has no informational 
benefit, but enhances incentives through two effects. The first is the desire to avoid 
costly liquidation^, which induces agents to exert more effort to reduce production costs 
as this decreases the likelihood of being liquidated and it is assumed that competition 
raises the impact of cost differences on the probability of being liquidated. On the other 
hand, changes in competition alter the value of inducing a cost reduction. In other terms, 
changes in competition modify the optimal incentive scheme, and principals may find 
it optimal to induce a lower effort level as tougher competition decreases the benefits 
from reducing costs^. Raith (2003) elaborates on this point and shows that when the
^Of course also in this case there can be multiple agents working for a principal and competing for a 
promotion.
 ^Schmidt (1997) assumes that Uquidation imposes a turnover cost on the manager, but the same result 
would hold if the manager enjoys private benefits from being in charge and hquidation had no cost. Then 
the cost of liquidiation would be the loss of private benefits.
^The results of Schmidt (1997) can still be applied to competition within an organisation if costly
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market structure is endogeneized, taking into account entry and exit of firms, tougher 
competition, modelled as higher product substitutability, induces stronger incentives to 
exert effort aiming at reducing costs'*. This literature focuses on situations where explicit 
performance contracts can be offered. Two recent papers analyse the role of competition 
in settings where incentives are provided by reputation, Horner (2002) shows that com­
petition strengthens reputational incentives as it provides principals with the option to 
switch to different agents. This enforces repeated exertion of good behaviour even when 
much has been learnt about an agent’s type and reputational incentives would therefore 
fade out. Park (2005) analyzes a repeated cheap talk model and shows that competition 
may reduce the sustainability of an equilibrium with honest transmission of information. 
Park (2005) and Horner (2002) differ critically in the way of modelling reputation. Park 
models reputation in a folk theorem sense as reputation consists in playing the (“coop­
erative” or ’’good”) equilibrium strategy. Competition reduces the continuation value to 
abide by the strategy of reporting information honestly, Horner (2002) on the contrary 
models reputation as an asset. The agent has an intrinsic type and principals learn in­
formation about it over time. Agents are thus motivated by the desire to be perceived as 
being of the “best” type and this provides incentives to exert effort. The difference in the 
modelling of reputation is an important point and it is discussed at further length in the 
next section.
1.2 R eputational Incentives
There exists a large literature on reputational incentives, and different ways to model 
reputation have been proposed. Bar-Isaac (2004) suggests the hterature used three main 
approaches to model reputation. The first is reputation as beliefs. Agents are character­
ized by some unknown characteristic (type) which is learnt over time. This characteristic 
can be unknown to the agent herself. The agent can take some action which is more likely 
to produce an output providing favourable information about her type, where “favourable 
information” means “information that raises the likelihood the agent has a type which is 
more valuable to principals”, Agents face a trade off between a larger payoff in the current 
period which can be obtained by taking an action that harms her reputation, and a lower 
payoff in the current period which provides the benefit of raising the chances that her 
reputation increases. This in turn allows the agent to profit more from future interactions
liquidation is interpreted as the loss of private benefits for the agent, while profits of agents are interpreted 
as performance schemes, or private benefits, of higher level managers, such as heads of a division. The 
latter should also have the freedom to choose the compensation mechanism being offered to employees 
within their division.
 ^Raith (2003) also provides results on the important topic of the relationship between risk and incen­
tives.
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with the principal(s). There is an early literature employing this approach to modeUing 
reputation, including the classical papers of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and 
Roberts (1982). For reputation to have a role, there must exists some uncertainty about 
the type of the agent. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) provide a clarifying treatment of 
this point and Mailath and Samuelson (2006) offer a review of the literature. The second 
approach to reputation, according to the taxonomy of Bar-Isaac (2004) is viewing repu­
tation as a commitment device in an infinitely repeated game, and reputation is intended 
as “reputation for playing the cooperative equilibrium in previous periods”. Reputation 
here is used to interpret the play of one of the equilibria of an infinitely repeated game, 
but has no value in itself. An early example in this line is the classical paper by Klein 
and Leffier (1981). Finally, Bar-Isaac (2004) suggests that reputation can be viewed as a 
coordination device. Reputation allows players to coordinate actions and expectations, so 
that a particular equilibrium could arise in settings where multiple equilibria are possible. 
In my view the third and the second approaches to modelling reputation are similar, and 
much less appeahng than that of reputation as beliefs which is at the basis of most of the 
recent literature on reputational incentives.
Part of the literature assumes that agents are informed about their type, so that there 
exists both an hidden action and an hidden information problem. This literature typically 
posits that there is a commitment type and one or more opportunistic, or biased types 
who may want to pool with or separate from the commitment type. Another strand of 
the literature assumed that agents do not know their type, so that the agency problem 
is one of hidden action, and all players are symmetrically uninformed about an agent’s 
type. The latter route has been taken by the original literature on career concerns which 
started to address the issue of whether market forces could solve moral hazard problems. 
Holmstrom (1982 - II) showed that this is not the case, although reputational incentives 
can alleviate agency problems. He also underlined that such incentives fade out as learning 
about the agent type becomes more precise. Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999 - I and 
1999 - II) clarify most of the issues about the role of the information structure, generalize 
the results of Holmstrom (1982 - II) and provide additional results about multitasking 
and several applications.
Following the Seminal contribution of Holmstrom the literature developed along different 
lines, and I will discuss those that are most relevant for this thesis. The first is the in­
teraction of reputational incentives with other kind of incentives. Gibbons and Murphy 
(1992) investigate the interaction of implicit and explicit incentives in a “traditional” 
moral hazard problem with a trade off between risk and incentives. In this setting risk 
includes also the uncertainty about the type (talent) of the agent, and not only that 
inherent in the realization of the performance measure. They derive an optimal incen­
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tive contract showing that explicit incentives should be stronger later in the career when 
reputational incentives become weaker as more information about the type of the agent 
is revealed. This is the first example analysing the interaction of reputational incentives 
with other incentives. The second is the importance of distinguishing among reputation 
of individuals, reputation of firms, reputation of groups (collective reputations). This 
issue is relevant for this thesis, as there are some interesting contributions showing the 
impact of organisational design on incentives. Organisational design modifies the way ex­
ternal evaluators in the market observe the performance of an agent, and thus the extent 
to which career concerns provide incentives. A recent interesting contribution is Harstad 
(2007) who investigates the interplay between product market competition, organisational 
design and reputational incentives. He shows how different market structures affect the 
choice of organisational form and how that is optimally chosen to optimise reputational 
incentives. The latter depend upon the exposure of the worker to the external labour 
market and that in turn depends upon the transparency of the organisation. Other pa­
pers discussing the interaction between organisational form and learning about an agent’s 
talent are Demougin and Slow (1994), Meyer (1994), Jeon (1996) and Carrillo (2003). In 
all these papers organisational form is important in that it affects the way information 
about the agent performance gets transmitted either inside, or outside the organisation. 
The third is the dark side of reputational incentives. An early contribution in this direc­
tion is Holmstrom and Ricart-i-Costa (1986) who show that career concerns may induce 
agents to have different preferences towards risk than principals. Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) showed that career concerns may induce herd behaviour, and their result is further 
analyzed by Ottaviani and Sorensen (2000). These authors investigates this issue further 
and show (Ottaviani and Sorensen 2006 - I, 2006 - II and 2006 - HI) that agents may 
distort the information they transmit in order to appear more talented. In their setting, 
experts just provide information and are not affected by the decision made. Thus, experts 
have no gain, in terms of higher current period payoff by misreporting their information. 
The distortion stems exclusively from the desire to show the market they observed a pre­
cise signal about the state of the world. Two very interesting contributions investigate 
distortions induced by the desire to pool with, or separate from, a given type of agents. 
Morris (2001) and Ely and Valimaki (2003) show that the presence of reputational con­
cerns may distort the incentives of agents who would otherwise have preferences aligned 
to those of principals. In these models there is an action which is always preferred by a 
type. Then, “unbiased” types prefer not to take that action in order to increase their 
reputation as “unbiased” types, even if that action raises their current period payoff. 
Other interesting contributions in this direction are Levy (2004) who shows that careerist 
decision makers can inefficiently try to differentiate themselves to signal their talent. Levy 
(2005) proposing an interesting application of this mechanism to the judiciary. Prat (2005) 
showing that transparency may raise reputational concerns and distort decision making
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by inducing agents to act in a conformist way^, and Levy (2007) who is concerned with 
the design of optimal decision making rules in committees made by agents motivated by 
reputational concerns. Finally, Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2006) investigate how the 
incentives created by markets, firms, and governments, each characterized by a different 
degree of transparency, interact with reputational incentives and induce agents to take 
actions which inflate performance measures but do not create any value for principals.
These contributions do not explicitly investigate the effects of the interaction of competi­
tion and reputational incentives, but some of them implicitly suggest that if the agency 
relationship was “exclusive”, some of the negative effects generated by reputational in­
centives could be dampened. For example, in Scharfstein and Stein (1990) if the second 
agent was not able to observe the decision of the flrst, and this is hkely to happen in a 
non market setting, then she would use her information efficiently. Also, market forces 
may affect the survival of certain types of agents, so that distortions induced by the desire 
to pool or to separate may change over time. For example biased types may be forced 
to exit the market at a higher rate as competition becomes tougher, and then unbiased 
types may have less incentives to distort their actions in order to separate from biased 
types. On the other hand, if appearing as a biased type entails a larger risk of being 
kicked out of the market, competition may raise the distortion induced by the desire to 
separate from biased types. However, this issue has not received a formal investigation in 
the hterature, and it may be a possibly fruitful route for future research.
1.3 M arkets for E xperts
There is a relatively large hterature studying markets for expert services. Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer (2006) provide a thorough critical review of the existing hterature, and this 
section draws heavily on their work. The hterature developed to analyse the market for 
the provision of credence goods. Darby and Karni (1973) define credence goods as goods 
and services for which the provider of the good (the expert) has better information about 
the needs of the consumer than the consumer herself. Often the output of such goods 
is difficult to verify and contracts based upon performance measures are not frequent. 
Typically the hterature distinguishes the provision of the diagnosis from the provision of 
the good or service. The informational advantage of experts can give rise to two forms of 
inefficient provision of the good or service. The first is undertreatment, occurring when 
the consumer gets a service at a standard which is not sufficient to solve her problem, or 
the opposite problem of overtreatment, occurring when the consumer gets a service at a
®Prat (2005) also underlines the importance of distinguishing between information about the conse­
quences of the agent’s action and information directly on the agent’s action.
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standard which is too high with respect to her need. The second is overcharging, occurring 
when the consumer pays too much for the service that was actually provided. The latter 
is different from overtreatment because the consumer gets the treatment she needs, but 
is charged as if she got a more expensive treatment. This implies that overcharging 
can arise if the treatment provided is not verifiable to court. On the contrary over- 
or undertreatment can arise even if the treatment provided is verifiable as long as the 
correctness of the diagnosis, or the true needs of the customer cannot be verified to court.
The existing work in the area is heterogeneous. There are many differences in the technol­
ogy assumed for the provision of the service, in the market structure under which experts 
operate, in the degree of verifiability of the service and diagnosis provided, and in the 
extent to which the expert is liable in case of malpractice. The main focus of the literature 
is on the conditions ensuring that equilibria with honest provision of the service arise. In 
general such equilibria exist if either the quality of the provided treatment is verifiable, 
or experts are liable so that they cannot provide less treatment than contracted, and 
consumers are homogeneous. When some of these assumptions are relaxed, inefficiencies 
arise. If both liability and verifiabihty do not hold, consumers face a lemons problem and 
the market may break down. Another important assumption is that consumers can com­
mit to undergo treatment once a diagnosis has been performed. When that assumption 
is dropped, equihbria are characterized by inefficiencies induced by duphcation of either 
search or diagnosis costs, or both.
Typically this literature does not consider reputational concerns as an incentive mech­
anism. A partial exception is Wohnsky (1993) who models reputation as playing the 
“honest” equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game. Another exception is Ely and Vali­
maki (2003) who model reputational incentives in a market for expert services (car repairs 
by mechanics), but they are not concerned with the effects of competition or of changes 
in marker structure. Reputational incentives can be a way to ensure that an equilibrium 
with honest treatment exists, even if verifiability and liability does not hold. In practice 
reputational considerations seem to be important in markets for experts. In fact it is often 
difficult to verify whether the expert provided the service at the agreed level, or whether 
the expert provided the appropriate service. The fact that reputational concerns are im­
portant is signalled by the fact that in some of such markets there exist league tables for 
experts, like in the market for investment banking services, while in other markets word of 
mouth advice or consumer reviews are a common way for customer to gather information 
about which expert to choose. Another important aspect that has been largely overlooked 
by the literature is consumers’ heterogeneity. The latter can have important consequences 
on the equilibrium fees through the way consumers sort into experts of differing perceived 
quality. In turn equilibrium fees are critical in determining the incentives of experts.
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1.4 T his Thesis and th e Literature
This thesis focuses on settings where explicit incentives are not available due to the non 
verifiability of the activity performed by agents, and incentives are provided by reputa­
tional concerns. Typically an agent faces a trade off between enjoying a gain in the current 
period by taking an action that reveals unfavourable information about her characteris­
tics, and foregoing that opportunity to enhance her reputation. Competition impacts the 
value of both actions, and therefore the incentives to build a reputation. In contrast to 
much of the hterature, competition does not necessarily provide more information about 
an agent’s type. That is surely an important aspect, and it has been extensively studied 
by both the literature on incentives and product market competition, and by the hter­
ature on reputational incentives. However, this thesis shows that competition induces 
other important effects, by altering the value of building own reputation, on top of pro­
viding more information about an agent’s performance or type. This is quite a different 
approach from that taken by the traditional hterature on tournaments, on product mar­
ket competition and incentives, and on reputational incentives. This approach is similar 
in spirit to Schmidt (1997) as competition alters the value of choosing the “desirable” 
behaviour, but it does so in a context where exphcit incentives are not feasible.
The second chapter of the thesis investigates in detail the effects of competition on rep­
utational incentives. This topic has been analyzed by Park (2005), as he shows that 
competition reduces the value of having a reputation. Moreover Park deals with a setting 
where exphcit incentives schemes are not feasible. However Park (2005) models repu­
tation as a conunitment device in an infinitely repeated game, and there is no issue of 
asymmetric information or learning about an agent’s type. On the contrary, in this thesis 
reputation is modelled as an asset and the principal interacts with the agents as a function 
of their reputation. In some cases (for examples in chapters 1 and 2), when the reputation 
of an agent is too low, the principal stops interacting with the agent forever. In the paper 
of Park (2005) the principal knows the type of an agent after a deviation, but may decide 
to revert to interact with her after the “punishment phase” is over.
The second chapter of the thesis also provides implications for organisational design. The 
latter has a role in that it can act as a commitment device for the principal to grant 
agents power to influence decisions. This is close in spirit to the important contribution 
of Aghion and Tirole (1997) on delegation of authority, but it is pretty much different in 
the set up and in the fact that the main source of incentives are reputational concerns. 
The chapter is also close to the idea that organisational form responds to the problem of 
fostering the transmission of relevant information within the organisation. Dessein (2002) 
shows how delegation can be preferred to communication as the latter entails a loss in
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the amount of information that can be transmitted in equilibrium. The chapter builds on 
the work of Dessein (2002) by introducing dynamics, asymmetric information about the 
motives of the informed parties, and multiple informed parties. The chapter shows that 
different organisational forms affect learning about agents’ types. Delegating decision 
powers shuts down information about the agents who are not delegated decisions. This 
point recalls the results of the literature investigating how organisational form impacts 
the availability of information about agents performance.
The third chapter of the thesis provides specific results on the eflFects of competition 
among financial analysts on the degree of optimism of their recommendations. This is 
a novel contribution to the literature as no previous work analyzed either theoretically, 
or empirically, whether competition relaxes conflicts of interests between investors and 
analysts. The hterature on the distortion generated by the desire to be perceived as 
talented may provide some guidance on this issue. If tougher competition raises the gains 
from being perceived as especially talented, then analysts may tend to bias their forecasts 
more. However, the mere presence of multiple analysts is not sufficient to generate effects 
on the incentives of each single analyst as shown in Ottaviani and Sorensen (2006 - III). 
This thesis takes a different approach. Competition reduces the current gains of reporting 
distorted information, because if investors observe multiple reports, and some of these 
are conflicting, each report will have a weaker impact on their investment strategies. 
The literature on reputational cheap talk instead attributes the distortion created by 
reputational concerns (which can be maybe exacerbated by tougher competition) to the 
process of Bayesian updating through which agents type is evaluated. That induces agents 
to distort their information.
The fourth chapter provides results about the effect of entry in a market for expert advice 
where experts are motivated by reputational concerns. The chapter shows how entry 
impacts on the incentives to provide a high quality service. The economic forces at work 
are different from those prevalently studied by the literature on expert advice. In fact, the 
chapter introduces the possibility that consumers differ in their valuation for the service. 
This, in turn implies that in equilibrium clients sort into experts of different reputation. 
Then, entry affects the sorting behaviour of clients and in this way the equihbrium fees. 
This affects the payoff from building a reputation and consequently the incentives to 
provide a high quality service.
Chapter 2
C om peting Influence
2.1 Introduction
This chapter aims at a better understanding of delegation and favouritism in organisations 
through the analysis of the incentives created by competition to influence decision making. 
This chapter argues that the choice between delegating decision powers versus relying on 
communication of information from multiple experts is crucially shaped by the incentives 
created by competition for influence. The results are based on the analysis of the effects of 
competition in a dynamic game of information transmission where those senders (experts) 
who have a conflict of interest with the decision maker are motivated by reputational 
concerns to report information truthfully. The novel theoretical feature of this chapter is 
that it introduces multiple senders in this framework and identifies two conflicting forces 
generated by competition among senders. On the one hand competition for influence 
induces a reduced influence effect: biased senders will have less chances to influence 
decision making both in the current and in the future period. Reduced future influence 
decreases biased senders’ incentives to maintain an untarnished reputation as the presence 
of competitors makes it less likely that a sender who behaves in the present is able to cash 
in the benefits of her undamaged reputation. Reduced current influence limits a biased 
sender’s opportunity to mislead the decision maker in the current period and increases his 
incentives to report information truthfully. On the other hand competition generates a lost 
reputation effect which has an ambiguous impact on truthtelling incentives: a sender fears 
other senders gaining more influence as his own reputation flutters when other senders 
may have non congruent preferences with his own. However, if the decision maker has no 
reliable senders she may choose an action that harms the sender. The balance between 
these effects is ambiguous and facing multiple senders is not always beneficial for the
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receiver. This result has important implication for organizational choice. Organisations 
can decide to let agents compete to influence decision making, thus aggregating all the 
available information. When the reduced future influence effect is very strong, however, 
organisations might flnd it optimal to commit to delegate decision powers to only one 
sender. The model shows that experts might be delegated decision powers on certain 
tasks in order to hmit competition for influence and spur truthtelling incentives. The 
model also shows that it can be optimal to commit to bias the competition for influence 
as favouring one of the experts helps creating additional incentives to report information 
truthfully. Although favouritism characterizes the every day life of many organizations, it 
has received little attention in formal economic analysis and this work shows it could arise 
as a rational organizational response to the problem of fostering truthtelling incentives. 
Finally, the model shows that different organisational forms are preferred as a function of 
the importance of the decision at stake. In particular, delegation should be used when the 
importance of the decision is neither very low nor too high. In the latter situations it is 
optimal to aggregate different opinions, so that decision makers will be better off relying 
upon communication of information.
The results can be applied to describe many real world situations in which a decision maker 
relies on the information provided by experts who may have a vested interest in inducing 
some decisions. A major apphcation is the analysis of resources allocation within a firm: 
the chief financial officer, CFO (the decision maker), is allocating funds among projects in 
a firm and wants to elicit information about such projects from project leaders (experts) in 
order to allocate funds to the most promising project. However, project leaders may derive 
a private benefit if more funds are allocated to the project they work on. This chapter 
shows how the incentives of project leaders to report the truth change if the CFO collects 
information from all competing projects leaders and centralizes the decision as opposed 
to delegating decisions to one project leader. The results of the chapter can be applied 
to describe other interesting economic interactions such as: politicians competing to be 
elected, lobbies willing to influence politicians, financial analysts providing information 
to investors, investment banks providing advice to corporate clients.
2 .1 .1  R e la te d  lite r a tu r e
The analysis of this chapter is related to the literature investigating the transmission of 
information from possibly biased experts. The contribution of Sobel (1985) is especially 
related. Sobel investigates the incentives for reputation building in a finite horizon model 
where the only sender is perfectly informed about the state of the world. The sender can 
have perfectly aligned incentives with the decision maker or perfectly opposed interests.
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Sobel derives conditions ensuring the existence of a truthtelling equihbrium and illustrates 
an application to a lender-borrower relationship. Benabou and Laroque (1992) is also 
related as they extend the framework of Sobel (1985) by allowing the sender to observe 
a noisy signal about the state of the world. This allows them to generate more reahstic 
dynamics for reputation. The present work differs from these two contributions as it 
introduces a second informed sender, and then is extended to allow for n senders, so 
that truthtelhng incentives are created both by the desire to keep a reputation and by 
competition for influence (which can also harm truthtelling incentives). Finally, it differs 
in the way the bias of senders is modelled: in both Sobel and Benabou and Laroque a 
biased sender always has a confhct of interest with the decision maker, while in this model 
senders always prefer a given decision which might coincide with the preferences of the 
decision maker according to the realization of the state of the world. This can be a more 
interesting way to model the preferences of experts in many applications.
The work of Horner (2002) is also related as he shows how reputation and competition 
interact to create incentives for “good” behaviour. He analyses a model featuring both 
moral hazard and adverse selection where “good” agents are able to produce a high quality 
product at some cost. Competition has the role of enforcing a good behaviour (production 
of goods of high quality) because it creates an outside option for consumers: they will 
switch to a different producer upon receiving a low quality good. This allows to preserve 
incentives for good behaviour even when reputational incentives fade out as uncertainty 
about a producer’s type dissipates. The present model is different as it deals with an 
environment where monetary transfers are not allowed, so that the economic forces at 
work will have a different bite on the incentives of the informed parties. Furthermore, the 
uninformed party can observe the good (the information) produced by all the informed 
parties. Finally, Horner does not discuss the implications of the interactions of reputa­
tional incentives and competition on organisational form, in particular on the choice of 
delegating authority.
The latter issue is investigated by a large and rich economic literature, with Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) being one of the most important contributions, but few papers deal with 
settings where transfers are not allowed and the rationale for delegation is based upon 
the desire to improve the transmission of information within an organisation. The contri­
bution of Dessein (2002) is the flrst to discuss delegation in a cheap talk setting. Dessein 
compares the use of delegation in contrast to communication in a model a la Crawford 
and Sobel (1982), where the sender’s bias is public knowledge. Delegation is shown to 
improve upon communication as the latter involves a garbling of information due to the 
sender bias. In the contribution of Dessein delegation always improves upon commu­
nication when the latter is feasible and the true state is distributed uniformly. Under
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more general distributions, communication can improve upon delegation when the bias of 
the sender is large with respect to the uncertainty of the environment. Using numerical 
simulation he shows that “only if communication is very noisy it beats delegation”. On 
the contrary, the present work shows that sometimes communication (letting the agents 
compete for influence while the receiver chooses the course of action) is preferable to 
delegation, depending on the importance of the decision and independently of the bias of 
the experts (which is unknown in this model). This model also shows that a combina­
tion of communication and delegation can improve upon both pure communication and 
pure delegation. This seems to be a broader view of organisational hfe, as delegation and 
communication coexists in practice and the choice between the two is often dictated by 
the importance of the decision at hand, as predicted by the model^. A few recent works 
analyse the optimal design of delegation as a way to promote information transmission. 
Alonso and Matouschek (2007 - I) investigates the optimal design of decision rules and 
show situations in which agents are delegated decision powers as a function of their bias. 
They also show that agents can be delegated power over some decisions and that rules may 
contain gaps. Alonso and Matouschek (2007 - II) analyze a repeated interaction between 
a principal and an agent and show how optimal decision rules evolve as a function of the 
principal commitment power to use the information provided by the agent. Both papers 
do not discuss the effects of competition and in both papers reputational incentives are 
absent as the bias of the agent is known.
Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Szalay (2005) also provide related results. They inves­
tigate whether the decision maker can improve information transmission by committing 
to follow certain decision rules. Both papers, however, do not deal with competition and 
rather focus on the role of the alignment of interest between the sender and the decision 
maker.
This chapter is related to the literature on favouritism. There exists a few papers in 
economics dealing with this issue: the literature mainly developed in sociology and to 
the best of my knowledge, there are only two contributions from economists in the area. 
The first is Prendergast and Topel (1996) who show that allowing managers to reward 
their favourite employees might be a cheap way of providing incentives. However the 
authors assume that managers utility is increasing if their subordinates get promoted. 
This assumption is key to generate a role for favouritism. The second is Kwon (2006) who 
generates endogenously a preference for favouritism in a model where inventors compete 
to have their project implemented and the decision maker designs an optimal incentive
 ^An important point to stress is that Dessein studies communication versus delegation with one sender. 
In my model, in the one sender case, communication and delegation yield the same truthtelling incentives. 
On the contrary, communication differs from delegation in the two senders case due to the incentives 
effects created by competition for influence.
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scheme. However, he deals with a model where inventors become informed after exerting 
costly effort and the effects generated by competition are rather different. Moreover, 
“fairness” would improve upon favouritism because it induces the same effort exertion by 
both agents, which is more efficient than asymmetric effort exertion because effort costs 
are convex, while in my model “fairness” (which I rather define “communication”) can 
induce stronger truthtelling incentives not because of assumptions about the technology 
but because of the incentives created by competition for influence.
This work is related to the hterature on infiuence activities. Milgrom and Roberts (1988) 
represents an early important contribution in the area. They show that employees might 
want to allocate effort to produce information about their abihty. Such information is 
valuable for the firm, but comes at the cost of subtracting effort away from other pro­
ductive activities. Milgrom and Roberts discuss organisational responses to the presence 
of excessive infiuence activities. My model shares the view that organisational form is an 
instrument that can be employed to improve the transmission of important information. 
However, infiuence activities are modelled rather differently and this literature has placed 
little attention on the explicit analysis of the effects of competition in inducing the correct 
transmission of information^.
Another related paper is Baliga and Sjostrom (2001) who deal with a similar set of issues: 
they investigate the effects generated by using peer review to evaluate a project whose 
quality provide information about the inventor’s talent. Both the inventor and the peer 
compete for a promotion and this generates incentives to misreport information. They 
derive the optimal renegotiation proof incentive scheme and show that self assessment can 
always replicate peer review, so that delegating self assessment to the inventor cannot be 
improved upon by using communication of information by both the inventor and the peer.
This work is also related to the theoretical literature on cheap talk. However, the fact that 
agent’s bias is unknown and that the game is dynamic differentiates this work from most 
part of the hterature in this area. Following the seminal contribution of Crawford and 
Sobel (1982), a large literature developed focussing on different variations on the theme, 
taking both a purely theoretical and an applied perspective. Among these contributions, 
Krishna and Morgan (2001) is the reference closest to the present work. The authors 
investigate the effects of the presence of a second sender in a static cheap talk game a la 
Crawford and Sobel (1982). They show that unless the bias of the senders is extreme, the 
presence of a second sender is beneficial in that the informativeness of equilibria increases.
^Rotemberg and Saloner (1995) is also broadly related as the authors show that conflict between 
members of an organisation can foster information production. The bad side of conflict is that producing 
information is costly, and too much conflict can lead to excessive effort being devoted to information 
production.
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They also show that when the bias of senders goes in the same direction, the information 
provided by the more biased expert is redundant. Krishna and Morgan (2001) assume 
that the bias of the agents is publicly known. The presence of a second sender in their 
model helps in assessing the credibility of information transmitted and is especially useful 
when senders have opposed biases. This is clearly different from the role competition plays 
in my set up. Finally, Krishna and Morgan do not study organisational form. Gilligan 
and Krehbiel (1989) discuss a static game with two senders to describe the desirability 
of open versus closed rule in the legislative process. In their model, the bias of informed 
parties is known and they do not consider repeated interactions.
When discussing information transmission from multiple parties, it is important to deal 
with the role played by information aggregation. Battaglini (2002) and Levy and Razin 
(2004) provide important results in this respect. The model of Battaglini shows conditions 
ensuring fuU information revelation in the case where information is multidimensional, 
while Levy and Razin provide an analysis of situations when Battaglini’s result hold and 
conditions when it does not, even when information is multidimensional. It is important 
to notice that the result of Battaglini does not hold in the setting of this model, even if 
information were multidimensional, as the bias of senders is their private information.
The chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 introduces the base model and competi­
tion is modeled as a situation where two senders interact with one decision maker, section
2.3 derives the equilibrium when the receiver cannot commit to delegate decision powers 
to a given sender, section 2.4 discusses the role of establishing an organization and dele­
gating authority to one of the senders, section 2.5 shows why favouritism can be optimal, 
section 2.6 discusses the welfare of the decision maker, section 2.7 shows when it can be 
optimal to delegate decision powers to an agent with a less established reputation, such 
as a junior, section 2.8 extends the model to the case of n senders competing to influence 
the decision maker, section 2.9 contains a discussion of the assumptions, the modeUing 
strategy, results and applications, section 2.10 concludes, the appendix contains proofs of 
propositions and lemmas.
2.2 T he m odel
The strategic interaction between the decision maker (she) and senders (he) is modelled 
as a two period game. The same stage game is repeated in each period.
P layers and actions: The decision maker interacts with one or two senders. In each 
period the decision maker has to implement a decision d G { —1,0,1}. Senders provide a
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message m  E { —1,0,1}, suggesting the appropriate course of action. After observing the 
messages, the decision maker decides what action to implement.
Inform ation structure: At the beginning of the first period nature draws the types 
of senders. They might be unbiased, left biased or right biased. A sender’s type is his 
private information, is constant over time, and is distributed according to the probability 
distribution Pr(i =  Honest) =  Pi, Pr(i =  L e ft biased) =  Fr{i =  Right biased) =  
Firstly both senders will be assumed to have the same ex-ante chance of being honest. 
In such a case, Pr(i =  H) =  Pr(j =  H) =  p. This assumption will be removed later. 
The type of each sender represents his preferences. An unbiased sender has no conflict of 
interest with the decision maker, left biased senders always prefer the decision maker to 
take action —1, while right biased senders always prefer the decision maker to take action 
1 .
Every period, nature draws a random variable y  E ( —1,0, 1} representing the state of the 
world. Define state 0 as the status-quo. State zero occurs with probability ^, while states 
— 1 and 1 occur with probability |  each, so that the decision maker chooses state zero and 
gets an expected payoff of zero when she is uninformed. States of the world in different 
periods are drawn independently. Senders privately observe a perfect signal about the 
realization of the state of the world. Moreover, nature draws a random variable that 
defines period importance. This is represented by the random variable A  with support 
P =  [A, A] and distributed according to a continuous distribution function G{-) for the 
decision maker, and by the random variable B, with support $  =  and distributed
according to the continuous distribution function H{-), for senders. The distribution H  
is atomless. Both A and B are non negative. The realization of period importance is 
common knowledge and observed before messages are sent and decisions taken. Finally, 
decision maker’s payoff is commonly observed, while each sender’s payoff is his private 
information^.
P layer’s payoffs: The decision maker would like to implement the decision that matches 
the state of the world. Formally, =  A li d =  y and =  —A \i d ^  y'^ . Honest
senders have the same preferences over actions as the decision maker, so that =  B ii 
d =  y, and =  —B  otherwise. On the contrary, left biased senders always prefer the 
decision —1 to be implemented, so that =  B  ii d =  —1 and =  —B  if d 7^  — 1. 
Analogously right biased senders always prefer decision 1 to be implemented, so that 
=  B ii d =  1 and =  —B  ii d ^  1. Notice that I am assuming that biased types
^This assumption is needed to avoid perfect revelation of a sender’s type when payoffs are realized. 
However, decision maker’s payoffs could be assumed to be unobservable without altering any of the results.
^The subscripts DM,  H, L, R  denote, respectively, the payoff functions of Decision Maker, Honest, Left 
biased and Right biased.
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suffer the same “damage” if their preferred decision is not implemented, independently of 
the “distance” of the decision from their preference. In fact, a left biased sender incurs 
a loss of —B  both if decision 0 is made and if decision 1 is made. It could well be the 
case that left biased senders prefer decision 0 over decision 1 and right biased senders 
prefer decision 0 over decision —1. Allowing for this possibihty complicates the notation 
adding little to the economic intuition and determining limited changes in results. I am 
also assuming the decision maker cannot adjust the intensity of the action as a function 
of the reputation of each sender nor as a function of the magnitude of the “consensus” : 
the decision maker might want to trust more the information provided by senders if the 
senders agree, and less if there is disagreement. I will explore this possibility further 
in the chapter when I extend the model to allow for the presence of more than two 
senders. Finally, I am assuming there is no type biased towards the status-quo. This 
is both interesting in itself, as it allows to explore the effect of having a decision that is 
“unbiased” ^ , and useful to keep the model simple and tractable.
Contracts: this model aims at describing an environment where it is difficult to write 
complete contracts to govern agents interactions. Sender’s private signals are not verifiable 
to court, and money cannot be transferred among players. The main contractible variable 
is the power to influence decision making. In the first part of the chapter, it will be 
assumed that the decision maker is not able to credibly commit to delegate decision 
powers to a sender. This assumption will be removed in the sections on delegation and 
on favouritism.
Tim ing: there are two periods (stages). At the beginning of the first period, sender’s 
types are drawn and privately observed by each sender only®. Then the state variable 
is drawn and privately observed by senders only, while the decision maker observes an 
imperfect signal. The period importance realization for decision maker and senders is 
drawn and commonly observed^. Senders simultaneously report messages, the decision 
maker chooses a course of action, possibly on the basis of senders reports, and payoffs are 
realized. The same stage game is repeated in the second period, with the exception that 
sender’s types are drawn once and for all at the very beginning of the game.
Strategies and beliefs: for ease of exposition it is assumed that honest senders are 
committed types and always report information truthfully. Therefore, attention should 
be placed on biased senders. Left biased sender i reports the state reahzation truthfully
®I mean a decision who is not preferred by any biased type.
® Sender i knows bis type, but not sender j's type.
 ^There is no loss of generality in assuming that the decision maker observes her own period importance 
realization and senders observe theirs. However, to decide whether delegation or favouritism are better 
than communication, the decision maker should be able to get at least an informative signal about the 
realization of period importance for the senders. This point will be discussed further later on.
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in period t with probability qf^{ht), where s represents the true realization of the state 
of the world, and ht is the history of the game at the beginning of date t. Analogously, 
right biased senders report the true reahzation truthfully with probability zf^{ht). The 
dependence on the state of the world follows because the true state can coincide with 
the preferred decision for the sender, and this affects the willingness to report the state 
truthfully. The decision maker updates her beliefs about sender i type through Bayes 
rule. At the beginning of the first period, pi =  p  while at the beginning of the second 
period
P2 =  i— --------n—:---- \ im  =  y  (report was truthful)
P2 =  0 l i m ^ y  (report was false)
Strategies for the decision maker are mappings from the set {mi, m2} x {%, —i} to the set of 
actions. In words, the decision maker chooses decision d, when sender i reported message 
mi, and sender —i reported message m_i in period t, with probability E [0 , 1],
where again ht is the history of the game at the beginning of date t. Such probabilities 
depend upon the credibility of the sender’s report and upon the messages sent.
From now on, until section 7, the probability a sender is honest will be denoted simply 
by p  when t =  1.
2.3 C om m unication
This section derives the equilibrium of the game under the assumption that the decision 
maker cannot commit to grant decision powers to a given sender. Senders communicate 
their information to the decision maker who dehberates on the appropriate course of 
action.
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Only strategies based upon 
current history are considered. An equilibrium is a set of strategies 9ff(hf), zf^{ht) for 
left and right biased senders and for the decision maker, as defined above,
and a set of beliefs {p,P2 } for the decision maker, such that strategies are sequentially 
rational for a given set of beliefs and behefs are consistent given the stràtegy profile. To 
ease notation I will drop the dependence of q, z  and u on. ht.
The assumptions that honest senders are committed types and those about the distribu­
tion of the state of the world, rule out the existence of babbling equilibria, at least if the 
probabihty senders are honest (which I define as “sender’s credibility” ) is large enough to
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ensure the existence of equilibria where information transmission can take place. When 
the credibility of a sender is too low, the decision maker discards the messages received 
and biased senders randomise.
It is useful to state two prehminary results, common to the one and two senders games.
L em m a 2.1 A biased sender always suggests his preferred decision to be implemented in 
the last period if he has enough credibility to transmit information
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
Lem m a 2.2 A biased sender always reports the truth when the state of the world coin­
cides with his preferences.
This is obvious as by reporting the true state of the world he enjoys a current gain without 
incurring any loss in reputation. Furthermore, it never pays to he by falsely reporting the 
true state is the status quo. This follows because the sender would suffer both a current 
period loss, and a reputational loss. The latter is implied by the assumptions that the 
true state is observed perfectly. Otherwise, it could happen that a biased sender lied in 
order to gain a reputation for being unbiased. This mechanism would be similar to that 
unveiled by the Morris (2001) paper.
The decision maker is willing to implement the decision proposed by the sender with 
positive probability in period t if and only if
A\pt +  -  (1 -  «?)) +  -  (1 -  4 ))] > 0 (2.1)
where 0 is the expected payoff from making an uninformed decision® and pt is the prob­
ability that the sender is honest conditional on the information available in period t. 
Then, the sender will be able to credibly transmit information in period 2 if and only if 
P2 +  ^ ^-ÿ^(— +  5) > 0, or p2 > 5 - This follows because the sender is honest with
probability p2 and then reports the truth. With probability he is left biased, and with 
probability |  the true state is —1, so he is reporting the truth, while with probability |  
the state is either zero, or 1, and the left biased sender lies. The same reasoning describes
The uninformed decision coincides with the status quo, as this is the most hkely state of the world 
ex-ante. Then the expected payoff is zero because the true state is zero with probability it is —1 with 
probability |  and it is 1 with probability Therefore, the expected payoff by choosing the status quo is 
hA — j A  — j A  =  0. Assuming the states of the world are equally likely and thus that the expected payoff2 " "  4 " *  4
from an uninformed decision is different from zero does not alter the results.
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the behaviour of a right biased sender. In period 1 the sender is able to credibly transmit 
information if and only if jp+ ^^ 2^^  i i  d- ~  f  (1 ~  çf)] 4- ^^ 2^^  4" — | (1  — > 0.
In order to ensure the existence of truthtelling equilibria in pure strategies, it is necessary 
that p >  | .  In fact, in such a case, both types of biased senders report the truth in 
the first period setting qf =  zf =  1, so that P2 =  p  and information can be credibly 
transmitted if and only if p2 > 3 •
I firstly analyse the game where one sender tries to infiuence the decision maker, then I 
will turn to the two senders game. I describe the behaviour of a left biased sender, as 
that of a right biased sender is analogous.
O ne sender. In the second period a left biased sender always reports that the true state 
is —1, which implies =  1 if the state is —1, and g® ~  2^ ~  0, otherwise. In the first 
period a left biased sender trades off current gains with the possibility of influencing the 
decision in the future. If the true state is —1, the sender reports the truth for sure, as 
this involves no reputational loss. If instead the true state is either zero or 1, the payoff 
of a left biased sender by reporting the truth in period 1 is
=  +  (2.2)
where is the indicator function taking the value 1 if p2 > 3 and zero otherwise,
Ô G (0; 1] is a discount factor and E{-) denotes the expectation operator, so that E{B) =  
B dH (B ). The payoff from lying is given by
Vl =  B -  SE{B) (2.3)
This follows because if a sender lies in the first period, his second period reputation is 
destroyed as the posterior probabihty he is honest is p2 =  0. Therefore the decision maker 
wiU not listen to the sender in the second period, and will make an uninformed decision 
which corresponds to choosing the status quo. As the sender is not believed because 
his reputation is gone, a biased sender without reputation randomizes among messages. 
When the true state is different from his preferred state, a biased sender reports the 
state truthfully in the first period if and only if Vy > V ,^ while randomizes in the knife 
edge case occurring when Vr =  Vi. In. the pure strategy equilibrium it is necessary that 
reputation is large enough for information transmission to take place. Assuming therefore 
that p >  5, it is possible to prove the following
P rop osition  2.1 In the one sender case, a biased sender reports information truthfully 
in pure strategies in the first period if and only if the decision at stake is not too important.
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P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
The intuition for this result is standard and is analogous to that in Sobel (1985): if the 
realization of decision importance in the first period is not too high, a biased sender is 
willing to incur a current loss in order to be able to infiuence the decision maker in the 
second period. The proof of the proposition shows that the truthtelling equihbrium in 
pure strategies exists if and only if
B < 6E{B) (2.4)
while there is a continuum of equihbria in mixed strategies, where senders report infor-
2p
mation truthfully with probabihty G (0,  ------], when the true state is the status
quo and G (0, ^  ],when the true state is 1, if and only iî B  =  5E{B). However
the mixed strategy equilibrium is a zero probability event as period importance is drawn 
from a continuous and atomless distribution.
I now turn to the analysis of the game where two senders report information and show 
the effects of competition on truthtelling incentives. Then, I will discuss the behaviour of 
the decision maker and derive the equihbria.
T w o senders. It is useful to state two prehminary results that allows to ease the 
exposition. Firstly, the decision maker never benefits from discarding information when 
senders have enough credibility to ensure information transmission takes place.
Lem m a 2.3 The decision maker always uses the information provided by senders if they 
have enough credibility. Formally, \
P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
Secondly, from the assumptions of the model, it follows that action 0 (the status quo) is 
not preferred by any biased type. Therefore when the decision maker observes confiicting 
messages, and one of the messages is zero, she knows that zero is the true state. This 
implies that if m"* =  0 and ^  0, the decision maker sets =  0. Then
L em m a 2.4 There is always truthtelling in the first period if the true state is the status 
quo
This follows because the status quo is the “unbiased” action. In a truthtelling equilibrium, 
the opponent reports the truth. When the true state is the status quo, the decision maker
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observes a message suggesting the status quo from the opponent. Then, there is no prof­
itable deviation to lying because the decision maker knows that zero is not the preferred
action of any biased type and it must be the true state. Thus, in a truthtelling equilib­
rium, a left (or right) biased sender derives no benefit from reporting false information 
when observing a true state equal to the status-quo (state zero).
Then, it remains to discuss the behaviour of a biased sender when the observed state is 
opposite to his preferences. I assume the biased sender is left biased and the true state is 
1^ . Biased senders always lie in the last period. Therefore, I denote as qj the probability 
a left biased sender i reports the truth in period 1 when the true state is 1, and I thus 
drop the reference to the time period. The payoff of a left biased sender i, in such a case, 
is given by
V i= \p  +  M  +  i ^ ( l  _
-  I /;'''''') +  ^ ^ ( 1  -  qli)] (2.5)
if he reports truthfully in the first period, and
V l =  \p +
^ ( 1  -
(2.6)
if he lies. Both equations have been simplified relying on the fact that
and on the fact that a right biased sender reports the truth when the true state is 1, thus 
setting z l  =  1. The intuition for the expression for the expected payoff from reporting the 
truth can be described as follows: when the left biased sender reports the truth in period 
1, the decision maker observes two agreeing messages if the opponent is unbiased, or is 
right biased, or is left biased but is reporting the truth. This happens with probability 
[p+ ^^ 2^^  4- In such a case the decision maker follows the advice of sender i with
probability and that of sender —i with probability where the superscripts
1,1 denote the fact that the decision maker is observing two messages suggesting the true 
state is 1. The payoff is negative because the left biased sender suffers a loss as messages
The case of a right biased sender observing the true state is —1 is identical.
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suggest implementing decision 1. With probability ^ ^ (1 —g l j  the opponent is left biased 
and is lying. Then the decision maker faces two conflicting messages, one suggesting the 
true state is 1 coming from sender i, the other suggesting the true state is —1 coming 
from sender —i, and she implements the decision suggested by sender i with probability 
leading to a loss for that sender (this explains the negative sign), or the decision 
suggested by sender —i with probability and this benefits a left biased sender
i (this rationalizes the positive sign). The other terms represent expected continuation 
payoffs. With probability the opponent is left biased and reported the truth and
in the second period both senders i and —i are credible. They report the true state is — 1 
as they are both left biased and in the last period they have no reputational concerns. In 
this case the decision maker implements the suggested decisions with probabilities 
and 1/ 2  ^ leading to an expected gain of SE{B). With probability p  the opponent is 
honest and with probability |  the true state is —1, the honest sender reports the truth 
and the decision maker observes two agreeing messages suggesting decision —1 should 
be implemented. She follows the advice of sender i with probability and that of
sender —i with probability With probability the true state is zero, the status
— quo. Then, the honest sender reports the truth, and the decision maker observes two 
conflicting messages, with sender i reporting the true state is —1 and sender —i reporting 
the true state is zero. As proved above, in this case, the decision maker learns the true 
state is zero, because only an honest sender has an interest in reporting the state is zero in 
the last period, so she sets =  0 and =  1, and this leads to an expected loss
for the left biased sender, as decision 0 is implemented. Finally, with probability |  the 
true state is 1, the honest sender reports the truth, the decision maker is faced with two 
conflicting messages, the first reporting —1, the other reporting 1. In this case the decision 
maker learns nothing about the true realization of the state and she implements decision
— 1 as suggested by sender i with probabihty and decision 1 as suggested by sender
—i with probability The former leads to an expected gain of SE{B), the latter
to an expected loss of 5E{B). With probability sender —i is right biased and the 
decision maker observes conflicting messages —1 from sender i and 1 from sender —i, no 
matter the state, and implements those actions with probability respectively and
The former leads to an expected gain of 0E{B), the latter to an expected loss of 
0E{B). Finally, with probability ^^-^(I—g l j  sender —i is left biased and lied in the first 
period. In such a case, sender i is left exerting full influence on the decision maker in the 
second period, and induces her to implement decision —1, leading to an expected payoff 
of SE{B). The payoff from lying in the first period (i.e. reporting that the true state is
— 1 when instead it is 1) can be understood following the same logic.
By examining payoffs, it can be seen that the presence of a second sender generates two 
effects. There is a reduced influence effect both in the current period and in the future.
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Reduced future influence implies that now a biased sender who maintained his reputation, 
will not be able to influence the decision maker for sure in the second period. So it is less 
important to be trusted and this reduces incentives for building a reputation for being an 
honest adviser. This can be seen by noting that the expected continuation payoff from 
reporting the truth
+  ^ ^ ( 1  -  «-i)l (2-8)
is smaller than SE{B), the continuation payoff from telling the truth in the one sender 
case, as
<  1 (2.9)
Reduced current influence softens the temptation to deplete own reputation because the 
sender might not be able to influence first period decision either, as the decision maker fol­
lows the advice of sender i with probability < 1. In other words, reduced current
influence decreases the opportunity cost of keeping own reputation. Therefore reduced 
future influence and reduced current influence determine opposite effects on truthteUing 
incentives.
Finally, competition has a lost reputation effect when senders messages are credible: if a 
biased sender lets competitors gain influence, he expects decisions against his preferences 
more than half of the times. However, if the decision maker makes an uninformed decision,
that may go against the preferences of the sender. This is represented by the expected
continuation payoff from lying:
(2.10)
which represents the cost of a lost reputation^®. The balance between the reduced influ­
ence (current and future), and the lost reputation effect determines whether competition 
increases or reduces truthtelling incentives.
Notice that the “sign” of this effect depends upon assumptions about the “status quo” decision. In 
this model the “status quo” is bad for a biased sender, but under different hypotheses it could be that 
depleting own reputation does not lead to a very unfavourable decision when the decision maker goes for 
the status quo, while with multiple sender, there will be some chances another sender with the same bias 
is able to influence future decisions away from the status quo.
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It is now important to discuss the behaviour of the decision maker in order to derive 
the equihbrium. It was proved above that when the decision maker observes a message 
suggesting decision zero should be implemented and another message suggesting decisions 
—1 or 1, she knows the true state is zero, as no biased sender prefers decision zero. 
However, when the decision maker observes a message suggesting action —1 and a message 
suggesting action 1, she cannot extract any information about the true state of the world. 
The following lemma shows the equilibrium behaviour of the decision maker in such a 
case
Lem m a 2.5 In equilibrium the decision maker always randomizes between messages when 
she observes conflicting messages —1 and 1 from senders with the same reputation.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
The next lemma shows that there cannot exist equilibria where the decision maker always 
takes an action or always implements the message of a given person in case of disagreement
L em m a 2.6 There cannot exist equilibria when the decision maker always follows the 
advice of a given sender.
P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
This is true as long as the decision maker cannot credibly commit to implement the advice 
of a given sender.
It is now possible to derive the equilibria. In a pure strategy equilibrium, by definition, 
qj^ =  =  1. Also, as proved by Lemma 5 and 6, _  i
TTij, m -i =  —1,1. Consider now mixed strategy equilibria. When the sender is left biased, 
he is willing to randomize if the true state in the first period is 1, otherwise when the true 
state is zero, or —1 there is truthtelling in pure strategies. Then has to be such that 
Vf =  Vf, and to ease notation, drop the dependence of q on the observed state. Then,
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by rearranging equations 2,5 and 2.6, it follows that
S E { B ) { ^ ^  +  ^ -  (2.11)
Plugging the equilibrium values of ;
2 m B ) i l - î p ) - B ]
S E ( B ) ( \ - p )  ( ^
the equihbrium is clearly symmetric and therefore =  q. In order for this to be
an equilibrium, two additional conditions have to be met. Firstly, q has to be a well 
defiried probability, hence 0 < g < 1, secondly p2 >  %, i.e., second period reputation must
P 1be high enough for senders to exert influence. This implies ------%-— r---- r-— r— > - ,  or
p + i l ^  +  i l ^ g  3 ’
q < ^ — - ,  which requires p >  ^ as g > 0. The following proposition summarizes these 
results.
P rop osition  2.2 When the true state is different from the status quo, the two senders 
game has both pure and mixed strategy equilibria. The pure strategy equilibrium with 
truthtelling exists as long as the realization of first period importance is not too high. 
The mixed strategy equilibrium is unique and symmetric and it exists for intermediate 
realizations of first period importance.
P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
The proof of the proposition shows that the pure strategy equihbrium occurs if and only 
if
B < SE{B){^  -  ^) =  BÎ  (2.13)
and p >  5 • The mixed strategy equihbrium occurs when
m ax{3£(B )(i -  | ) ; 3 S ( B ) ( ^ : ^ ) }  < B <  SE{B){1 -  jp) = BJ*”  (2.14)
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and p >  Biased senders report truthfully (when the true state is neither zero, nor their 
preferred state) with probability
2 [ 5 E { B ) { 1 - I p ) - B ]
i £ ( B ) ( l - p )  ( )
The intuition is analogous to that of the one sender game: if period importance is low 
enough, it pays to give up current period payoffs to retain influence on future decisions.
If period importance is larger, it is optimal to report information truthfully only at times. 
Finally, if period importance is very high, it is optimal to influence the decision maker in 
the current period as the stakes are high and it is unlikely that future decisions will be 
even more important.
The discussion so far makes it possible to investigate whether competition fosters truthtelling 
incentives. The following proposition summarizes one of the main results of the chapter.
P rop osition  2.3 If the true state is the status quo, competition raises truthtelling incen­
tives. On the contrary, when the true state is different from the status quo, competition 
reduces truthtelling incentives.
P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
If the true state is the status quo, competition has a beneficial effects as aggregating 
information ensures the decision maker learns about the true state of the world. If instead 
the true state of the world is not the status quo, the proposition shows that when there 
is truthtelling in pure strategies under competition there always is truthtelling in pure 
strategies with one sender only, and there are levels of period importance such that there 
is no truthtelling under competition (not even in mixed strategies) and truthtelling in pure 
strategies with one sender. Therefore, competition for influence can reduce the incentives 
of biased senders to report the truth. Truthtelling incentives are greatest if a sender is 
certain that his effort to gain influence on future decisions will not be jeopardized by the 
analogous effort of another player. However the fear the other sender gains influence on 
future decisions and turns these against own preferences generates incentives to preserve 
credibility to influence future decisions. Moreover, the presence of a second sender reduces 
the value of a current deviation and this softens the temptation of giving up reputation 
to enjoy current payoff. The balance among these effects determines whether competition 
raises truthtelling incentives. A key factor is the hkehhood the other sender is honest. If 
that is high, then it does not pay very much to retain influence on future decisions as the 
honest sender will surely influence the future decision if the true state is the status quo.
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2.4 D elegating authority
Previous discussion made clear how the interplay of two forces (reduced current and future 
influence, and lost reputation effect) shapes truthtelling incentives when the decision 
maker cannot commit to follow the advice of a specific sender. This section investigates 
whether organisational design can be used to improve matters for the decision maker. 
In particular, delegating decision making powers to a sender could be a way to soften 
the reduced future influence. In order to achieve this, the decision maker needs to be 
able to commit to implement the decision proposed by one sender. A way to reach a 
credible commitment is to delegate authority to make decisions. Decision making powers 
can be awarded to a sender until he maintains his reputation. When the latter is depleted 
the agent is flred and another agent gets the authority to decide in the second period. 
Intuitively this might be beneficial because it eliminates the reduced future influence 
effect and raises incentives for having a reputation in the future. On the other hand, 
however, this policy increases the gains from a deviation in the current period. For ease 
of exposition the sender who is delegated decision powers will be called “the influential 
sender”. A strategy of full delegation imphes that v\  =  l,  under the assumption
that p* =  =  p >  so that player i denotes the influential sender. If he does not
lie in the flrst period, =  I, =  0, and the opposite otherwise. Notice that in this 
situation the strategy of the decision maker is not contingent on the observed messages as 
the decision of the influential sender can not be overturned: the decision maker credibly 
committed to delegate decision making powers to that sender. If the decision maker 
could overturn the influential sender decision, the equilibrium would be the same as in 
the communication case.
An important aspect to stress is what the set of available contracts is. The only as­
sumptions needed are that the decision maker cannot overturn the decision chosen by 
the influential sender after observing the reports and that senders cannot be fined for a 
wrong report. Then contracts can be made contingent on different variables. Firstly, a 
contract could just state that decisions in the flrst period are made by sender i. Then 
after a good report in the flrst period, the decision maker is indifferent between letting 
sender i influence second period decision or remove him. Alternatively, contracts can be 
contingent on the importance of the decision. Then delegation could be implemented by 
stating that an agent will be delegated powers (in both the current and the future period) 
as a function of current period importance: this will take care of equilibrium behaviour of 
biased senders. Finally, a contract could state that a sender can fully influence decisions
^^The decision maker could prefer to commit to follow the advice of a sender in the first period with 
a probability v\  <  \  ^ promoting him to full delegation in the second period, if first period outcome was 
good. This possibility is discussed in the next section.
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and if he is fired after the first decision, the principal (the decision maker) has to pay 
penalties for breaching the contract. This is self enforcing because the sender would prefer 
to fire the agent and pay the fine only when the first decision was wrong^^. This is very 
similar to a severance payment system.
I am assuming the decision maker can fully commit not to renegotiate the contract offered. 
However, it is interesting to examine whether such contracts are renegotiation proof. The 
influential sender would need a payment of 2B to accept a contract that overturns the 
decision, so the benefit for the decision maker has to be larger than this quantity. More­
over, the possibility of renegotiation would reduce incentives for a biased non influential 
sender to report information truthfully: in fact when reports do not coincide, the biased 
non influential sender might induce the decision maker to overturn the influential sender 
decision. Hence, the decision maker will have to pay 2B  and will implement the correct 
decision only with probabihty p-\- This might not be in the interest of the
decision maker and will not be the case if period importance for her is perfectly correlated 
to that for senders^^.
It will now be established whether setting up an organization and delegating decision 
powers leads to stronger truthteUing incentives than communication does. Suppose the 
sender is left biased (the right biased case is analogous). If the true state is —1, he will 
report the truth. When the true state is either zero, or 1, a left biased sender i reports 
the truth when delegated authority if and only if:
V i =  - B  +  SE{B) > V l  =  B  +  6 E ( B ) [ ^  +  4 “  2 ~  4 “
The first term represents the expected payoff from reporting the truth: the biased sender 
implements the action preferred by the decision maker (and thus gets a payoff of —B)  
in the first period, and is able to fully influence the decision in the second period when 
he implements his preferred action yielding 0E{B).  If he lies he gets the current period 
payoff B.  In the second period he is fired and the other sender is delegated authority. 
This agent tells the truth if he is honest (this occurs with probability p ) , and implements 
an action which accords with sender i preferences if next period state is —1, which occurs 
with probability | , and implements an action against gender i preferences when the state 
is either zero or 1 (these states occur respectively with probability  ^ and | ) .  The other 
sender is left biased with probability and implements action —1, while he is right 
biased with probability and implements action 1. Therefore a left biased sender teUs
Provided, of course, the fine is not too large. 
^ I^n this case A — B.
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the truth (in the first period, if the true state is 1) under delegation as long as
(2.17)
Notice that mixed strategy equilibria here exists only for a set of parameters whose joint 
occurrence is a measure zero event. This follows because the sender who is not dele­
gated authority reports the truth with probability one in the first period. The following 
proposition shows in what circumstances delegation is optimal.
P rop osition  2.4 When the true state is different from the status quo, delegating deci­
sion powers to one sender induces stronger truthtelling than letting senders compete for 
influence.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
The proof shows that there are values of period importance such that there is truthtelling 
in pure strategies under delegation, while under communication with two senders there 
is truthtelhng in mixed strategies only. Furthermore, if the probability the opponent is 
honest is large enough {p >  5), there is truthtelling under delegation, while there is not 
even truthtelhng in mixed strategies under communication with two senders '^ ,^ Delegating 
decision powers to an agent amounts to let the agent influence the decision both in the first 
and in the second period if he does not jeopardise his reputation. Thus, delegation protects 
influence. On the other hand, if the influential sender destroys his reputation, he will not 
have any chance to influence the decision maker in the future and newcomers will have full 
decision powers. In every equilibrium with information transmission both senders must 
have a large enough prior reputation. Thus each sender thinks the opponent is relatively 
more likely to be honest. Therefore the fear that future decisions will be influenced by an 
agent with opposed interests raises truthtelling incentives of the influential sender.
Hence, the relative benefits and costs of delegation as opposed to communication, are to 
be identified along two dimensions. First, delegation protects influence. The dark side 
of delegation is obvious: the influential sender has unfettered ability to implement his 
preferred action in the current period. Moreover, under competition, the decision maker 
implements the correct action for sure, whenever the true state requires the unbiased 
action to be chosen.
'^*When instead, p <  \ ,  there are values of period importance such that < B,2
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2.5 Favouritism
Thus far, the analysis showed that a pohcy of full delegation has the drawback that the 
influential sender has unfettered ability to cash in the full value of a false report in the 
current period. A way to Overcome this problem is to conunit to follow the advice of sender 
i with a given probability u\ < 1 in the flrst period, and to commit to delegate decision 
making to one of the senders in the last period, so as to preserve future influence. This 
can be regarded as a form of favouritism, as the decision maker biases the competition for 
influence in favour of one of the senders. This helps to reduce the temptation to deviate 
in the flrst period, with respect to the case of full delegation. Then, assume, without loss 
of generality, that sender i is delegated decision powers in the second period, provided he 
reports information truthfully in the flrst period. Call sender i the “influential sender”. 
The policy consists in offering the influential sender the following contract: the decision he 
proposes is implemented with probability \  < v \ < \ i n  the first period. The probability 
u\ can be regarded as the degree of favouritism and as u\ is close to one, the degree 
of favouritism is said to be “strong”. If the report turns out to be correct, the sender 
gets full decision powers in the second period. Formally i/j =  1 if ~  ^
otherwise^^. It is assumed the decision maker commits to follow the advice of each sender 
with probabihty u\ and =  \  — v\ ,  and that the probability senders are honest is large 
enough so as to ensure information transmission occurs in equilibrium. Under favouritism 
players can behave asymmetrically: in fact, when the influential sender finds it optimal 
to report information truthfully, a biased non influential sender prefers to he in the flrst 
period as he will not have any chance to influence second period decision. On the other 
hand, he might tell the truth, when the influential sender is lying, provided that current 
period importance is not too large.
I assume sender i is left biased. When the true state is —1 he triviaUy reports the truth. 
When the true state is not —1, it is important to distinguish the case when the true state 
is the status quo, from that when the true state is 1. In fact, in the latter case, a right 
biased opponent surely reports the truth, while, if the true state is the status quo, a right 
biased sender might prefer to lie. Therefore, the payoff of a left biased influential sender
Essentially, I am assuming that the decision maker has access to a commitment technology that does 
not allow to condition the decision about who influences the decision in the first period on the messages 
received. Another possibihty is that the decision maker, in the first period, does not rely on favouritism 
when she observes confiicting messages and one of these messages suggests the status quo. This would 
change very httle in the results, and would just increase the desirabihty of favouritism.
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is given by:
Vÿ(0) =  - i > \ B {1 -  i>\)[-----------  ^ { l - z ) - p --------------4-
^ i l - q ) ] B  +  SE{B)  (2.18)
ViiO) = +u\B  +  ( l - , ^ \ ) [ - ^ z - ^ i l - z ) - p - ^ q  +  ^ ( l - q ) ] ] B  +  
S E { B ) [ ^ ^ q  +  1 - 1 - 1 -  (2.19)
when the true state is the status quo, and by
Vÿ(l) =  —i>\B +  (1 — i'i)[-----— p  "I 0 ^ (1  “  +  5E{B)  (2.20)
^ l(I )  — + u \B  +  {1 -  v\)[-----^ ~ P  ^ 9  -I-----
+ 0 E { B ) [ ^ ^ q  +  (2.21)
when the true state is 1. When the true state is the status quo, the right biased sender 
reports the truth with probability z, and reports his preferred state otherwise. Therefore, 
he retains his credibility with probability z. On the contrary, when the true state is 1, 
a right biased sender always reports the truth and retains his credibility. The first term 
of equation 2.18 is current period payoff when reporting the truth. The decision of the 
influential sender is implemented with probability u\ leading to a payoff of —B, while the 
decision of the non influential sender is implemented with probability 1 — i/\. The non 
influential sender can be right biased and reports the truth (this occurs with probabil­
ity ^ ^ z), or right biased and reports the true state is 1 (this occurs with probability 
^-^(1 — z)) and in both cases the left biased influential sender suffers a loss of —B. The 
non influential sender could be honest, reporting the true state is zero (this occurs with 
probability p ) , or left biased reporting the true state is zero (this occurs with probability 
and in both cases the left biased influential sender suffers a loss of —B. Finally, 
the non influential sender could be left biased and lies reporting state —1, this occurs 
with probability ^^(1  — q), and leads to a gain of B. In the second period the influential 
sender exerts full influence on the decision and expected payoff is SE{B).  Equation 2.19 
is similar, although now the left biased influential sender lied. Then, if the decision he 
suggests is implemented in the flrst period the payoff is B,  this occurs with probability 
but he will have no opportunity to influence second period decision. The latter 
will instead be influenced by the non influential sender, unless he lied in the flrst period.
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Therefore, with probability the non influential sender is left biased and reported 
the truth in the first period, so that he will induce the decision maker to choose action 
— 1 in the second period, leading to an expected payoff of 6E{B).  With probability p 
the non influential sender is honest, and with probability |  the true state is —1, so that 
expected payoff is SE{B),  while with probability 5 +  5 the true state is either the status 
quo, or state 1, and the honest sender induces the decision maker to implement the true 
state leading to a loss of 5E{B)  for the left biased influential sender. Finally, the non 
influential sender could be right biased and reported the truth in the flrst period. Then 
he will induce the decision maker to implement action 1 in the second period, leading to 
an expected loss of SE{B)  for the left biased sender. The intuition underlying equations 
2.20 and 2.21 is analogous, with the difference that a right biased influential sender would 
report the truth for sure in the first period (thus z =  \) and will retain credibility to 
influence second period decision.
A biased non influential sender always lies in a truthtelhng equilibrium, as he will not 
have any chance to influence future decisions, unless the true state coincides with his 
preferences. Thus, when the true state is the status quo, biased non influential senders lie 
(and q =  z =  Qi) and a left biased influential sender reports the truth in the first period if 
and only if
B  <  a i + f )  (2.22)
4:V\
When the true state is 1 and the influential sender reports the truth, a right biased non 
influential sender report the truth (so that z =  1), while a left biased non influential 
sender lies (so that q =  0) and a left biased influential sender reports the truth if and 
only if
a  <  (2.23)
If the influential sender lies, a biased non influential sender might prefer to report the 
truth. Again it is important to distinguish the case when the true state is the status quo 
from the case when the true state is 1. In the former situation, both a left and a right 
biased non influential senders behave analogously. Payoffs for such senders are given by
V f \0 )  =  - y i B p - ( l - i ^ i ) B  +  â E ( B ) ( l - p ) + p ^ ^ ^  (2.24)
V£-’(0) =  - i / i B p + ( l - ( . i ) B - | i £ ( B )  (2.25)
The continuation payoff follows because with probability =  (1 — p) the
influential sender is either left, or right biased, and lies in the first period, so that the non 
influential sender can influence second period decision. On the contrary, with probability 
p, the influential sender is honest, reports the truth in the first period and influences
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second period decision leading to an expected payoff of — — The payoff from lying 
can be understood analogously. Therefore, biased non influential senders are willing to 
report the truth if and only if
If the true state is 1 a right biased sender always reports the truth, while a left biased 
sender has the following payoff functions:
V ( l )  =  - u \ B p - i l - i y \ ) B  +  ^ S E { B ) - p ^ - ^ - ^ S E { B )  (2.27)
=  —v\B p  +  (1 — v \)B  — p — ^ ------^ 6 E ( B )  (2.28)
and he is willing to report the truth if and only if
It is now possible to show the following
P rop osition  2.5 Depending upon the degree of favouritism there can exists two equilib­
ria.
P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
The proposition shows that there can exist two possible equilibria. One in which a biased 
non influential sender always lies when the true state does not coincide with his prefer­
ences, and another in which there are values of period importance such that a biased 
non influential sender is willing to report the truth while a biased influential sender lies. 
Their existence depends upon whether the threshold for period importance that ensures 
a biased non influential sender reports the truth is larger or smaller than the threshold 
ensuring a biased influential sender reports the truth. In fact, if the latter is larger than 
the former, there does not exist values of period importance such that a biased influential 
sender lies while a biased non influential sender is willing to report the truth. Then, in 
equilibrium biased non influential senders always lie. In the opposite case, it is possible 
that biased non influential senders report the truth for values of period importance such 
that the influential sender lies, as biased non influential senders, with a conflict of in­
terest with the decision m a k e r a r e  wilhng to report the truth only if they have some
^®This refers to left biased senders when the true state is either the status quo, or state 1, and right 
biased sender when the true state is the status quo. Right biased non influential senders always report 
the truth when the true state is 1, independently on the strategy of the influential sender.
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chances to influence second period decision and this may occur if the realization of period 
importance is such that a biased influential sender is willing to lie in the flrst period.
The results of this section are summarised in the following
P rop osition  2.6 Favouritism induces stronger truthtelling incentives for the influential 
sender than delegation. It induces stronger truthtelling incentives than communication 
when the true state is different from the status quo. When favouritism is strong, a biased 
non influential sender chooses to report the truth for intermediate realizations of period 
importance.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
Favouritism allows the decision maker to provide the influential sender with stronger 
truthtelhng incentives. On the other hand, the non influential sender might lie, and 
a wrong decision suggested by the non influential sender is implemented with positive 
probabihty. When the degree of favouritism is very strong^ a biased non influential 
sender reports the truth for period importance reahzations that ensure a biased influential 
sender lies, and that are not extremely large. Therefore, favouritism leads to stronger 
truthtelhng incentives than pure delegation and communication when the true state is 
different from the status quo.
2.6 D ecision  M aker Payoff
Previous discussion made clear how competition for influence shapes truthtelhng incen­
tives. This section investigates the conditions ensuring the decision maker prefers com­
munication rather than delegation^®. This choice depends upon four factors. The first is 
truthtelhng incentives, the second is the distribution of period importance for the decision 
maker, the third is the distribution of period importance for senders, the fourth is the 
distribution of the states of the world. It should be noticed that the assumed distribution 
of states of the world is “biased” towards making communication more beneficial than 
delegation. This follows because it was assumed that the status quo is the most hkely 
state of the world and it was shown that under communication there is always truthtelhng, 
in the flrst period, when the true state is the status quo. Assuming a different prior dis­
tribution of states of the world would not alter the results about truthtelhng incentives.
^^The degree of favouritism is a choice variable of the decision maker who will set so as to maximize 
her expected payoff.
18 The comparison with favouritism is similar, it just involves more tedious algebra.
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at least as long as states —1 and 1 have the same probability of occurrence, but would 
make communication less desirable.
In order to establish whether decision maker payoff is larger under delegation or un­
der communication it is crucial to distinguish two cases: in the first the decision maker 
chooses whether to delegate decision powers to one sender or to rely upon communication, 
after observing first period importance (both for himself and for the senders), but before 
senders propose a decision; in the second, decision maker chooses communication or dele­
gation before observing the realization of first period importance. The main intuition can 
be gained from the analysis of the first case. When the decision maker chooses organi­
zational form after observing the realization of first period importance, the optimality of 
communication as opposed to delegation depends exclusively upon truthtelhng incentives 
and the distribution of period importance for the decision maker. Then, it is possible to 
prove the following
P rop osition  2.7 Communication leads to a larger payoff for the decision maker if period 
importance for senders is low. When period importance is intermediate, delegation can he 
preferred to communication. When period importance for senders is very high, delegation 
can be preferred to communication only if period importance for the decision maker and 
for senders features strong negative correlation.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
The first part of the result refers to the case when there is truthtelling in pure strategies 
both under delegation and under communication. In general (unless period importance for 
senders and for the decision maker have a very large negative correlation), communication 
is preferred to delegation for low and high values of period importance^^. In other terms, 
when there is truthtelling both under communication and under delegation or when there 
is no truthtelhng either under communication, or under delegation, the former is preferred. 
The main reason is that communication ahows to fully exploit the presence of a non biased 
action and the confiict of interest between senders with opposed bias. On the contrary, 
when period importance is intermediate, delegation can be preferred to communication 
thanks to the stronger truthtelhng incentives it induces.
This analysis underlines that truthtelhng incentives can be interpreted as incentives for 
biased senders to pool with honest senders. Delegation can increase such incentives, 
thus delaying learning about senders’ type. Notice that if the decision maker attaches
fact, when B  >  S'*®* =  SE {B )^^  and corr{A,B) >  0, the condition A < SE(A) i s  very 
difficult to meet.
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the same importance to decisions as senders do, truthtelling occurs for decisions that 
the decision maker does not regard as especially important. As truthtelhng incentives 
represent conditions under which biased types pool with honest, the decision maker learns 
senders types when it is more costly for him to do so. To see this, notice that truthtelhng 
incentives under delegation and communication imply that there is never truthtelhng for 
values of period importance B >  6E{B)  max{(^ +  |) ;  (1 — |p )} , and max{(^ 4- |) ;  (1 — 
|p )}  < 1, so that if biased senders pool there is a benefit today of implementing a decision 
yielding B <  0E{B),  but there are greater chances of making a wrong decision in the 
second period, when expected importance is 6E{B).  Essentially, the decision maker cannot 
hedge against agency conflicts, so that when her period importance is very positively 
correlated with that for senders she prefers to learn as quickly as possible about senders’ 
types. In such a case truthtelhng incentives might be bad as they reduce learning about 
a sender’s type.
A further effect arises when the decision maker has to choose between relying upon com­
munication or upon delegation before knowing the reahzation of flrst period importance: 
now, the distribution of flrst period importance for senders plays a role. Intuitively, the 
distribution of period importance for senders attributes different weights into the deci­
sion maker payoff to the four regions for period importance reahzations identified above. 
In order to provide further results it is necessary to make specific assumptions on the 
distribution of period importance for the decision maker and that for senders.
These results show that the optimality of delegation as opposed to communication essen­
tially depends upon the importance of the decision for senders.
2.7  P rom oting a junior
Previous discussion showed that the decision maker can raise truthtelhng incentives by 
delegating decision powers to a sender elected as “more influential”. Delegation is benefi­
cial because it protects influence while maintaining the lost reputation effect. The latter 
is larger, the more the influential sender fears the opponent is honest. It is thus inter­
esting to extend the model and analyze a situation in which one sender has already an 
established reputation (the senior), while the other is promising, but has still to prove 
his qualities (the junior). This is modelled by assuming that one sender has a larger prior 
probabihty of being honest, although both have enough reputation to ensure truthteUing 
occurs in equihbrium. Suppose, without loss of generality, that player s (the senior) is 
more hkely to be honest ex ante. Thus the lost reputation effect will be stronger if player 
j  (the junior) is chosen as the influential sender. The decision maker faces an interesting
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trade off: on the one hand, delegating power to the player with the more established 
reputation yields a larger probability to get truthful reporting in both periods because it 
is more likely that he is honest; on the other hand, a biased sender has stronger incentives 
to report the truth, the higher the reputation of the opponent. This is reminiscent of the 
result in the reputation literature that once a player’s reputation is more established its 
incentivizing role fades out. However, in this model, the intuition is very different as it is 
rather the reputation of the opponent that acts as an incentive mechanism. This can be 
verified by inspecting the condition for truthtelling for biased senders, under delegation. 
This is
B  <  +  V )  ^  B'  ( 2 . 3 0 )
If the senior is delegated powers, =  pj, while if the junior is delegated decision powers, 
P-i =  ps and it is clear that if ps > pj, player j  has stronger incentives to report the truth 
in the first period than player s. The choice between a junior and a senior trades off 
a larger chance that a biased infiuential sender reports the truth in the first period, 
against a lower chance that the infiuential sender is honest. The results for the case when 
the decision maker delegates power to either sender after observing period importance 
is along the fines of the analysis conducted in the previous section. Therefore, I will 
explicitly discuss the case when the decision maker chooses the infiuential sender before 
knowing the realization of period importance. By delegating powers to the senior, she 
gets an expected utility of
W, = p,[E(A) +6B(A)] + (1 -p J {[P r(g  < g ')|E (A  | B
P r ( B  >  ( 2 . 3 1 )
The first term represents the case in which a biased sender reports truthfully in the first 
period because the realized first period importance is low enough to sustain truthtelling, 
while the second represents the opposite case. Following a wrong report in the first period, 
sender 2 becomes infiuential in the second period. The expression for the case in which 
the junior is chosen as the infiuential sender is analogous and given by
w ,  =  Pi[E{A) +  SE(A)\ +  ( 1  - p , . ) { [ P r ( B  <  B^)[E{A | B
P r ( B  >  ^ ^ ' \ 5 E ( A ) p , - { l  ( 2 . 3 2 )
The decision maker is better off by delegating power to sender j  if Wj > Wg and this can 
occur in equilibrium depending upon the distribution of the decision maker’s payoff, so 
that
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P rop osition  2.8 Delegating decision powers to a junior can be an optimal policy if the 
decision maker is interested in ensuring that early decisions are made correctly.
This analysis predicts that organisations can decide to transfer powers from a senior to a 
junior as a function of the relative importance of period decisions, A junior has stronger 
incentives to behave in first period because he has more to loose by misbehaving in early 
periods. In fact in such a case, if the senior is appointed in the second period, it is very 
hkely he will distort decision making against the preferences of a biased junior.
2.8 C om petition  am ong m any senders
All results so far rest on the assumption that the decision maker does not interact with 
more than two senders. This implies that each sender can be pivotal for the decision 
at least if the true state is different from the status quo. On the contrary, if there are 
at least three senders, all with the same reputation, there will trivially be truthtelhng 
under communication, if, as assumed in the model so far, the decision maker cannot 
adjust the intensity of the action as a function of the breadth of the “consensus”, or as 
a function of the probability the message is correct. Notice that this would be true even 
in a static game. In that case, there would not be any truthtelhng equihbrium with two 
senders, while there could be a truthtelhng equihbrium when at least three senders report 
information. To see what happens if more than two senders report information and the 
decision maker can adjust the intensity of the decision, suppose there are 3 senders and 
focus attention on the last period^®. In a truthtelhng equihbrium all senders report the 
same state. If the decision maker observes two senders reporting state —1 and one sender 
reporting state 1, she knows at least one sender is lying. She must attach probability
that state —1 is correct, because conflicting messages can arise 
if two senders are honest and one left biased (this occurs with probability 3p^^^), one 
sender is honest, one left biased, one right biased (this occurs with probability 6p(^^)^), 
two senders are left biased and one sender is right biased (this occurs with probability 
3(^^)^). On the contrary, state 1 is the true state with probabihty 3p(^^)^ +  3(^^)^  
because it must be that there are two left biased senders and either one honest or one 
right biased sender. Then decision —1 is correct with probabihty
3 p 2 1 ^  +  6 p ( i ? ) 2  +  3 ( l ? f  ^2,33)
+  6 p ( i? ) 2  +  )3 +  3 p ( i ÿ ) 2  +  3 (i= £ )3
^°This just simplifies the exposition as it is clear that right biased senders would always report the true 
state is 1, and left biased senders that the true state is —1. The analysis of the first period would be 
essentially the same, with the difference that right biased senders might be willing to report information 
truthfully.
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where the denominator represents the probability of observing two messages suggesting 
the true state is —1 and one message suggesting the true state is 1, If the decision maker 
observed 3 agreeing messages suggesting the true state is —1, it could be that all senders 
are honest, or that two senders are honest and one left biased and the true state is —1, 
one sender is honest, two left biased, and the true state is —1, that all senders are left 
biased. The total probability of this is +  3p^^^ 4- 4- \  The message
can be wrong only if all senders are left biased and the true state is not —1, this event has 
probability Then, action —1 is correct, when observing three agreeing messages
with probability
p 3  +  3 p 2 1 y + 6 p ( l y ) 2 + l ( l ^ ) 3
(2,34)
+  6p( +  | ( V ) "
Thus, decision —1 is more hkely to be correct when the decision maker observes three 
agreeing messages, than when she observes two messages suggesting it, and one message 
suggesting action 1 instead. In any equilibrium with information transmission the decision 
maker would take the action suggested by the majority. However, if she can adjust the 
intensity of the action she will be more wilhng to take an action closer to the true state, 
the larger is the majority. Then, it is reasonable to think that the decision maker will 
be willing to put more resources on decision —1 in the first case, than in the second. 
This is true even if senders observe perfectly the state of the world and there is no direct 
information aggregation effect about the true state of the world. In fact, observing more 
senders reporting the same message provides information about the type of senders, as in 
equilibria with information transmission it must be relatively more likely that each sender 
is reporting information truthfully. In order to investigate the effects of competition 
for influence when an arbitrary, but finite number of senders report information to the 
decision maker, I assume the decision maker can adjust the intensity of the decision as a 
function of the breadth of the consensus among senders. In particular, assuming there are 
n senders, the decision maker adjusts the intensity of the action so that the payoff will be 
A” and in case of maximum consensus, and A 2 5  a i f  there are f  4-1 concordant 
messages and therefore a majority of one or two messages, depending upon whether n is 
odd or even. As in the two senders model, there will not be equilibria where, in case of 
disagreement, the decision maker always implements the suggestion of a given sender. If 
there is no consensus, but at least one of the conflicting messages suggests the status quo, 
then the latter is implemented, while if there are conflicting messages suggesting actions 
—1 and 1 and there is no majority, the decision maker prefers to randomize. Consider the 
case of a left biased sender observing the true state is 1. Suppose also that there are n 4-1 
senders, with n even^ .^ I denote with I the number of left biased senders, with r  that 
of right biased and with h that of honest senders. Then in a pure strategies truthtelhng
The case n odd is essentially analogous.
Chapter 2. Competing Inûuence 51
equilibrium, payoffs under communication from reporting the truth and lying are given 
by
Vt  =  - 5 ”+^+
i l E E
r= 0 /= 0   ^ ^
E  E  nrMn
r=^+l /=0 ’
and
+ 1 (5 :
r=0 \  /  r = 2 + l  ^ /
Z=g r=0 '' ''
E  E  ;iH(n -  r .11)!^ "'*'^ ^^
VL =  -B " +
i i E E  ,w r .4 "  Z!r!(n -  r — l)\ 2r=o z=o ' '
Ê  E  ,H(„
r=2+l 1=0  ^ ’
+ \ { p  Q p ' ' i ^ r - ' ^ ( - ^ E i B f ) +
( ^ ) " [ E  -  Ê2 ^  v j  ''’•
n n—Z
4 ,  - 0 1
E  E  ;w(« (2-36)
Chapter 2. Competing Influence 52
The expressions follow by the same reasoning as in the two senders case and by noting 
that senders are “drawn” from a trinomial distribution, with parameters n, p, If the 
sender reports the truth in a truthtelhng equilibrium, current period payoff is as
all n +  1 senders are reporting the same message. Then in the second period the true 
state is —1 with probability There will be a majority of messages suggesting state —1 
as long as there are no more than ^ right biased senders. This is captured by the term
È E  (2.37)
With probability  ^ the true state is 0. If there is at least an honest sender, he reports 
the truth and the decision maker knows the true state is 0 and sets the intensity to 
the maximum, which I denote . If there is no honest sender, the decision depends 
upon whether the majority is left or right biased. The former case occurs with proba-
bihty and the expected payoff is given by (^){SE{B'^ ^), be-
r=0 r=0
cause there is a majority of left biased senders and decision —1 is implemented. The
n
latter case occurs with probability (”), and the expected payoff is given
r = f + l
n
by — ^ 2  Ç )^{SE{B' )^] because there is a majority of right biased senders and deci- 
r=f+ l
sion 1 is implemented. Then, with probability |  the true state is 1. With probability 
Z ]l= |+ i Ylr=o there is a majority of left biased senders who
induce the decision maker to choose action —1, with intensity SE{B^^^), while with prob­
ability J2r=o there is a majority either of unbiased, or of
right biased senders, and decision 1 is implemented with intensity 6E{B'^~^). The payoff 
from lying can be understood analogously. It should be noticed that when sender i lies, 
the total number of credible senders in the second period is n. Then, if the true state 
of the world in the second period is —1, (this occurs with probability | ) ,  decision —1 is 
implemented when there is a majority of either left biased or of unbiased senders, and 
this occurs with probability ) ^ +r can be seen that
when there are |  left biased or unbiased senders, and  ^ right biased senders, the deci­
sion maker observes exactly the same number of conflicting messages and she randomizes, 
while, if the (n +  1)*^  sender reported the truth in the first period, he could be pivotal 
and create a majority of messages suggesting decision —1. The other terms can now be 
easily understood, and I omit a detailed explanation.
The main effects of competition highlighted in the two senders version of the model are 
still at work. There is a reduced future influence effect, as the sender does not know
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whether he will be able to influence next period decision. In fact, there can be a majority 
of right biased senders, or the true state can be different from —1 and there can be a 
majority of honest senders. On the other hand there is a lost reputation effect, as next 
period decision could be influenced by right biased senders, or the true state might be 
different from —1 and there can be a majority of honest senders. Both effects are further 
affected by the adjustment in action intensity: if the sender maintains his reputation, he 
can affect next period decision by changing the breadth of the majority: if all senders are 
left biased, the intensity will be if there is one right biased, the intensity will be
B ”, etc. Similarly, the reduced current influence effect depends now upon the ability of 
the sender to affect the intensity of the decision. There is truthtelhng in pure strategies 
if and only i i V r > V L  which can be rewritten as
E  ,!H(„ +
T Z
1=0  ^ '
n_l
2 '  2 '
n n—l
'•=0 ^
> - B ^  ' < (2.38)
Now, competition induces a further “consensus” effect: if the sender lies in the current 
period, he changes the decision from to J3” . Analogously, keeping a reputation
allows to increase the intensity of the decision when this is favourable, and to decrease it 
when it is unfavourable. Thus, the choice between giving up own reputation and giving 
up current period payoff will depend upon the interplay of the reduced influence, lost 
reputation and consensus effects. The latter contributes to determine both the magnitude 
of the opportunity cost of keeping own reputation and the strength of the future benefit 
of keeping own reputation. In fact, if the difference (5^+^ — 5 ”) is very small, the sender 
will not be able to modify much the intensity of the decision in the current period. The 
benefit of keeping own reputation will depend upon the likelihood next period decision 
accords to the preferences of the sender. This crucially depends upon the probability
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distribution of types and upon the strength of the change in intensity of the action when 
the majority gets larger. The latter is represented by the differences —
6E{B^-^-^^) -  6E{B^-^), 0E{B^+^) -  6E{B^). Such consensus effect stems 
from the assumption that the decision maker can now adjust the intensity of the decision. 
This creates a new dimension to be analysed also when discussing delegation of authority: 
the decision maker might delegate decision powers, while constraining the ability to set 
decision intensity. Denoting the latter as B^ ,^ the payoff of a left biased sender who is 
delegated authority and the state is different from —1 is
Vt  =  - B ^  +  0E{B^) (2.39)
Vl =  +  +  (2.40)
This follows as it is assumed the proportion of honest, left biased and right biased is the 
same in the sample of n senders. Then, there is truthtelhng as long as
(2.41)
Whether delegation or communication leads to stronger truthtelhng incentives depends 
upon the parameters of the problem, and it is necessary to impose more structure on 
the model to get a precise threshold^^. However, it is clear that in principle either orga­
nizational form could be superior, and the main insight of the two senders model carry 
forward to the n senders case extended to the possibility that the decision maker adjusts 
the intensity of the decision. This is formalized in the following
P rop osition  2.9 All effects highlighted in the two senders case are still present if n 
senders compete for influence and the decision maker can adjusts the intensity of the 
decision.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 2 ■
2.9 D iscussion
This section discusses the role of the main assumptions, the modelling strategy, and 
applications of the model.
^^For example, it is necessary to establish the way the difference 5 ” —  ^ evolves as n  changes, as
well as how large this is in comparison with S'*.
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2 .9 .1  A ssu m p tio n s  a n d  m o d e llin g  s tr a te g y
The model captures, in a parsimonious way, the effects of introducing competition in a 
dynamic game of information transmission when the bias of senders is not known. The 
set up of the model is quite standard, and alternative ways to model the bias of senders 
(such as in Sobel 1985, or in Benabou and Laroque (1992)) would not alter the main 
results of the model. The assumption that one action is not preferred by any biased type 
is not critical, as different specifications would work, although it makes communication 
with multiple senders naturally more attractive, as biased senders would always report 
information truthfully when observing the state corresponding to the unbiased action. 
Similarly, the assumption that biased senders derive the same disutility when actions 
different from their preferred one are implemented, is not essential. Assuming left biased 
senders prefer state 0 over state 1, would slightly complicate the analysis, but would not 
alter any of the results.
An important element that deserves further discussion is the definition of competition. 
Most part of the analysis models competition as a situation where two senders are in­
teracting with the decision maker. However, situations where an arbitrary, but finite, 
number of senders provide information to the decision maker is discussed in section 8, 
where it is shown that the main forces at work are the same as in the two senders case. 
Moreover, with n senders, a further effect, which I label “consensus effect”, contributes to 
shape truthtelhng incentives. In order to provide a full treatment of the n senders case it 
would be necessary to impose more structure on preferences: however, even at a greater 
level of generality it is possible to conclude that due to the interaction of the reduced 
influence, lost reputation and consensus effects, there can be cases when delegation may 
improve upon competition, and situations when the opposite occurs.
Another assumption that deserves further discussion is that senders observe perfectly the 
state of the world. This impacts on the dynamics of reputation: once a sender makes 
a mistake his reputation is gone. If he observed the state imperfectly, a mistake could 
be attributed to him receiving a wrong message, rather than to opportunistic behaviour. 
In that case, reputation would evolve more realistically over time as, for example, in 
the paper of Benabou and Laroque. Furthermore, the assumption makes information 
aggregation useless, and shuts a potential important benefit of competition: if the state 
of the world was observed noisily, aggregating the messages of multiple senders would 
increase the precision of the information received, even if some senders reported informa­
tion strategically. This is clearly an important element, but its inclusion would complicate 
substantially the analysis preventing a clear investigation of the other effects generated 
by competition (reduced influence and lost reputation effect). Moreover, situations where
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experts observe a variable, relevant for decision making, without noise are quite common. 
Take as an example the evaluation of a report about the prospects of a firm: even if the 
report is a noisy signal of the true value of the firm, the latter might be observed very 
far in the future, and the right decisions in the short-medium term could be dependent 
upon the content of the report. This in turn can influence short or medium term payoffs, 
which could be the relevant performance measure for the decision maker.
Finally, the assumption that honest senders always report information truthfully is with 
little loss of generality. Without that assumption, there could exist babbling equilibria 
in which the decision maker discards all information transmitted and senders randomize 
among messages, as well as “partial babbhng equihbria” in which the decision maker only 
listens to one sender and discards the messages of the other who randomizes. There are 
two points to stress on this issue: firstly, aU the equilibria derived under the assumption 
that honest senders always report the truth are still equilibria when that assumption is 
removed; secondly one could still compare the communication case, in which the decision 
maker listens to all senders if they have enough reputation, with the partial babbling 
equilibrium which would coincide with the pure delegation case, and identify the different 
forces that shape truthtelhng incentives.
2 .9 .2  A p p lic a tio n s
The model lends itself to analyse situations characterized by the presence of experts who 
can provide information relevant for sound decision making and who are interested in 
influencing the decision making process. The leading application is the analysis of the 
interaction among managers competing for corporate resources. Managers (the experts) 
observe information relevant to determine what is the most appropriate decision to max­
imize firm profits, or financial ratios, or other measures of performance. Managers can 
be of two types: biased managers derive private benefits from an action which is not 
necessarily in the best interest of the firm; honest managers do not derive any private 
benefit and are thus willing to report information truthfully. For example one manager 
can be the head of domestic operations and another manager the head of overseas oper­
ations. The state of the world can be the state of the economy: if the domestic economy 
is very strong, the central management of the firm (the decision maker) should allocate 
more resources to the domestic operations department, but not if the overseas economy 
is growing strongly. If global markets are stagnating, the firm should allocate resources 
neither to domestic, nor to overseas operations. Biased managers prefer more money to 
be allocated to their department, irrespective of the state of the economy. The central 
management observes whether the information provided was correct, and evaluates the
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reliability of managers for future decisions. The central management can choose to collect 
information from managers and decide on the appropriate corporate strategy, or can dele­
gate decisions to one of the managers, say, the head of domestic operations. The results of 
the chapter show that delegation can improve the quality of the decision making process 
when the importance of the decision is neither too low, nor too high. In the latter cases, 
the central management should collect information from all managers.
Another interesting application is the analysis of the financing of a new technology on 
part of governmental bodies. Suppose one team of scientists is working to improve the 
technology to derive fuel from ethanol, while another team is working on wind energy. 
The government might be interested in allocating scarce funds to the project which is 
most likely to succeed. The government can hire different experts from the academia 
to assess the relative merits of the two and evaluate the one that deserves funds the 
most. However, some experts could be captured by agricultural lobbies supporting ethanol 
as it would boost the value of corn crops, while other experts could be captured by 
some corporations producing components for wind farms. The chapter shows the relative 
benefits of consulting multiple experts as opposed to rely only on one and shows conditions 
under which the latter can be preferable.
The results of the chapter can also be applied to the investigation of other important real 
world interactions such as pohticians competing to be elected, lobbies trying to influence 
politicians, financial analysts providing information to investors, investment banks pro­
viding advice to customers, and in general all those situations where experts can have a 
vested interest in the decision maker choosing a particular action.
2.10 Conclusion
This chapter analysed truthtelhng incentives of players competing for infiuence. Two 
conflicting forces are identified. On the one hand competition for influence determines a 
“reduced infiuence” effect both in the current and in the future period: a biased sender 
knows he is less likely to influence future decisions, so that he is less willing to sacrifice 
current payoffs to build a reputation for providing sound advice; however a biased sender 
is not able to enjoy the full value of a current deviation, thus the opportunity cost of 
maintaining a reputation is reduced. On the other hand, competition for infiuence deter­
mines a lost reputation effect: biased senders fear that if they deplete their reputation, 
other senders will infiuence future decisions. The interplay among these effects gener­
ates interesting results and offers novel insights for organisational design. The first is 
that the decision making process can be less prone to errors if only one sender reports
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information, as competition may harm decision making. Thus, the quahty of decision 
making can be improved if one sender is delegated authority to make decisions, becoming 
an “influential sender”. This happens because delegation preserves influence. The second 
result is that decision making could be further improved if the decision maker biases the 
competition for influence: this shows favouritism can arise as an optimal way to foster 
truthtelhng incentives. The third result is that delegation is optimal if the importance of 
the decision is neither very low, nor too high. Both routine and very important decisions 
should rather be assigned to a committee. Thus, this chapter provides a new theory for 
the allocation of authority and for the use of favouritism in organisations: they arise en­
dogenously as rational organizational responses to the incentives created by competition 
to influence decision making. The leading application of these results is the analysis of 
resource allocation among divisions within an organisations, but the insights of the model 
can be applied to investigate a variety of economic interactions: politicians competing to 
be elected, lobbies wilhng to influence politicians, financial analysts providing information 
to investors, investment banks providing advice to corporate chents.
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2.11 A ppendix  to  C hapter 2 - Proofs
P ro o f o f Lem m a 2.1
In the last period the sender has no reputational concerns. By reporting his preferred 
decision he can enjoy a positive payoff, while his payoff is non positive if he does not 
report his preferred decision. When he does not have enough credibility, he randomizes 
and the decision maker puts zero weight on the message provided.
P ro o f o f Lem m a 2.3
This follows from the fact that when senders have enough credibility, the expected payoff 
from following their advice is larger than that from making decisions without information. 
When this is true, as the decision maker has a linear payoff function, it is optimal to set
P ro o f o f  Lem m a 2.5
The expected payoff by randomizing is
(A2.1)
In fact, conflicting messages —1 and 1 can occur when the decision maker faces an honest 
sender and a biased sender (this occurs with probabihty or when both sender are
biased, but one is left biased and the other right biased (this occurs with probability 
2(^^)^). The decision maker might use a strategy that implements action k G { —1,0,1}  
when observing disagreeing messages —1 and 1. In such a case, suppose the true state is 
— 1 and the strategy is “implement state 1 when messages disagree” : a left biased sender 
will report the truth because he has no way to influence the decision maker. A right 
biased sender, on the contrary, can decide to ensure getting the current period payoff 
by lying. When observing conflicting messages —1 and 1, the decision maker knows the 
true state is —1 and will want to deviate from the proposed strategy. The same applies 
to strategies prescribing to choose 0 when observing messages —1 and 1. The decision 
maker gets — - A by randomizing while gets 4 p ^ ^ { —A) +  (0) by choosing 0.
The latter follows because if there is at least one honest sender, and messages are —1 and 
1, by choosing decision zero, the decision maker surely implements a wrong action. If 
both senders are biased, and messages are conflicting, expected payoff by choosing action 
zero is ^A — ^A =  0. It can be seen that >  —2p(l — p)A which is verified as
long as p >  g, and it will be shown that this occurs in any equilibrium with information 
transmission.Using the same reasoning it is possible to rule out strategies that implement
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action k in mixed strategies, with asymmetric probabilities.
P r o o f o f Lem m a 2.6
Suppose not and suppose that when there is disagreement the action of sender i is imple­
mented. This cannot be true if sender i suggests action —1 and sender —i suggests action 
zero. In general, sender —i will prefer to tell the truth as she will not be able to influence 
the current decision, but then, in case of disagreement, the decision maker knows sender 
i is lying and she will prefer not to abide by the proposed equihbrium strategy.
P r o o f o f P rop osition  2.1
The payoff of a biased sender, when the true state is different from the one he prefers, is 
given by
Vt  =  - B  +  6E{B)  (A2.2)
if he tells the truth in the first period, and
Vl = B -  SE{B) (A2.3)
if he lies in the first period. The necessary condition for a pure strategy equilibrium with 
truthtelhng is Vr > Vl , which is verified when
B < 6E{B)  (A2.4)
The model has a continuum of mixed strategy equihbria. When the true state is 0,
both a left and a right biased senders he. As payoffs are the same, the equihbrium is
symmetric and =  q, therefore, p2 =   rr---- r" • The posterior probabihtyp + { l —p)q
that an agent is honest should be high enough in the second period, in particular p2 =
p  X 2 p
 —------— > % which is verified as long as q <  ------ which is a necessary condition
p + { l - p ) q  3 l - p
for a mixed strategy equihbrium to exist. When instead the true state is 1, =  1, and
P2 =  ------— r — T^— the condition P2 > \  then is verified as long as q <  ^+  3 e. l - p
These mixed strategy equihbria occur over a set of measure zero. In fact, it is a measure 
zero event that parameters are exactly such that the first period importance happens to 
be
B =  5E{B)  (A2.5)
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2.2
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The proof of the first and the second part follows by comparing payofiFs from lying and
telling the truth and imposing the condition Vp > Vl - The fact that the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium is unique follows by the non-existence of asymmetric equi­
libria, established by Lemma 5 and 6. Other necessary conditions, for a mixed strategy 
equilibrium are 0 < g < 1 and q <  These yield
B <  5 E ( S ) ( l - j p )  (A2.6)
B >  (A2.7)
which implies that if a mixed strategy equilibrium exists, a pure strategy equilibrium will
not exist and vice-versa. Finally, the condition q <  imphes,
B  > SE{b E  (A2.8)
Hence, a mixed strategy equihbrium exists if and only if
SE(B)  m a x { ^ : : ^ ;  1 -  | }  < B  <  i£ ( B ) ( l  -  jp ) (A2.9)
and it is easy to see that this set is non empty.
P ro o f o f P roposition  2.3
When the true state is zero, the status quo, there always is truthteUing with two senders, 
while there is truthtelhng with one sender only if period importance is not too large. 
When the true state is different from the status quo, in the one sender case there is 
truthtelhng (in pure strategies) if and only if
B < 5E{B) =  B{  (A2,10)
In the two senders case, truthtelhng in pure strategies in the first period occurs iff
B <  « B (B )( i -  =  Bi  (A2.11)
Truthtelhng in pure strategies occurs over a set of parameters of larger measure when 
there is only one sender, iff
SE{B)  > SE(B)(^ -  | )  (A2.12)
which is always verified. There is truthtelhng in mixed strategies with two senders if and 
only if
B < 6E(B)(l  -  jp ) =  B l .  (A2.13)
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and
SE{B) > 5E{B)(1 -  jp ) (A2.14)
Therefore there is truthtelhng in pure strategies with one sender and no truthtelhng with 
two senders.
P r o o f o f P rop osition  2.4
It can be seen that delegation generates stronger truthtelhng incentives than communi­
cation in both the one and the two senders cases. In fact, it is easy to see that
SE{B)i^ +  \ ) >  SE{B){^ -  | ) }  (A2.15)
Moreover,
5EiB) i^ +  ^ ) > 5 E { B ) { l ~ ^ p )  (A2.16)
if and only if p >  ^ so that, when the true state in the first period is different from
the status quo, and the probabihty the opponent is honest is relatively large, delegation
improves upon communication, as there are values of period importance for which there 
is truthtelhng in pure strategies under delegation and not even truthtelhng in mixed 
strategies under communication.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2.5
I show the conditions ensuring the existence of the equihbria both if the true state is the 
status quo and if the true state is 1. When the true state is the status quo, a left biased 
influential sender reports the truth in the first period as long as
SE (B ) j2 + p )
and lies otherwise, while non influential senders always he if
5 E { B ) { l - p )  ^ Ô E {B ) { 2 + p )
2(1 -
which is verified as long as
j/i < (A2.19)
4 — p
There exists another equihbrium where a left biased influential sender reports the truth 
as long as
g  < (A2.20)
and biased non influential sender he, while the influential sender lies and biased non
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influential senders report the truth as long as
SEiB)i2 +  P) (A2.21)
2(1  -  u \ )
and they all lie when
and this occurs when
i/i > ■ (A2.23)
4 - p
In the latter equilibrium, the degree of favouritism is quite strong, so that the non influ­
ential sender has httle chances to influence current period decision and therefore is more 
willing to report the truth. This ensures that there are values of period importance such 
that the influential sender lies and a biased non influential sender is willing to report the 
truth.
Similarly, when the true state is 1, there exists an equihbrium where the influential sender 
reports the truth as long as
B <  (A2.24)
and lies otherwise, and a left biased non influential sender always lies. Such equilibrium 
occurs when
4(1 -  u{) <
which is verifled when
i/'i < (A2.26)
4 - p
There also exists an equilibrium where the influential sender reports the truth and the 
non influential sender lies for
B < « a ± ^
4i/|  ^ '
the influential sender lies, and the left biased influential sender reports the truth for
« a ± ^ < B < ™ i ^
4i/| 4(1 -  u\)
which occurs for
i/’i > —^  (A2.29)
4 - p
P r o o f o f P rop osition  2.6
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The influential sender reports the truth as long as
Ai/\
if the true state is the status quo and
as u\ <  1. Moreover, the non influential sender reports the truth if he is honest, or if 
favouritism is not too strong. According to the degree of favouritism there can be values 
of period importance such that non influential senders report the truth. When the true 
state is 1, a left biased sender reports the truth as long as
B  <  (A2.32)
and obviously
+  (A2.33)
Moreover, the non influential sender reports the truth if he is honest, right biased, or left 
biased and the degree of favouritism is large enough and period importance is intermediate.
P r o o f o f P roposition  2.7
The proposition can be proved by comparing payoffs for the decision maker for different 
realizations of period importance. I will also assume that p >  ^ so that which
implies that there exists realizations of period importance such that there is truthtelhng 
in pure strategies under delegation and no truthtelhng (not even in mixed strategies) 
under communication. The logic of the proof for the opposite case is similar and is thus 
omitted (although the optimality of delegation as opposed to communication over that 
range of period importance realizations may differ).
• if 5  G [S, ^ 2], there is truthtelhng in pure strategies both under communication 
and under delegation. In this case expected payoff for the decision maker under 
communication is
=  p'(A +  <SB(A)l +  4 p f i ^ [ A + j i £ ; ( A ) ]  +
i ^ ^ f [ 4 A - 2 ^ S E ( A ) ) \  (A2.34)
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while that under delegation is
— P^[A +0E{A)] -^2p-— SE{A)]-\-2p-— — - 6E(A)] 4- 
( l ^ f [ i A - i ^ 5 E ( A ) ) ]  (A2.35)
The intuition for these expressions is as follows: with probability p  ^ both senders 
are honest and report the truth no matter the state and period importance. Then, 
the decision maker implements the correct decision ensuring a payoff of A  in the first 
period, and an expected payoff of 6E{A) in the second. With probability one 
sender is honest, and the other is biased and as the latter can be left or right biased, 
the total number of such cases is four. Period importance is low enough so that 
there is truthtelhng in pure strategies in the first period, and payoff is A  both under 
delegation and under communication. In the latter case expected second period 
payoff is ^5E{A), because with probability  ^ the true state is zero, and the decision 
maker observes a zero message from the honest sender and a non zero message from 
the biased sender, and learns the true state is zero. With probability |  the true state 
accords with the preferences of the biased sender and the decision maker observes 
two agreeing messages and implements the correct decision, FinaUy, with probabihty 
I the true state is opposed to the preferences of the biased sender and the decision 
maker observes conflicting messages and randomises, so that expected payoff is zero. 
Under delegation, if the honest sender is delegated decision powers, second period 
decision is made correctly, otherwise, it is correct only when the true state is the one 
preferred by the biased sender, and this happens with probability In the other 
cases, the biased sender implements a wrong decision yielding an expected payoff of 
—5E{A). Finally, with probability both senders are biased, either left or right.
They report the truth in the first period as period importance is lower than 5^, while 
they lie in the second period. Under communication, there can be 2 cases: both 
senders have the same bias, or they have opposed biases. In the latter case, which 
occurs with probability the decision maker observes conflicting messages
and randomizes. In the former case, which occurs with probability 2(^^)^, the 
decision maker observes agreeing messages and implements the decision preferred 
by senders. That is correct with probability |  and wrong with probability | ,  Under 
delegation the decision is correct with probability |  and wrong with probability | ,  
It is easy to verify that =  ^ ^ 5 E { A ) ( ), so that communication
leads to a larger payoff for the decision maker,
• if B  G there is truthtelhng in pure strategies under delegation, and
truthtelhng in mixed strategies under communication, unless the true state is zero.
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Payoffs for the decision maker are:
+  -6E{A)]  +
+  (1 “  g)(^E(A)]} 4- (—^ ) ^ { 2 [ - ( A -------+
2g(i -  g)(------+  (1 -  9)^(--^))] +
+  (1 -  g)(------+  (A2.36)
— p‘^ [A-\-5E{A)] +  2p-—^^[A- \-5E{A) ] - \ - 2p -— +  
{ I ^ Ÿ \ A A - a\6E{A))]  (A2.37)
The payoff under communication can be illustrated as follows: with probability p  ^
both senders are honest, they report the truth in both periods, and the correct 
decision is implemented, so the payoff is [A +  J-E(A)], Then, with probability 
one sender is honest and the other biased. As the latter can be left or right biased, 
the total number of such cases is four. With probability |  the true state is either 
the status quo, or the state preferred by the biased sender, who reports the truth 
in both cases. Then the correct decision is implemented and the payoff is A. In the 
second period when the true state accords with the biased sender preferences, the 
decision maker receives two agreeing (and correct) messages, when the true state is 
the status quo she observes two conflicting messages of which one suggests the status 
quo so that she learns the true state, finally when the true state is the opposite of 
the biased sender preferences, the decision maker observes conflicting messages and 
randomizes, so that overall the expected payoff is ^5E{A).  When instead in the 
first period the true state is the opposite of the biased sender preferences, the latter 
reports the truth with probability q, retains credibility, and reports the truth in 
the second period only if the true state agrees with his preferences, otherwise the 
biased sender lies, in which case the decision maker observes conflicting messages 
and randomizes, and overall the expected payoff is ^SE{A). However, the biased 
sender reports falsely in the first period with probability (1 — g), the decision maker 
observes conflicting messages and randomizes, but in the second period only the 
honest sender retains credibility and the correct decision is implemented (and the 
expected payoff is SE{A)). Then, with probability both senders are biased.
When they have the same bias, if the true state is the status quo, or their preferred 
state, both senders report the truth in the first period and report their preferred 
state in the second and the decision maker observes agreeing messages (the term
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{A — If the state of the world is neither the status quo, nor their preferred
state, they can both report the truth in the first period, retain credibility and 
infiuence second period decision when the decision maker observes agreeing messages 
(this is represented by the term (p‘{A— or they can both lie in the first period
and the decision maker observes agreeing messages, but future reputation will be 
lost (this is represented by the term (1 — qŸ{—A)), or one sender lies and the other 
does not, so that the decision maker observes conflicting messages in the current 
period and randomizes, and only one sender is still credible in the second period and 
influences that decision (the term 2q{\ — g)(— However,  senders can have 
an opposed bias. In such a case, if the true state is different from the status quo, 
one sender reports the truth, and the other, who has a conflict of interest with the 
decision maker, randomizes. When the latter reports the truth, first period decision 
is made correctly (this is represented by the term qA) , but in the second period the 
decision maker observes conflicting messages and randomizes. When the sender who 
has conflict of interest hes in the first period the decision maker observes conflicting 
messages, while in the second period only one sender retains credibility and fully 
influences the decision (this is represented by the term (1 — ç)(— Whe n the 
state of the world in the first period is the status quo, both senders report the truth 
(this is represented by the term \A) ,  while they lie in the second period. However, 
as they have opposed biases, they send conflicting messages and the decision maker 
randomizes. Then,
-  U c ^ m  =  2p(l -  p)[ “4“ ^ ----- j^(^E(A)]4-
( l ^ ) ^ [ ( 2( l - g ) A - ( ^ ™ ]  =
- g^ {8(l  — q)A +  SE{A){—15p +  2pq — 3 — +  pq^} (A2.38)
In order to investigate the sign of this expression, it is necessary to plug q* in. 
However, q* is function of B  and 5E{B),  and it is necessary to make assumptions 
about the correlation between B  and A. I assume they are perfectly correlated, so 
that B =  A, and q* =  this expression is positive if and only if
the quadratic equation
QQ
12A^ -  6pA5E(A) +  (S E ( A ) f ( —p  ^ -  2% -  7) >  0 (A2.39)
is satisfied. This implies
A <  «B(A) 1 jp  -  i  V 3(9p +  7 ) ( l - p ) ]  (A2.40)
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and
A > S E { A ) l ^ p + ^  V 3(9p +  7 ) ( l - p ) ]  (A2.41)
The term SE{A)[^p — |> /3  {9p 4- 7) (1 — p)] is positive for p >  0.956. When this
does not happen, delegation can dominate communication as long as
A > SE{A)[^ -  y / { l - p ) { l  +p)]  (A2.42)
However, notice that if period importance for the sender and for the decision maker 
are positively correlated and that B  <  implies that also A  will have a bound, 
in order to satisfy the conditions ensuring there is truthtelhng in mixed strategies 
under communication and in pure strategies under delegation. Therefore, delegation 
can dominate communication as long as
3B(A )[jp  +  iV 3 (9 p  +  7 ) ( l - p ) ]  < A <  ~ (A2. 43)
and it can be seen that there when p <  § the inequahty A2.43 is satisfied. When,
instead p >  0.956, there is no value of p, such that condition A2.43 is satisfied.
However, it is necessary that
— ^  =  B 2 <  A < 5E{A)[-^p — - \ / 3  (9p +  7) (1 — p)] (A2.44)
and it can be seen that this inequahty cannot be satisfied. Therefore, delegation can 
dominates communication when the importance of the decision is intermediate and 
the probabihty experts are honest is relatively low, even if the importance of the 
decision for experts and for the decision maker are perfectly correlated.
•  if H G there is truthtelhng under delegation, and no truthtehing under
communication if the state is not zero. Payoffs for the decision maker then are:
USlm = p\A  + 5E(A)] + ip^^ ^ ^ \\(A  + \5E(A)) + \5E{A)] +
+  2 ( - | )  +  2i ( A  -  M ) ]  (A2.45)
USd =  P^ lA + SEiA)] + 2p^^^-^lA + SE{A)]+2p^^^^[A-^0E{A)] + 
( ^ ^ f [ i A - i \ 5 E ( A ) ]  (A2.46)
Where, in the payoff under communication, the term 2p(l — p )[|(A  +  \6E{A))  +  
\5E{A)\  represents the case when there is one honest and one biased sender. With 
probabihty  ^the true state is zero and both senders report the truth. With probabil-
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ity I the true state is the one preferred by the biased sender and the decision maker 
observes agreeing messages and implements the truth, while with probabihty |  the 
true state is the opposite as the biased sender preferences and the decision maker 
observes two conflicting messages and randomizes. Therefore the correct decision 
is implemented with probability while with probability |  the expected payoff is 
zero. In the second period, when both senders reported the truth in the previous 
period, the same reasoning applies, and the correct decision is implemented with 
probabihty | .  When instead conflicting messages are observed in the first period, 
the biased sender revealed his type, and the honest sender is left to influence sec­
ond period decision, thus expected payoff is 5E{A).  When both senders are biased, 
which occurs with probabihty they can have either the same, or different
biases. In the former case if the true state is the status quo (this occurs with prob­
abihty 5 , they both report the truth in the first period and they both report their 
preferred state in the second (the corresponding payoff is represented by the term
— I ), while when the true state is different from the status quo, they both 
report their preferred state which is implemented (this is represented by the term 
— ^ ). However, in the second period they have no credibility and expected payoff 
is zero as the decision maker makes an uninformed decision. Finally, when senders 
have opposed biases and the true state is the status quo, they report the truth in 
the first period, retain their credibility and report their preferred state in the sec­
ond period, and the decision maker observes conflicting messages and randomizes. 
When the true state is different from the status quo, the sender who has a conflict of 
interest reports his preferred state, the decision maker observes conflicting messages 
and randomizes, while second period decision is influenced by the biased sender who 
did not have a conflict of interest in the first period (this is represented in the term 
l ( A - ^ ) ) . T h e n :
USd ~  =  2p(l  — p)[-j — — +  (—^ ) ^ ( 3 A  — SE{A)) (A2.47)
it can be seen that this expression is positive as long as
• Finally, if H E biased senders have no incentives for truthtelhng neither
under delegation, nor under communication unless the state is zero. Payoffs for the
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decision maker in such a case are
UciLm  =  +  2p(l -  p)[[-^{A +  -^5E{A)) +  -^5E{A)] +
( ^ ) M \ a - \ ^ ^ )  +  2 { A )  +  2 \ { A - ^ - ^ ) \  (A2.49)
U S ^  =  v M  +  ^ E { A ) \ + p ( l - p ) \ A  +  S E ( A ) ] + p ( l - p ) [ ~ + i E ( A ) \  +
(A2.50)
The intuition for these expression is analogous to that of the previous cases. The 
only difference is in the payoff from delegating power, as in this case, a biased sender 
who is delegated power lies. This occurs either when there is both a honest and 
a biased sender and this event has probability p (l — p), or when both senders are 
either left or right biased and this event has probability In both cases, the
expected payoff for the decision maker is — y , because the biased sender induces his 
preferred action which coincides with the true state with probability leading to 
a payoff of A, and does not coincide with the true state with probability |  leading
to a payoff of —A. Then, it is easy to see that
~ U c^ m  =  -  P)[g^^{A) -  A]-h (—y ^ )^ [-3 A  -  SE{A)] (A2.51)
This expression is positive as long as
A < 5 E { A ) ^ ^ ^  (A2.52)
and this condition can be verified only if period importance for senders and for 
the decision maker has a strong negative correlation. In fact, it must be that
Q > Qdel _  SE{B)(1+ )^ ^  ^ S E { A ) ^
P ro o f o f P rop osition  2.9
In the one sender case, the payoff from reporting the truth is
Vt  =  -B ^  +  5E{B^) (A2.53)
while that from lying is
Vl =  B^ (A2.54)
The gain from lying in the current period is 2B^, the expected payoff from exerting 
infiuence in the future is 5E{B^)^ the expected future payoff if own reputation is depleted 
is zero.
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In the n senders case, the gain from lying in the current period is
^n+l _  (A2.55)
Thus, competition reduces current influence as long as
2B^ >  (A2.56)
This is likely to happen, especially if the intensity of the action does not “jump” signifl-
cantly when the consensus becomes more widespread.
The expected future payoff from keeping own reputation is
s t E E  -
r= 0  Z=0  ^ '
n n—r
r=5+l 1=0
E  f" ) ('SECS’')]}+2 \ r  J ' V rr=0 '  ' r = ^ + l '
31Ê  E
Z=n r=0 '' '
-  E E „H(„- . -
Firstly, it should be noticed that when the true state is 0, it is sufficient that there is only 
one honest sender to influence the decision away from a left biased sender preferences. 
Furthermore, the decision goes against the interests of a left biased sender when the true 
state is 1 and there is not a majority of left biased senders, when the true state is one 
and there is a majority of left biased senders, or when the true state is 0 and there are 
no honest senders and a majority of right biased senders. This shows the sender will not 
be able to cash in the benefit of keeping own reputation with probability one, although 
it is not possible to directly compare those beneflts with the payoff in the one sender 
case because the expected intensity of the action is typically different from the intensity 
corresponding to that in the one sender case (which would correspond to a majority of 
one sender). However, again, if the intensity of the action does not jump too much when
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the consensus increases by one unit, future influence is reduced under competition.
A benefit of keeping own reputation is the ability to move next period decision towards own 
interests by changing the majority, so that a favourable decision will be “more favourable” 
and an unfavourable decision will be dampened. When own reputation is lost, in the one 
sender case expected payoff is zero, while with n senders it is given by
r=0 1=0  ^ '
n n—r
r=2+l /=0 '' '
+ |{ E
4-1
r=0 ^ /  r= ^  + l  \  /
Z =n+lr=0 ^
E  E  iW{n  -  r -  (A2.58)
and again the decision goes against a left biased sender preferences in the same situations
as above. An additional difference is that now n is even, so having lost own reputation
prevents the left biased sender to be pivotal in those situations. Here it is possible to say 
something more, as
Ë  E  =
1=0 r=0
-  E E  iM i„  - r  -  (A2.59)
and
r=5+l 1=0 /2
n n—l
-   ^E   ^E  (A2.60)
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furthermore
T -i
5 3 ( " ) ( 5 E ( B " - ' - ) =  (A2-61)
r=0 \  /  T-=f+l ^ /
SO that the lost reputation effect is
<  0 (A2.62)
and it affects truthtelhng incentives as in the two senders game.
Chapter 3
C om petition and O pportunistic 
A dvice o f Financial Analysts: 
Theory and Evidence
3.1 Introduction
The scandals involving some of the major players on Wall Street in the first half of this 
decade, cast dark shadows on the conduct of many financial analysts. The prestige and 
glamour surrounding the profession during the 1990s, which has been dubbed the “Age 
of the analysts”, has been dissipated. The pubhc debate focussed on searching for the 
causes of the excessive optimism shown by analysts when producing their reports about 
companies, as well as for appropriate corrective action. The incentive system influencing 
the analysts has been considered a major suspect and was put under close scrutiny by 
policy makers in order to restore confidence in financial information. The industry re­
sponded by claiming that analysts overoptimism was not driven by distorted incentives 
but by psychological biases leading analysts to have too positive an impression of the 
stocks they followed.
An important question in the debate is to what extent market forces help reducing bi­
ases in afiiliated analysts recommendations, and consequently to what extent regulatory 
intervention is desirable. This chapter investigates this issue and provides empirical evi­
dence on the effects of competition on the degree of optimism of afiiliated analysts. When 
more analysts cover a stock, more information is available for investors. That can be 
helpful in reducing biases in recommendations from afiiliated analysts. If overly opti­
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mistic recommendations are induced by the presence of conflicts of interests, competition 
can be beneficial as it softens the potential gains from opportunistic behaviour. If overly 
optimistic recommendations are induced by psychological biases, competition can be ben­
eficial, as affiliated analysts have more chances to revise their beliefs using the information 
provided by unaffiliated analysts. From now on, for expositional clarity, analysts working 
for the lead underwriter of the IPO are dubbed “insiders” while analysts working for 
other broker houses are dubbed “outsiders”. Thus, This chapter addresses the following 
questions:
1. Are insiders less optimistic when other analysts issued (or are likely to issue) a 
recommendation on the same stock?
2. Are insiders more likely to issue an optimistic recommendation if they observed an 
optimistic recommendation from outsiders?
A simple univariate analysis suggests that analysts working for the lead underwriter of an 
IPO behave differently according to whether they face some competition from outsiders 
or not. Table 3.1 represents the six month average returns in excess of the CRSP value 
weighted index^ as a function of whether the IPO is covered by the insider only, or whether 
also at least an outsider covered the IPO, and as a function of the recommendation issued 
by the insider^. It also shows the percentage of “strong buy” and “buy” recommendations 
issued by insiders as a function of the strength of competition from other analysts.
The data document that insider analysts appear to be less optimistic when some out­
sider covers the stock. The average excess return of IPOs for which insiders issued a 
“Strong Buy” recommendation with no outsider covering the stock is lower than when 
some outsider competes providing information on the same IPO. The same happens for 
“Buy” recommendations. On the other hand, strong buy recommendations are issued 
much more often (about 60 per cent of the times) when the insider faces no competition, 
than when some outsider provides coverage of the stock, even tough IPOs covered by 
both insiders and outsiders had a larger six month excess return. Of course this simple 
univariate analysis must be enriched to control for variables that could be affecting the 
incentives of analysts, as well as for the possibility that firms not covered by outsiders are 
much different (also in terms of quality) from those that receive wider coverage. However,
^IPO firms are typically quite small, suggesting the equally weighted index would be a better proxy 
for the returns of IPO firms. However, the value weighted index is a better proxy for the value of the 
market returns investors face. Results are qualitatively similar if excess returns are computed using the 
return on the CRSP equally weighted index.
listed only “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations, but there were also a few “Hold” recommen­
dations. See Table II.
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Table 3.1 Recommendations and Returns
The entries in left cells are six months average returns, in US dollars, in excess of returns 
on the CRSP value weighted index conditional on recommendations (“Strong Buy” or 
“Buy”) from analysts aflSliated with the lead underwriter and on whether non affiliated 
analysts covered the stock (Competition versus No Competition). The entries in right 
cells are the fraction of “Strong Buy” and “Buy” recommendations issued by insider 
analysts, again conditional on whether non affiliated analysts covered the stock The left 
panel labeled as “competition” refers to situations in which some analyst non affiliated 
with the lead underwriter covered the stock.
Competition No Competition
Strong Buy
% ofExcess Return recomm. 
0.26 50.6
Excess Return r^ecomm.
0.008 60.2
Buy
% ofExcess Return recomm. 
0.71 47
% ofExcess Return recomm. 
0.035 38.4
Table 3.1 represents a first sign that insider analysts may change their behaviour when 
competition from outsiders is stronger.
The behaviour summarized in Table 3.1 could be driven either by distorted incentives, or 
by psychological biases. In fact, if insiders are psychologically biased in that they observe 
too positive a signal about the IPO, but are rational in updating their information, they 
will be less optimistic when observing the unbiased signal contained in recommendations 
from outsider analysts. Then, I will test whether insiders are infiuenced by the information 
provided by outsiders. If that is not the case, their overoptimism cannot be attributed 
to rational Bayesian updating, providing indirect evidence in favour of the view that 
attributes affiliated analyst overoptimism to the presence of confiict of interests. Thus, 
a further important contribution of This chapter is that it provides evidence allowing to 
distinguish between the main competing explanations for the overoptimism of analysts 
affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO.
The growing interest in the behaviour of financial analysts prompted the appearance of 
many important papers investigating different dimensions of the issue. Some document 
over optimism in forecasts and recommendations from sell-side analysts. Raj an and Ser- 
vaes (1997) show that analysts forecasts of IPOs future earnings are overoptimistic and 
they are even more so for more underpriced IPOs and over longer time horizons. Michaely 
and Womack (1999) show that sell side analysts are systematically more optimistic than
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other analysts in their recommendations. Michaely and Womack (2004) review the htera- 
ture and discuss the different theories brought forward to explain overoptimism from sell 
side analysts. In the context of IPOs that is especially true for analysts affiliated with the 
bookrunner (lead underwriter) of the IPO. In particular they stress two major hypotheses: 
the first, which I label the “opportunistic view”, maintains that sell side analyst overopti­
mism is driven by incentives. The bookrunner profits by placing shares of the IPO on the 
market and from trading commissions. Therefore a positive recommendation boosts both 
channels. The second hypothesis, which I label the “naive view”, suggests that analysts 
following the company through the due diligence process become truly convinced of the 
superior quality of the firm just hke parents see their kids under an especially positive 
fight.
Other papers point attention on the role of reputation and career concerns in influencing 
analyst behaviour. Hong and Kubik (2003) focus on analysts career concerns and discuss 
the effects of earnings forecast precision on job separation. They show that controlling 
for accuracy, analysts that tend to be more optimistic are more likely to experience 
favorable job separations. This evidence suggests that career concerns could be a driver 
for bookrunner analysts overoptimism. Jackson (2005), using Australian data, shows that 
there is a positive relationship between reputation and performance and also that more 
accurate analysts acquire a higher reputation. Fang and Yasuda (2006) document, on 
US data, that there is a positive relationship between reputation and forecast quality. 
They also show that the relative accuracy of more reputable analysts deteriorates during 
hot market periods when the gains from opportunistic behaviour are greatest. Fang and 
Yasuda (2007) investigate the effect of personal reputation on the values of analysts’ 
stock recommendations. They show that recommendations of more reputable analysts 
working at top-tier banks outperform those of all other analyst subgroups in both buy 
and sell category. They also provide evidence suggesting that reputation seems to play a 
disciplinary role in the face of conflicts of interest. Finally, they show that more reputable 
analysts were faster in downgrading their buy recommendations in the bear market than 
less reputable analysts. This evidence suggests that reputation can provide important 
incentives to discipline analyst having possible conflicts of interest with investors. The 
existing literature provides a starting point for the present work: there is evidence of sell 
side analysts overoptimism and there is evidence that reputational concerns are important 
for analysts.
There are some important papers that investigate whether the documented optimism of 
sell side analysts influences firms and investors. Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2005) 
investigate whether analyst behaviour influences the likelihood of banks winning under­
writing mandates. Their results suggest that optimistic behaviour does not increase the
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chances of winning a mandate. However, they do find that analysts are more optimistic 
when the fees at stake are larger. Blanes-i-Vidal (2004) provides evidence that investors 
react more to unfavourable earnings forecast than to favourable ones, and that the dif­
ference in this reaction is higher when the investor has a greater prior suspicion that the 
analyst is a biased type. Agrawal and Chen (2007) confirm that sell side analysts tend to 
issue overly optimistic recommendations, but that investors are able to discount analysts 
opinions. The last two papers seem to suggest that it might not be necessary to worry 
much about analysts providing biased information, as investors are able to discount the 
bias embedded in analysts recommendations and forecasts. However, analysts overop­
timism can harm investors if analysts provide favourable information when they should 
have provided unfavourable information instead. Furthermore, the evidence does not al­
low to conclude that investors are able to fully discount the bias contained in analysts 
information, and thus analysts may still be able to infiuence investors, although not fully. 
Finally, the information provided by sell side analysts is especially important in the case 
of IPOs, as relatively little information on such companies is available to investors and 
to other non affiliated analysts. Thus even if some sophisticated investors may be able 
to discount, at least in part, the biases contained in analyst opinions, such biases can 
still harm market players especially in the case of recently fisted companies. Therefore, it 
is interesting to investigate to what extent competition in the production of information 
from non affiliated analysts helps disciplining affiliated analysts.
The theoretical model formalizes the interaction among analysts and investors as a dy­
namic cheap talk game. This is related to the contributions of Sobel (1985), Benabou and 
Laroque (1992), Morris (2001). The main step ahead from these papers is that multiple 
sources of information are introduced and their influence is studied in detail. The focus 
on the effects of competition is shared with Horner (2002). The main difference is that 
Horner (2002) do not deal with a cheap talk model and the uninformed party can interact 
with only one informed agent in each period. Finally, Morgan and Stocken (2003) propose 
a theoretical model showing the existence of equilibria where information from analysts 
is transmitted using categorical ranking systems. However they do not analyze the effect 
of competition.
The chapter proceeds as follows: section 3.2 outlines the theoretical model, section 3.3 
discusses the testable predictions, section 3.4 outlines the identification strategy, section 
3.5 describes the dataset, section 3.6 presents the empirical results, section 3.7 discusses 
the effect of selection, section 3.8 discusses assumptions and results, section 3.9 concludes, 
the appendix contains proofs of propositions and tables with estimation results.
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3.2 A  M odel o f A nalyst Behaviour
The interaction among analysts and investors is modelled as a dynamic cheap talk game: 
analysts privately observe the reahzation of a random variable that provides information 
about the quality of the firm and send a recommendation to investors. The latter adjust 
their portfolios possibly using the information provided by analysts. Insider analysts 
have a confiict of interest: they would like to report favorable information, so as to induce 
investors to purchase the stock, even when they observe a negative signal, because they 
are incentivized to do so by their employer. Each analyst is characterized by a type 
(careerist, not careerist) which is constant over time and across firms, and a condition
(insider, outsider) which is constant over time for a given firm. The type of analysts
is modelled as follows: the careerist type is wilhng to enjoy the current profit as he 
cares both about his future reputation, and about conforming to the interests of the 
bank he works for. On the contrary, a non - careerist type wishes to report the truth 
anyway, because of, say, strong moral characteristics that induce very large costs from 
behaving opportunistically^. The market appreciates non - careerist analysts because 
their incentives are aligned to those of investors.
Players: there are one insider (he), one outsider (he) and one investor (she).
Tim ing: Agents interact over time repeating the same stage game (evaluation of an IPO 
and portfolio investment decision). The timing of the stage game is as follows:
1. Analysts receive a signal about the quality of the IPO and report it (issue a rec­
ommendation) immediately as soon as they observe it. Hence, no strategic delay is 
allowed. The outsider analyst might not cover the stock. In that case he receives 
no information and issues no recommendation. The insider does not know whether 
an outsider covers the stock. Recommendations are publicly observed.
2. The investor adjusts her portfolio each time she observes a recommendation, pro­
vided the recommendation has enough credibility (notice that it is optimal for her 
to do so as I am assuming no adjustment costs).
3. Payoffs are realized and all players observe whether the recommendation was correct. 
Therefore the reputation of an analyst is public information.
Inform ation Structure: agents can be of two types, careerist and non - careerist. The 
prior probability of the latter event is A. An analyst’s type is drawn at the very beginning
^Notice that even a small fraction of such analysts is sufficient to generate the results.
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of the game and is private information. The investor and the other analyst share the 
same beliefs about an analyst’s type. Analysts also privately observe a signal s about the 
realization of a binary random variable 0  =  {L ,H }  representing the quality of the firm. 
The precision of the signal depends upon whether the analyst is an insider as insiders get 
more informative signals than outsiders. Formally,
Prob{0 =  Y  \ s =  Y, Insider) =  a . , 1
% \  , Y  =  L,H , where a >  b > -
Prob{6 =  y  I s =  y, Outsider) =  b 2
ensures that insider agents get a more informative signal than outsiders. The probability 
the signal of the insider is correct does not affect the probability the signal of outsiders is 
correct, and vice versa. Formally,
Prob{Outsider correct | Insider correct) =  b 
Prob(Insider correct | Outsider correct) =  a
This assumption implies that no information about the true signal observed by an analyst 
can be extracted from the observation of the correctness of the recommendations issued by 
other analysts on the same stock. Notice that this assumption implies that the presence of 
outsider analysts does not impact the reputation of the insider analyst^, and only affects 
his chances to fully enjoy current profit if he lies. Without this assumption, the presence 
of outsiders will also affect the updating about the insider reputation.
C ontracts: monetary transfers contingent on the correctness of the recommendation are 
not feasible.
A n alyst Strategies: analyst’s actions in each period are m : S  M; where m is 
a mapping from the set of signals S =  { L ,Y }  to the set of recommendations M  =  
{sell, buy}. Attention is limited to Markovian strategies, i.e. strategies that depend upon 
history at time t — 1 only. Strategies are probabilities of truthful reporting q\’^ , where i 
denotes an agent type, j  denotes the state observed, and t  the time period.
A n alyst Payoffs: the payoff of analysts is comprised of a wage which is increasing in 
his reputation and, when he is an insider, of a term which depends upon his ability to 
induce investors to purchase shares of the IPO. Formally, the payoff of a careerist insider
^There exists a relatively large literature on herd behaviour of financial analysts. That does not arise in 
this model as outsider analysts essentially are “committed types” and insider analysts do not observe the 
signal of outsiders. In the latter case, insiders may disregard their more precise information and report 
favourable information upon observing a favourable report from outsiders as this would entail a lower 
reputational loss. In this case, we should observe that insider analysts are more optimistic following an 
optimistic recommendation from outsiders. This possibihty is further investigated empirically in section 
V-B.
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is Î7 =  w{Xt) F ga~  ^ +  where w is a wage increasing in the reputation of the
analyst for being non - careerist (the intuition is that these are the analysts most valued by 
investors, though not necessarily by investment b a n k s )T h is  assumption is motivated by 
the fact that analysts are nominated in the All American League by institutional investors 
and there is evidence that such analysts earn higher wages. The term represents 
the payoff from inducing investors to purchase the stock, p is a positive constant and o:+ 
represents the amount of shares bought by the investor®. Thus, I am assuming the analyst 
gains if investors purchase the stock, while he does not gain anything if investors do not 
purchase, or sell, the stock. Those gains can derive both from trading commissions^, 
and from the fact that stronger demand for the stock raises its price®. Finally, the term 
represents the future gains from having reputation At+i, V  is continuous and 
increasing in A, and <5 <  1 is a discount factor. The function U is continuous and maps 
the set of non negative real numbers (Mg ) into itself. Non - careerist insiders payoff 
features a cost of lying, high enough so that they will always find it optimal to report 
information truthfully, setting q =  I. Outsiders, either careerists, or not, have a payoff 
U =  w(Af)4-^y(Af_|_i) and they do not gain anything by misreporting information, so that 
they always report the truth. Finally, to ease the analysis, it is assumed that insiders face 
the risk of getting a punishment from their employer if they are discovered reporting low 
prospects after having observed good prospects for the firm. The employer can go to court 
and bring verifiable evidence. Such punishment is large enough so that insiders always 
report the truth if they observe a good signal (notice that this might not be necessarily 
the case, in equihbrium, for careerist insiders®). Therefore it follows that
g f  =  1
%
® Therefore investment banks are forced to link wage to the chances the analyst is non careerist because 
such analysts increase the appeal of the bank to investors, even if banks would prefer careerist types. 
The wage function could also include a component linked to the chances of internal career (which could 
then be decreasing in the probabihty the analyst is non careerist) without altering the basic insight of the 
model. However, if the internal career motive becomes too strong, insiders will have stronger incentives 
to misreport information and in equihbrium their credibihty could be compromised.
® Technically this is the positive part of the optimal demand of the investor. Such demand can be 
negative, as the investor may seU (or short sell) the stock. In that case, the analyst gains nothing.
^Trading commissions could also be generated by sales of the stock. However investors often face short 
selling constraints which reduce that possibihty so that trading commissions are mostly generated by 
investors purchasing the stock. See Jackson (2005) on the latter point.
higher price for the stocks of the company can benefit both the broker house, which is perceived 
as one that is wilhng to provide favourable coverage of the stock by its analysts, and the investors that 
acquired the IPO in the first day of trade, which often are among the best clients of the broker house.
^This follows because if in equihbrium careerist types find it optimal to report optimistically when 
observing that the state is low, they can also have incentives to “pool” with non careerist and report a low 
state more often than what own information would dictate. This is essentially the “political correctness” 
effect highlighted in Morris (2001).
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=  1
where N C  refers to non - careerist and C  to careerist. Hence, non - careerist analysts 
always report truthfully, while careerist analysts always report truthfully if they observe 
the firm prospects are good. It remains to determine the probability a careerist 
analyst reports the truth when he observes the firm has bad prospects, and this will be 
determined in equilibrium. To ease notation, from now on,
Investor Payoff: The stock provides a return Rjj  in the high state, and in the low 
state. The investor can put her money (normahzed to one unit of wealth) either in the 
stock, or in a riskless asset that yields a return R f . l  assume that R l < R f < Rjj. Thus 
the payoff of the investor is given by
+  (1 -  a)R f)  +  +  (1 -  a)R f)  (3.1)
as the good and bad states are equally hkely. The term a  is the holding of the stock 
by the investor. The utility function H is continuous and differentiable at least twice. 
Moreover, H  ^ > 0, H^a <  0 (so as to ensure a unique interior solution), I assume the 
investor starts with no stocks in her portfoho^®. The investor sets a  as a function of 
the hkelihood the messages received are correct. An insider analyst is credible as long 
as AfQ 4 -  (1 — A()[a 4 -  (1 — a)(l — %)] > - ,  If this is not verified, the investor ignores 
the recommendation from the insider. When recommendations are credible, and only the 
message of the insider is available, the probabihty that buy is the true state conditional 
on a buy recommendation from the insider is given by
_ +  (1 ~  A()[u +  (1 — a )(l — qt)] _
P — Xta +  (1 — At)[o +  (1 — a)(l — qt)] +  At(l — a) +  (1 — A)[(l — a) 4- a (l — %)] 
AfU +  (1 — Af)[a +  (1 — a )(l — qt)]
(3.2)
1 +  (1 — Af)(l — qt) 
and the investor sets the optimal a  as the solution of the program
Maxci pfi{cxRj{ +  (1 — oc)Rf) 4 -  (1 — p)Yl{ocRi, +  (1 — cx)Rf) (3,3)
It is easy to see that a  is increasing in p, which in turn increases in q. In fact the first 
order condition yields
\pU.a{otRH +  (1 — a)R f){R jj  — Rf)  +  (1 — p)Ha{ocRi, +  (1 — a)Rf){Ri, — Rf)] =  0 (3,4)
*^^ This assumption is motivated both by the fact that the stock began trading recently and by the desire 
to avoid introducing additional notation to denote the initial stock holdings. All results are essentially 
unchanged if it is assumed that agents starts with positive holdings of the stock.
Chapter 3. Competition and Opportunistic Advice of Financial Analysts 83
and the implicit function theorem yields
f p =
— +  (1 — a)Rf){Rfj — R j)  — HaioiRi, 4- (1 — Oi)Rf){Ri, — Rf)]
IpUaaiocRn +  (1 -  Ot)Rf){RH ~ Rf)"^  4- (1 —p)f^aa{o^RL 4" (1 -  a)Rf){RL ~ Rf)' ]^
which is positive as < 0. Notice that a sell recommendation will be taken at face 
value because careerist types never report a negative recommendation when observing 
a good signal as they could be punished by their employer. Therefore, following a sell 
recommendation from the insider, a  is set independently of A, the probabihty the insider 
is non - careerist. This implies that p =  1 — a and a  is set optimally independently of the 
analyst reputation^
When outsiders issue their recommendation, they might be influenced by the signal re­
ported by insiders. However, as the recommendation reported by insiders does not provide 
any information about the type of the outsiders, the latter has no reason to report a rec­
ommendation different from the signal he observed^H ence, if the investor also observes 
the recommendation of the outsider, the probability that buy is the correct action is 
represented by:
=  Pvibuy  I buy, buy) =  -^6)(1 - p j
where the notation indicates that a recommendation from the outsider has also been 
issued, and that the recommendation was a buy. As po’^  >  p, a buy recommendation from 
an insider is reinforced by a buy recommendation from the outsider. On the contrary, a 
sell recommendation from an outsider reduces the probability that buy is the true state 
when the investor observes a buy message from an insider and a sell message from the 
outsider. In fact:
I ‘“S'. =  ( i - 6) p O a - p )  (3.7)
it is easy to see that po'^  < p, so that now the investor will buy less shares of the company, 
as a  is increasing in p. Notice that if the probability the insider is non - careerist is not
Allowing insiders to strategically report a sell recommendation when observing a good signal about 
the company, an effect similar to Morris (2001), would imply that the more reputable the insider, the 
more it hurts him to issue a sell recommendation as in that case <  0 and the sensitivity of a  to p 
will be increasing in the reputation of the insider, so that a sell recommendation by a more reputable 
insider induces the investor to invest less than if the recommendation was issued by an insider with lower 
reputation. This is not the case here as a sell recommendation surely means the insider observed a negative 
signal on the company and the probability the signal is correct is just o.
^ I^n fact the payoff of the outsider depends upon his present and future reputation, and inference about 
the latter is not affected by the recommendation reported by the insider, due to the assumption that 
Prob{Outsider correct \ Insider correct) =  Prob(Outsider correct) =  b.
Chapter 3. Competition and Opportunistic Advice of Financial Analysts 84
large enough to ensure his recommendation is credible, then the message of the insider 
will be ignored and the only equilibrium involves babbling from the insider. I assume that 
returns are such that a > 0 even when the investor observes two sell recommendations. 
That is the most general case. Situations when the investor (short) sells the stock after 
observing one or two “sell” recommendations are essentially analogous^^.
Beliefs: First of all, there is no updating on the type of the outsider, as outsiders are 
committed types and report the truth. The market updates the reputation of an insider 
analyst for being non - careerist according to Bayes rule, so that:
Pr(non — careerist \ Buy,True) =
aXt +  (1 — At) [a 4- (1 — a) (1 — %)]
Pr(„on -  careerist | B u y ,W ro r.g )  =  A®- =  ^  (Y +  a (l -
Pr(non — careerist I S e ll,T ru e) =  Aflt = ---  --------- ——r—
 ^  ^ At +  (1 -  Xt)qt
Pr(non — careerist I Sell, W rong) =  AfiT =   ------———
' At +  (1 -  Xt)qt
It is useful to state a preliminary result.
R em ark 3.1 A careerist insider never reports information truthfully with probability 1.
O l  Ç  __  D  I p
In fact in such a case, A^ _|^  =  =  At. Then, there is no reputational
gain from reporting the truth, and thus lying is always optimal. This, however, contradicts 
the fact that q =  1.
Equilibrium : the equihbrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. The , game can 
be reduced essentially to a static game '^ .^ The equilibrium is a set of behefs L about the 
insider analyst type, probability of truthtelling 0 < % < I and an optimal investment 
strategy a  for the investor so that
a  G arg max E li
the insider behaves optimally and beliefs are confirmed in equilibrium and evolve according 
to Bayes rule. The payoff of the insider from reporting the truth, when observing the true 
state is low is given by
Ut  =  gE[a  I s, z] +  i[oP(A®'+) +  (1 -  a)y(A®-)] (3.8)
those situations the analyst does not gain anything, 
assumed that the analyst cares about his reputation as represented by the term FfA) in the payoff 
function. In a previous version of the model, I proved the existence of a unique equihbrium in which 
reputation has value in an infinite horizon game, along the fines of Benabou and Laroque (1992).
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while that from lying is
Ul =  gE[a  | 6, z] +  i[oy(A®’- )  +  (1 -  a)V(A®’+)] (3.9)
and the insider decides whether to lie or to randomize^^, so that
Ut  < Ul
In both expressions, V'(.) is the continuation value. This formulation implies that the 
payoff of the insider depends upon the effectiveness of his recommendation: if the investor 
has more trust in the analyst, then a  will be larger and the current gain amphfied. The 
term gE[a  | j ,z ] ,  where j  =  s,b, represents the expected gains for the analyst which in 
turn depend upon the optimal strategy of the investor. The expected gain for the analyst 
is function of the probability z  the outsider issues a recommendation on the company. 
This in turn can depend upon company observable characteristics, such as industry, size, 
upon how hot the IPO market is and upon the general conditions of the market. The 
expectation is conditional upon whether the recommendation issued by the insider was 
a buy or a sell, and of course gE[a \ b,z] > gE[a  | s,z]. I firstly prove there is a unique 
equilibrium probability of truthtelling, then I turn to analyze the effect of competition.
P roposition  3.1 The game has a unique equilibrium probability of truthtelling %.
Proof. See Appendix 1 ■
Now, it is possible to analyse the effects of competition on truthtelling incentives. The 
answer can be found by inspecting gE[a  | 6, z] and gE[a  | s, z]. These are equal to
gE[a I b , z ] =  zg{a[{l  -  6)a(pJ’*) +  ba{p '^ )^] +  (1 -  a)[ba{p^/) +
{I -  b)a{pl’^ )]} +  {I -  z)ga{p) ' (3.10)
and
gE[a I s,z] =  zg{a[{\ -  b)a{pl'^) 4- ba{pl’^ )] +  (1 -  a)[ba{pl’^ ) +
(1 -  4- (1 -  z )g a { l  -  a) (3.11)
The continuation value does not depend upon the probability outsiders issue a recom­
mendation, while the expected gains do.
Before deriving the effect of competition, I add the following simplifying assumption
’Remark 1 shows that q =  1 implying Vt  >  Vl , cannot occur in equilibrium.
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A ssum ption  3.1: the function a  is linear in the probability the stock is good (conditional 
on observed recommendations).
Then, it is possible to prove the following
P rop osition  3.2 Competition increases truthtelling incentives.
Proof. See Appendix 1. ■
This proposition shows that competition increases truthtelling incentives. The intuition 
is that when outsiders are likely to issue a recommendation, the short run gains for 
insiders by misreporting information are smaller. In fact, when the insider observes a 
negative signal on the stock, outsiders are relatively more likely to observe a negative 
signal and report a sell recommendation. Then, the investor will reduce the amount of 
shares purchased, and this impacts negatively on the gains from misreporting information. 
Assumption 3.1 is quite important for this result. In fact, if the function a  is very convex, 
it could be that investors sensibly increase their demand for the asset upon observing a 
buy recommendation from both the insider and the outsider. Then, the insider may gain 
very much from reporting a buy recommendation when it is more hkely that outsiders 
issue a recommendation on the stock. In fact, outsiders may observe a wrong signal and 
issue a buy recommendation. Even if this happens with a low probability, it can lead to 
large gains if investors react sharply^®. This situation, however, seems quite special, and 
unlikely to be occur in practice.
Finally, it is left to discuss how results are affected if outsiders issue a recommendation 
before the insider does. All results are similar. If the insider observes the outsider reports 
a buy recommendation, she will be more willing to misreport information. However, on 
average, when the true state of the company is poor, outsiders will issue a sell recom­
mendation, and, in this case, the insider has weaker incentives to misreport information. 
The model predicts that the insider is relatively more willing to report a buy recommen­
dation, independently of the recommendation of the outsider. Furthermore, even when 
the outsider issues a buy recommendation the insider is willing to randomize between 
reporting information truthfully and lying. Thus, the model predicts that the correlation 
between the probabihty the insider issues a positive recommendation and the probability
Notice that the same logic would hold in a model where short run gains for insiders are not affected 
by the presence of outsiders, but recommendations from outsiders provide information about the signal 
observed by the insider. In fact, even if reputational losses of reporting a wrong buy recommendation 
when outsiders reported a sell recommendation increase, the gains from reporting a buy recommendation 
when outsiders report a buy recommendation can be quite large. That depends upon the shape of the 
continuation value function V.
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the outsider issues a positive recommendation can be quite low. That would not be the 
case if insiders were optimistically biased and updated their beliefs according to the rec­
ommendation issued by the outsider. This point will be exploited to distinguish between 
the opportunistic view and the naive view.
3.3 Testable H yp oth eses
The model underlines that competition is expected to increase truthtelling incentives. 
The model assumes that insider analysts are rational and driven by incentives. This is 
the view taken by the New York attorney - general, Eliot Spitzer, as well as by a large 
part of the press, about the financial scandals of 2002-2003. An alternative hypothe­
sis suggests that analysts are truly convinced of the superior quality of the stocks they 
follow, so that they receive an optimistically biased signal but do not realize it. Then 
there can be two possibihties: the first is that analysts are totally naive and ignore the 
information that could be conveyed by recommendations issued by outsiders. In such a 
case, insider analysts should be more optimistic independently of whether they observe 
information provided by other analysts. The second possibility is that analysts, though 
optimistically biased, are rational in updating their beliefs. Then, if they are the first to 
issue a recommendation, they report their biased signal at face value. On the contrary, 
when an outsider issues a recommendation they update their signal and make a less op­
timistic, though positively biased, recommendation. Then the “naive view” predicts the 
same empirical behaviour as the “opportunistic view”.
However, it is possible to distinguish between these hypotheses by testing whether the 
behaviour of insider analysts is affected by that of outsiders. This is a possibility sug­
gested by the theoretical model. In fact the model predicts that the insider is willing to 
randomize between reporting information truthfully and lying even after observing the 
outsider reported a positive recommendation. Thus, the model predicts that the cor­
relation between the probability the insider issues a positive recommendation and the 
probability the outsider issues a positive recommendation can be quite low. This would 
not be the case if insiders were optimistically biased and updated their beliefs according 
to the information contained in the recommendations issued by outsiders. This point will 
be exploited to distinguish between the “opportunistic” and the “naive view”.
To sum up, the following hypotheses are brought to empirical test:
• HI: Insiders are more optimistic when it is more likely that outsiders issue a rec­
ommendation about the stock, so that insiders face more competition.
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• H2: The extent to which insiders issue an optimistic recommendation is not influ­
enced by the observation of previous optimistic recommendations by outsiders.
The next section discusses the identification strategy where these hypothesis are developed 
and made operational.
3.4 Identification Strategy
3 .4 .1  E s t im a tio n
The theoretical model suggests that analysts observe a signal about an IPO. This can be 
formalized as follows
r e c c ^ t ^ i d e r  ^  ^ c m t s i d ^ r  (3 .12)
recél^sidev ^  (3.13)
where reccf^^^ '^ ,^ j.^^^tsider recommendations issued by the insider and by an
outsider on IPO i, respectively; g^tsider the signals received by the insider and
by an outsider on IPO i. The terms g and h are the components in insiders recommen­
dation stemming from the presence of conflicts of interest. Similarly to the assumptions 
of the model, signals can take the following form:
^msider _  ^insider (3.14)
^^tsider ^  ^,_^^^tsider (3.15)
where  ^ ^outsider represents noise terms. I assume these noise terms come from
distributions from the same family, have zero mean, but differ in their variance and are 
independent. The insider decides whether to inflate the recommendation as a function 
of his optimal trade off between short run gains and reputation. I denote this term as 
g. Furthermore, the insider decides to inflate the recommendation as a function of his 
assessment of the presence of outsiders. I denote this term as h. The goal of the empirical 
analysis is to estimate h, which represents the effect of lack of (or weaker) competition^^, 
and g, which represents the inflation term due to being an insider and having a conflict 
of interest with investors^®. A possible empirical specification suggested by the model
the interpretation suggested by the naive view the term h would capture the lack of reduction in 
the optimistic bias in the beliefs of insiders due to not observing the information provided by outsiders.
®^In the interpretation suggested by the naive view the term g would capture the optimistic bias in the 
behefs of insiders.
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has the probability of observing the most optimistic recommendation as the dependent 
variable. This is an especially interesting possibility as recommendations are coded on a 
discrete scale^ .^ The idea is that analysts issue a “Strong Buy” recommendation only if 
the signal they receive is above a given threshold. For outsiders that can be formalized 
as
=  “Strong Buy” i f  Si > s* (3.16)
for insider as
=  “Strong Buy” i f  S i>  s* — g — h (3.17)
then the probability a “Strong Buy” recommendation is issued by an outsider is given by
the probability that Si > s*, or that Si ^ implying > s* — Sj. In
the case of insiders, the probability a “Strong Buy” recommendation is issued, is given
by the probability that > s* — Si — g — h. Therefore:
Prob{reccY^ ^^ ^^ '  ^ =  “Strong Buy” | no competition) =  G{si +  g A h) (3.18)
Prob{recc\^^^^^ =  “Strong Buy” | competition) =  G{si +  g) (3.19)
Prob{reccT^^^^^  ^ =  “Strong Buy”) =  G(a<) (3.20)
where G is the probability distribution for the noise term in the signal^®. Operationally, 
estimates of g and h can be obtained by including dummy variables for being an insider, 
and for being an insider facing no competition. The latter is observed ex post and a 
critical assumption is that insiders have rational expectations on the likelihood outsiders 
issue a recommendation on each stock.
An important problem is that the signal s is not observed. However, the signal can be 
proxied by observable variables. In fact, s represents the signal about the perspective of 
the company, therefore returns (the one day return which is observed by analysts when 
issuing recommendations and medium term returns in excess of some benchmark), time 
eflFects and industry, represent information about the signal observed by analysts. If IPOs 
of different quality are assigned to analysts according to analyst talent or willingness to 
trade off reputation for current gains, etc., then it will be necessary to include an analyst 
fixed effect. Size, captured by the proceeds amount of the IPO may also influence the 
signal received as it can signal how successful the IPO was, and it can be an important
alternative would be to analyze analyst forecasts. However, earnings forecasts for IPOs are typ­
ically not available in the first period after the company stocks began trading. That period is, however, 
the most suited to identify what analysts have a stronger confiict of interest with investors.
^°The fact that the noise term has difi’erent variance across analysts is taken care in the estimation by 
allowing for errors to be clustered at the analyst level.
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variable to include. In practice, I approximate the signal on the IPO as a hnear function, 
as follows:
Si =  Oisizci +  6 2 returnsi +  industryi +  timci (3.21)
Then, in order to identify the terms g and h, it is needed that the dummies for being an 
insider and those for being an insider facing no competition are non linear functions of 
the same controls (or of a subset of them). In such a case, it is possible to get
Frob{reccij =  “Strong Buy”) =  (3.22)
G[ip +  6 \sizei  +  6 2 returnsi +  industryi +  timei +  g * duminsij +  h*  {no competitionij)]
where reccij is the recommendation issued by analyst j  on IPO i, G is a distribution 
function, ip is a constant term, duminsij  is a dummy taking the value 1 if analyst j  is an 
insider for IPO i and no competitionij is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if analyst j  
is an insider facing no competition for IPO i, and both dummies are non hnear functions 
of the controls (size, returns, etc.). That is a reasonable assumption as both dummies can 
be intended as probabilities that the insider issues a recommendation and that the insider 
issues a recommendation facing no competition^^. The critical identifying assumption 
is that the dummies for being an insider and for facing less competition should not be 
correlated with firm unobservable quality. I further discuss this issue in sections 3.6, 3.7 
and 3.8.
Another possibility is to use the strength of coverage from outsiders to capture the effect 
of stronger versus weaker competition. This implies assuming that h depends upon the 
number of outsiders covering the IPO. To get an estimable equation, I assume that h 
is a linear function of n. Again, I use the probability of observing the most optimistic 
recommendation as the dependent variable. I also introduce an interaction term between 
the number of outsiders and size, in order to allow for the possibility that competition 
affects the degree of opportunism of insiders differently as a function of the size of the 
deal, and thus of the importance of the deal for the employer of the analyst. Formally:
Prob{reccY^^^^^  ^ — “Strong Buy”) =  (3.23)
G[ip +  6 isizci  +  9 2 Teturnsi -(- industryi +  timci 4- Pni +  (p{ni * sizei)]
where ip is a constant, ni is the number of outsiders issuing a recommendation on firm i, 
and the main parameters of interest are /3 and (p. The key identifying assumption in this
^^ If, on the contrary g and h were linear functions of the controls, the term g can identify the part of 
conflict of interest that does not depend upon size, and the term h can identify the assessment of the 
insider about the extent of coverage from outsiders that is based on his unobservable information.
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case is that the number of outsiders covering the IPO is uncorrelated with unobservable 
firm quality, conditional on the included controls. I discuss this point in greater depth in 
section 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8.
3 .4 .2  Issu es
The first issue is to define which agents have a stronger confiict of interest with investors. I 
limit attention to recommendations about IPOs issued in the first days after the company 
went public so as to define clearly who is the insider. This can be achieved by gathering 
information on the identity of investment banks underwriting the IPO, as they will have 
the strongest conflicts of interest with investors. However, IPOs typically involve other 
intermediaries acting as co-managers. I believe this is not a great problem for two reasons. 
Firstly, the lead underwriter has a stronger confiict of interest with investors than all other 
co-underwriter involved. Secondly, this would weaken the differences between insiders and 
outsiders, increasing the diflSculty to identify any effect. Therefore, if any difference in 
the behaviour of insiders and outsiders is found in the data, it could be argued that it is 
underestimated.
The second issue is to define when an insider analyst faces more or less competition. I take 
two approaches. The first considers the insider as facing less competition if no outsider 
analyst issued a recommendation on the stock during the first 45 days of trade, defining 
a dummy variable taking the value one when the insider is the only analyst to issue a 
recommendation on the IPO, as in equation 3.22. The second employs coverage of the 
stock from outsider analysts, including the number of outsiders issuing a recommendation 
on the IPO as a regressor to capture competitive pressure on insider analysts, as in 
equation 3.23.
The third issue is that insiders form expectations to assess whether outsiders cover the 
stock. Such expectations are based upon variables such as the size of the IPO, the industry 
the firm operates in, how “hot” the market is. The fact that insiders can make mistakes 
raises the difficulty to identify the effect of competition, because insiders might report the 
truth attaching a large probability outsiders issue a (truthful) recommendation, while this 
might not happen in the data. On the other hand, insiders may have private information 
about whether outsider analysts issue a recommendation. I observe (ex - post) that insider 
analysts are facing less competition. When this happens, the measure of competition from 
outsiders captures also the private information the insider may have on the strength of 
coverage on the stock from outsiders.
The fourth issue concerns the evaluation of whether the behaviour of analysts could be
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determined by psychological biases as suggested by the naive view or not. The analysis 
of the effect of competition does not allow to answer this question. Therefore, I try 
to establish whether an analyst updates his beliefs about the stock after observing a 
recommendation from other analysts (this could be due to rational Bayesian updating or to 
herd behaviour) by testing directly whether insiders seem to use the information contained 
in recommendations from outsiders (and vice versa j. This is done by running a Probit 
regression to check whether the fact that outsiders issued a positive recommendation 
before the insider, raises the chances the latter issues a positive recommendation. A 
rejection of this hypothesis suggests insiders are optimistic independently of whether they 
observed an optimistic recommendation from outsiders. That would provide indirect 
evidence in favour of the “opportunistic view” for insider analysts overoptimism. Of 
course, if the hypothesis is not rejected that could also be due to the intrinsic quality of 
the firm.
3.5 D ata
Information about IPO deals have been collected from the SDC-Platinum database. The 
dataset I obtained lists IPOs in the period 1995 to 2002 providing information about the 
identity of the bookrunner(s), the date of the IPO, the size of the issue, the offer price, 
the one day, three and six months returns, the industry, the nationality of the company, 
the market on which it trades, the type of shares issued. There are 3707 IPOs in the 
dataset^^. Data on analysts recommendations come from I/B /E /S . Recommendations 
are coded in a scale from 1 (the most favorable to the company, “Strong Buy”) to 5 (the 
least favorable to the company, “Strong Sell”). Following the existing literature, I recode 
recommendations so that 5 corresponds to “Strong Buy” and 1 to “Strong Sell”. The 
database also provides information about the analyst issuing the recommendation, the 
date of the recommendation, the broker the analyst is working for. The two dataset are 
matched in order to identify who is the analyst issuing the recommendation and whether 
this analyst is working for the bookrunner and is thus an “insider”, or not. I also include 
information on returns. These come from the CRSP database.
The main data issue is dealing with IPOs with more than one bookrunner. In such cases 
the game changes: one insider knows that there are chances that other insiders as well 
as outsiders issue a recommendation and this can modify his incentives. My strategy 
is to exclude the company when multiple insiders are issuing a recommendation in the 
same time window. The fact that brokers engaged in extensive M&A activities is not an
^^This is consistent with the information provided by Jay Ritter on the number of IPOs per year in the 
US.
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important problem for this work as the analysis is limited to the recommendations issued 
in the first days after the IPO.
Insiders are prevented to release recommendations about the company before the end of 
the “quiet period”. This was set at 25 days until July 2002, and later extended to 40 days. 
For this reason, data on IPOs that begun trading after the second quarter of 2002 have 
been excluded from the analysis^^, Therefore the sample includes recommendations issued 
in the first 45 days after the IPO begun trading (end of the quiet period plus 20 days). 
This choice is motivated by the desire to have a clear definition of “competition”, and 
by the desire to minimize distortions coming from the possibility that new information 
about the company becomes public in the meanwhile. A longer interval would add noise 
as it is more likely that new information gets revealed in the meanwhile. A shorter 
interval raises the risk of misclassifying the degree of competition, as outsiders may issue 
a recommendation 35 or 40 days after the IPO. I am including in the analysis ordinary 
(or common) shares only, as comparing different financial instruments can be misleading 
as the degree of “competition” among analysts could differ for very specialized financial 
instruments. Also, including issues of shares with limited (or extra) voting rights could 
affect the recommendation, I also exclude those recommendations for which the identity of 
the analyst is not reported, though the identity of the bookrunner is. When this happens, 
recommendations are excluded in order to be able to use information about analysts. I 
identified a few errors, such as repeated recommendations, and I excluded them. There 
are a few cases (38 observations) where an insider issues more than one recommendation 
in the 45 days sample. These observations are not excluded from the analysis, but the 
estimation has been performed also on the sample excluding such observations as a further 
robustness check and results hold. There is no information about the first day return of 
some firms. Analogously the six month excess return is missing for some firms. The 
sample also includes a few (78) non-US firms. Most of these are those firms for which 
informations about returns are missing. Their inclusion do not alter results, so such IPOs 
are left in the sample. Thus, in the end, the analysis is carried out on a sample including 
3164 recommendations from 1275 analysts about 1416 IPOs.
It is important to review the summary statistics of the sample. Table 3.2 summarizes 
the distribution and the mean of recommendations according to the type of analyst that 
issued them.
A preliminary inspection of Table 3.2 suggests that insiders issue more optimistic rec-
These could be included adding other 20 days after the quiet period. Results are unchanged. However, 
recommendations issued 60 days after the IPO date might incorporate a great deal of new information 
and the comparison with recommendations issued when the quiet period ended on the 25th day after the 
IPO might be debatable.
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Table 3.2 Distribution of Recommendations by type of Analyst
This table displays the distribution of recommendations by type of analyst. The first 
column shows the percentage of occurrence of each recommendation issued by all the 
analysts in the sample. The second column shows the percentage of occurrence of each 
recommendation issued by analysts non affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO 
(outsiders). The third column shows the percentage of occurrence of each recommendation 
issued by analysts afiiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO (insiders). The fourth 
column shows the percentage of occurrence of each recommendation issued by analysts 
afiiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO issuing a recommendation on a company 
that received no coverage from non afiiliated analysts (insiders with no competition). 
The last line represents the average recommendation issued by each type of analyst. 
Recommendations are from the I /B /E /S  dataset, recoded on a scale from 5 (Strong Buy) 
to 1 (Strong Sell).
All analysts Outsiders Insiders Insiders with no competition
Strong Buy 46.11 43.88 50.62 60.19
Buy 49.59 50.83 47.09 38.39
Hold 4.20 5.15 2.29 1.42
Sell 0.09 0.14 0 0
Strong Sell 0 0 0 0
Average 4.41 4.38 4.48 4.58
ommendations than outsiders, and furthermore that insiders issue even more optimistic 
recommendations when they face less competition. In fact outsiders issue a far larger pro­
portion of “Hold” recommendations than insiders, and a far lower proportion of “Strong 
Buy” recommendations. Finally, insiders issue a larger fraction of “Strong Buy” recom­
mendations when they face no competition from outsiders (this information was already 
provided in Table 3.1).
It is also interesting to examine firm characteristics. Table 3.3 shows descriptive statistics 
about the size and returns of the IPOs.
These statistics show that companies recommended only from insiders are on average 
smaller. It seems obvious that outsiders are more hkely to issue a recommendation about 
“larger” issues. This can constitute a problem if size is related to firm unobservable 
quality. On the contrary, as long as size is a measure of firm visibility^'*, it will be a 
crucial factor in determining the incentives of outsiders to acquire information about 
the company and issue a recommendation. IPOs receiving less coverage from outsider
This expression refers to the degree investors are interested in getting information about the company.
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of IPOs
Panel A contains summary statistics of size, first day return and six month excess return 
for the whole sample of IPOs. The first column represents the main statistics of the size 
of the IPO (proceeds amount in million US Dollars) for the whole sample under analysis, 
the second column represents the main statistics of the first day return, the third column 
contains the main statistics of six month returns in excess of the CRSP value weighted 
index. Returns are measured in US dollars. Panel B represents the same information for 
those IPOs for which insider analysts are the only analyst issuing a recommendation in 
the first 45 days after the stock began trading.
P anel A Full sample 1416 Observations
Size First Day Return Six Month Excess Return
Mean 78.37 0.412 0.487
Median 45.5 0.191 0.091
Std. Dev 159.5 0.665 1.804
Skewness 10.83 3.206 7.677
P anel B IPOs with no coverage from outsiders 208 Observations
Size First Day Return Six Month Excess Return
Mean 45.51 0.167 0.0710
Median 35.65 0.115 -0.077
Std. Dev 43.53 0.222 0.701
Skewness 5.58 1.668 3.069
analysts also have lower returns, both first day and six month excess returns^®. This 
suggests that IPOs that receive wider coverage from outsiders have higher returns, and 
are thus probably “better companies” for investors.
Finally, IPOs are classified in different industries according to the SIC-4 digit classification 
system. There is a relatively large fraction of IPOs operating in the information technology 
and biotechnology reflecting the “Hi - Tech” boom of the nineties.
^®The mean six month excess return is especially large for three observations for which insider analysts 
facing no competition from outsiders issued a “hold” recommendation. That explains why the average six 
month excess returns for IPOs in table III is larger than the average six month excess returns for IPOs for 
which insider analysts facing no competition issued “Strong Buy” or “Buy” recommendations displayed 
in Table I.
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3.6 R esu lts
3 .6 .1  T e s t in g  th e  E ffect o f  C o m p e t it io n
In this subsection, I test whether and how competition affects the recommendation issued 
by insider analysts. Recommendations are a discrete and ordered dependent variable. 
This suggests estimating a multinomial ordered Logit or Probit model. However, it can be 
important to take into account that analyst unobserved characteristics may be correlated 
with the regressors. Estimating an ordered Logit with fixed effects is not feasible, due 
to the incidental parameters problem. As shown in section 3.4, the theoretical model 
suggests that it is possible to focus attention on the probabihty that an analyst issues 
the highest recommendation “Strong Buy”, thus obtaining a binary dependent variable. 
Then, it is possible to estimate a conditional fixed effect Logit model to take into account 
the influence of analyst unobserved heterogeneity^®. Then, I estimate a model based upon 
equation 3.22:
Prob{recCij^t =  ‘^ Strong Buÿ^) =  (3.24)
AfV' +  7  * d u m in S i j  + t] * nocom pe ti t io r i i j  +  0 * +  Cj]
where A is the logistic distribution, reccij^t is the recommendation about firm i from 
analyst j  at time t, V' is a constant, duminsij  is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when 
the recommendation from analyst j  about firm i is issued by an insider, nocompetitoriij 
is a dummy variable taking the value 1 when the recommendation on firm i is issued by 
an analyst j  being an insider facing no competition from outsiders. The parameters 7 
and 77 are the estimates for the parameters g and h in equation 3.22. The matrix Xi t^ 
includes industry fixed effects, quarterly dummies to capture the effect of the business 
cycle and of market conditions, the size of the issue (measured as the logarithm of the 
proceeds amount of the issue, the name of the variable is Size), the return in the first day 
of trading (the name of the variable is First Day) and the six month excess returns on the 
stock computed as difference from returns on the CRSP value weighted index (the name 
of the variable is Six Month Excess Return), as a control for the quality of the firm. I run 
regressions including both the three and the six month return from the issue date. Results 
are not affected by the choice of this time span. The three months (excess) return could be 
more directly affected by recommendations, therefore, I present results including the six- 
months returns^^. The term 9*Xi^t aims at capturing the signal observed by the analyst.
^®In a previous version of this paper, I estimated an ordered Logit model (without analyst fixed effects), 
and a linear model. Results are very similar and are available upon request.
Another possibility is to compute excess returns on the CRSP equally weighted index. Results are 
both qualitatively and quantitatively very similar.
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However, the size of the issue can also capture the effects of the incentives as insiders 
are subjected to stronger pressure to issue a favourable recommendation on larger chents. 
Finally, the term Q represents an analyst time invariant component. It can be especially 
important to control for analyst unobserved heterogeneity as firms can be allocated to 
analysts as a function of analyst unobservable (and time invariant) characteristics, such 
as ability or willingness to trade off reputation for current gains.
The main hypothesis to be tested concerns the behaviour of insider analysts as a function 
of whether other analysts are transmitting information about the same company in a 
given time window. This is:
9 r) =  0 versus an alternative r] >  0.
If 77 > 0, then
Prob{recc =  StrongBuyf^ | X, insidernocompetition) >
Prob{recc =  ‘^StrongBuy^^ | X, insider) (3.25)
and insiders are more likely to issue the most optimistic recommendation when there is 
no coverage of the stock from outsiders.
Another hypothesis to be tested is:
• 'y =  0 versus an alternative 7 ^ 0.
and the model also suggests testing the one - sided hypothesis:
# 7  =  0 versus an alternative 7 > 0
so that insider analysts are more likely to issue the most optimistic recommendation than 
outsiders independently from the strength of competition from outsider analysts. In fact, 
if 7 >  0,
Prob{recc =  ^^StrongBuy’^ | X, insider) >  '
Prob{recc =  ‘^ StrongBuy^^ | X, outsider) (3.26)
Table 3.5 in Appendix 2 reports results. The first column displays results firom a logit
model estimated by maximum likelihood that does not control for analyst unobserved
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heterogeneity. It can be seen that the dummy for the insider facing no competition from 
outsiders is positive and significant at the five percent level. The dummy for being an 
insider is positive but not significant in a two sided test (but it is, at the 6 per cent 
level, in a one sided test). The size of the issue is negative and significant, at the ten 
percent level. The first day return is negative and highly significant. The fact that the 
first day return is negative, suggests that analysts tend to be less optimistic about those 
IPOs that experienced a very pronounced increase in price during the first day of trade. 
Finally, the six month excess return is negative but not significant. The negative sign 
is a bit puzzling, although this may be due to the fact that this regression does not 
control for analyst characteristics that may be correlated with the quality of the IPO. 
In fact, IPOs may be assigned to analysts according to their ability or talent, or maybe 
according to their willingness to sacrifice their reputation to please their employers. The 
second column of Table 3.5 reports results from a conditional fixed effects Logit model. 
Some observations are lost, as this model does not use those observations for which the 
dependent variable does not change within individuals. Therefore recommendations from 
those analysts always issuing a “Strong Buy”, or never issuing a “Strong Buy” are not 
used in the estimation. It can be seen that when analyst fixed effects are included, the 
dummy for the insider facing no competition is still positive and significant, although 
now at the 10 per cent level (p-value is 0.07). The dummy for being an insider is positive 
and now strongly significant, suggesting that insiders are more likely to issue “Strong 
Buy” recommendations than outsiders. An interesting change occurs to the parameter of 
size. The coefficient becomes positive, and significant. This seems to suggest that analyst 
characteristics infiuence the kind of IPOs they are assigned to cover. Finally, the first 
day return is again negative and highly significant, while the six month excess return is 
not significant but has now the expected sign (positive). Results are similar when analyst 
effects are treated as random, and the dummy for the insider facing no competition is 
now significant at the 2 per cent level. The main difference concerns the coefficient for 
the size of the IPO which is now quite small and not significant.
As a second approach to capture the effect of competition, I include the number of out­
siders, an explicit measure of coverage of the stock, as a regressor in a model including 
only recommendations issued by insider analysts. If the insider has rational expectations, 
he will be able to forecast correctly the number of outsiders issuing a recommendation on 
the same company, and thus the degree of competition. Having a measure of the strength 
of analyst coverage allows to take care of the possibility that competition and size also 
have an interaction effect, so that competition affects the degree of opportunism of in­
siders differently as a function of the size of the deal, and thus of the importance of the 
deal for the employer of the analyst. As discussed above, recommendations are discrete 
and ordered, calhng for the use of an ordered Logit or Probit model to estimate para­
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meters, which however, is not tractable if analyst fixed effects are included. Therefore, 
as above, I estimate a Logit model for the probability the insider issues a “Strong Buy” 
recommendation. The model, based upon equation 3.23, is:
Prob{recà^fl^^'^ =  ^^StrongBuy’^ ) =  (3.27)
A[i/j +  finumbouti +  psizci +  4>{sizei * numbouti) 4- +  C>]
where, again, A is the logistic distribution, reccl^^^'^ is the recommendation by analyst j  
being an insider on company i, ip is a constant, numbouti is the logarithm of the number 
of outsiders issuing a recommendation on company , sizci is again the logarithm of the 
proceeds amount in million dollars on IPO i, sizei * numbouti is an interaction between
size and number of outsiders, and Xi t^ includes the remaining controls: the six month
excess return on the IPO, the return in the first day of trade, quarterly and industry 
dummies. The term Q represents an analyst specific time invariant component. The 
main hypotheses to be tested in this case are:
• P =  0 versus an alternative P <  0
• (p =  Q versus an alternative <p>
The first hypothesis suggests that when coverage from outsider analysts is stronger, insider 
analysts display a larger degree of optimism. The second hypothesis implies that such 
effect is weaker for larger deals, exactly those for which the incentives of insider analysts 
to report favourable information would be stronger.
Table 3.6 in Appendix 2 shows results. Column 1 reports estimates from a Logit model
that does not control for analyst unobserved heterogeneity. The coefficient of the number
of outsiders issuing a recommendation is negative and highly significant (at the one per 
cent level), suggesting that the more outsiders cover the stock, the less optimistic the 
insider analyst, when the effect of size is ignored^^. The coefficient for size is negative 
but not significant (although it will be significant in a one-sided test at the 6 per cent 
level). The marginal effect of the interaction term is positive and significant (at the 1 
per cent leve l)su ggestin g  that the effect of competition is weaker for larger deals. In 
fact the partial effect of the number of outsiders on the probability the recommendation
rescaled the number of outsiders adding one, so as to include the cases when no outsider issued a 
recommendation, which would turn as missing values, being the log of zero.
^^The partial effect of the number of outsiders on the probability the recommendation is a “Strong 
Buy” is given by /3 +  (psize 
^°The z  — sta tistic  refers to the significance of the coe&cient of the interaction term. However, in order 
to test the significance of the interaction effect, it is necessary to test for the significance of the whole 
interaction effect which is given by /3A (•) +  (/3 +  (f)size){p +  <f)numbout)A (•).
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is a “Strong Buy” is given by ^ +  (f)size and as <  0 and 0 > 0, the mitigating effect 
of competition from outsiders is weaker for larger IPOs, The coefficient for the first day 
return is again negative and significant. Finally, the coefficient for the six month excess 
return is negative but very small and not significant. Again, it could be important to 
control for analyst unobserved heterogeneity. However, as discussed above, the conditional 
fixed effect Logit discards quite a lot of observations, and the model is estimated using 
only 310 recommendations. Results are reported in the second column of Table 3,6, The 
coefllcient for the (log) number of outsiders is negative, but not significant. The coefficient 
of the interaction term is positive but again not significant, as it is the coefficient for 
Size. Only the coeflScient for the first day return is significant, and negative. The fact 
that most coefficients are not significant is not very surprising due to the small number 
of observations on which the model is estimated, and the relatively large number of 
dununy variables included. However, at least the sign of the coefficient for the number 
of outsiders and for the interaction term, is the one expected on the basis of the model. 
The third column of Table 3,6 reports results for the Logit model with random effects. 
The coefficient for the number of outsiders is negative and significant (at the 2 per cent 
level), the coefficient for size is negative but not significant while the interaction term is 
positive and significant at the three per cent level. Returns on the first day of trade are 
negative and highly significant, while six month excess returns are, again, not significant,
3 .6 .2  D isc r im in a tin g  b e tw e e n  th e  O p p o r tu n is t ic  a n d  th e  N a iv e  V iew :  
T e stin g  for B a y e s ia n  U p d a tin g
The results presented up to this point leave the question on the origin of insider ana­
lyst overoptimism open. Insiders could be less optimistic when there is wider coverage 
of the stock from outsider analysts due to “simple” rational Bayesian updating. When 
insiders are the first to issue a recommendation they do not have any other information 
but their private signals, while if they can observe a report from an outsider, they might 
decide to use this information when issuing a recommendation on the company. Thus, it 
is important to understand whether some learning takes place, in order to distinguish the 
“opportunistic” versus the “naive” view to explain overoptimism. To this end, I examine 
whether insiders are influenced by outsiders when issuing their recommendation. This 
is done by checking whether the chances the insider issues a positive recommendation 
increase after observing a positive recommendation from outsiders. This requires defining 
situations in which outsiders issued an optimistic recommendation on the IPO, The av­
erage recommendation from outsiders issued before the insider issues a recommendation 
is distributed as summarised in Table 3,4,
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Table 3.4 Distribution of the Average of Recommendations by Non-Affiliated Analysts 
Issued before an AflSliated Analyst Issued a Recommendation
The table reports the distribution of the average recommendation issued by analysts non 
affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO in the ttnee days before an analyst affiliated 
with the lead underwriter of the IPO issued a recommendation. Recommendations are 
from the I /B /E /S  dataset recoded on a scale from 5 (Strong Buy) to 1 (Strong Sell). 
The column labelled as recc contains the recommendation, the column labelled as obs the 
number of observation for each recommendation, the column labelled as freq the relative 
frequency of the recommendation and the column labelled as cum contains the cumulative 
frequency.
recc obs freq cum
5 40 27.4 27.4
4.5 22 15.07 42.47
4.333 6 4.11 46.58
4 69 47.26 93.84
3.5 4 2.74 96.58
3 5 3.42 100
Total 146
It can be seen that half of the times the average recommendation is larger than 4.333. 
Thus, in order to build a measure of outsider analyst optimism, I define a dummy vari­
able taking the value 1 if the average recommendation is greater or equal than 4.333. 
Essentially, I define a case when the average recommendation from outsiders is above 
the median average recommendation as a situation where outsiders issued an optimistic 
recommendation. As a second measure for outsider analyst optimism, I consider the most 
optimistic recommendation issued by outsiders, and I define a dummy variable taking the 
value 1 when at least an outsider issued a “strong buy”. This strategy is formahzed as 
follows
Prob{recd^'^^^'  ^ =  strong buy) =  $(•0 +  ^outopti -f 4- £i,f) (3.28)
where represents the recommendation issued by the insider on company i at
time t, $  is the Normal distribution, 0  is a constant, outopti is a dummy taking the 
value 1 if the average of outsider recommendations on company i is larger than 4.333 
(the median average recommendation from outsiders). Then in a second regression the 
dummy outopti takes the value 1 if at least one outsider issued a “Strong Buy”, and 
is a vector of controls including size, the first day and the six month excess return on the 
stock. Quarterly and industry dummies are not included as the number of observations 
is small, in order not to reduce the precision of inference too much. The main hypothesis
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to be tested is whether ^ ^  0, and in particular whether P > 0. Table 3.7 in Appendix 
2 presents results for the sample including only recommendations issued in the three 
days prior to the date the insider issued his recommendation^^. Results show clearly 
that outopt, the tneasure for outsider optimism, is not significant. Notice that finding 
a significant coefficient of the dummy for an optimistic report from outsiders would not 
signal that insiders use the information of outsiders, it could just be that the company is 
of intrinsically good quality. In fact, if controls are not enough to capture the unobserved 
quality of the IPO, the measure of outsider optimism would be endogenous, as it is 
correlated with the unobserved quality of the firm that also affects the recommendation 
from the insider (the dependent variable). However, if this is the case, the bias should 
clearly be positive, because if the IPO is good, both the insider and the outsiders are 
relatively more likely to have observed favourable signals about the IPO. This implies 
that finding the coefl&cient is not significant is clearly inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that insiders update their information observing the information provided by outsiders.
3 .6 .3  S u m m a ry  o f  R e su lts
The evidence provided so far suggests the following:
1. Insiders are more likely to issue “Strong Buy” recommendations than outsiders. 
Such optimism is more pronounced when competition, measured in various ways 
referring to the extent of coverage from outsider analysts, is less intense.
2. The effect of competition is weaker for larger IPOs, those for which confiicts of 
interest are likely to be stronger.
3. Insiders do not seem to update their beliefs when observing recommendations from 
outsiders, as the probability they issue the highest possible recommendation is not 
affected by whether they observed a positive recommendation by outsiders.
These findings suggest that competition disciplines insider analysts. In principle, this 
result is consistent both with an incentive based theory (opportunistic view), and with 
an irrationality based theory (naive view) where insiders are optimistically biased but 
update their information rationally, so that they learn about the true distribution of firm 
quality when observing recommendations from outsiders. The second result is clearly
Results are essentially unchanged if all recommendations issued before the one issued by the insider 
are included. Of course there can be noise in these results, as new information about the company may 
become available over time. Similar results are also obtained if the regression includes all recommendations 
issued in the 10 or 5 days prior to the recommendation issued by the insider.
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consistent with the “opportunistic view”, and it could also be consistent with the “naive 
view” if one is ready to assume that psychological biases are stronger for more important 
deals. The third finding can be consistent with the “opportunistic view”, but not with 
the “naive view”. In the latter case, insiders should be more optimistic when observing an 
optimistic message and less optimistic otherwise. On the contrary, the fact that they tend 
to maintain the same degree of optimism independently of whether they observed positive 
recommendations from outsiders, suggests insiders behave opportunistically, trying to 
induce investors to have a positive perception of the quality of the IPO.
Thus far, the analysis maintained the assumption that the degree of competition from 
outsiders is independent of intrinsic firm quality, once observable characteristics of the IPO 
are controlled for. The analysis also controlled for the infiuence of analyst fixed effects, 
and this seems to be sufl&cient to conclude that the measure of competition used in the 
analysis is exogenous conditional on firm characteristics and analyst identity. However, 
the next section exphcitly addresses the possibility that some form of selection takes place, 
so that the degree of competition (stock coverage from outsider analysts) is lower exactly 
when the IPO is of better quality.
3.7  A ddressing Selection
One potential problem of this analysis is the possible presence of selection bias: if it 
happens that insider analysts face less competition exactly when firms are better, then 
there would be no strategic behaviour from insiders who would just be reporting what 
they observe. There are three answers to this important point. The first is that it is hard 
to imagine that outsiders issue recommendations about worse firms: if they have some 
freedom about which firm to analyse, then it is unlikely that they on average choose to 
cover the less promising IPOs. On the contrary, it seems more reasonable that outsiders 
do not issue recommendations about the worst companies. Therefore, selection bias, if 
present, should lead to an underestimation of the effect of competition on the degree of 
optimism of insider analysts. The second answer is that including as regressors industry 
and quarterly dummies, the six month excess return on the stock, and the return in 
the first day of trade, which can proxy for quality, the size of the issue and analyst 
fixed effects, should be enough to control for the effect of selection. The third answer is 
to further exploit the role of these observable variables and estimate the average effect 
of competition from outsiders through propensity score matching. I estimate a sort of 
average treatment effect, where the “treatment” is represented by lack of coverage of
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the IPO from outsiders^^. In this setting matching estimates the “correct assessment” 
of insiders about the degree of competition from outsiders on a given IPO. As discussed 
in section 3.4, insiders inflate or deflate their recommendation as a function of their 
assessment of the degree of competition from outsiders. That can depend upon observable 
information, but also upon private information of the insider. Matching methods try to 
identify observations such that the coverage from outsider analysts can be considered 
as random conditional on observable variables^^. Then, matching compares two IPOs 
that, given their characteristics, have similar chances of being covered by outsiders, and 
have similar chances to be given the same recommendation by the insider. If the insider 
has no further information, he should inflate his recommendation in the same way on 
both IPOs, and “competition” would have no effect. If, on the other hand, the insider is 
able to correctly assess the extent of coverage from outsiders on the IPO, that should be 
fully captured by matching. In other terms, matching compares two IPOs with the same 
characteristics, but for one IPO the insider attaches larger chances that outsiders provide 
coverage, and thus inflates less his recommendation.
It is important to stress that if the strength of coverage from outsiders depends upon 
unobservables, matching methods would be of no help. In that case, it would be necessary 
to estimate an Heckman selection model. That requires finding a valid instrument and 
thus imposing a reasonable exclusion restriction. In This work I can control for size, 
returns, industry and for the time period in which the IPO takes place. All such variables 
are both likely to affect the coverage of the stock from outsider analysts, and likely to 
affect the recommendation. Therefore, there is no obvious exclusion restriction that can 
be imposed. On the other hand, it seems that conditioning on size, returns, industry, the 
period in which the IPO occurred, is enough to control for factors affecting the strength 
of coverage from outsider analysts. If this is the case, matching may represent a cleaner 
way to estimate the effect of competition than the regressions run in section 3.6.
Thus, I firstly estimate the propensity score, in order to capture the likelihood that the 
insider faces less competition, as follows: ,
Prob(No Competitiorii^t =  1) =  +  ^Xi^t +  i^,t) (3.29)
where Prob{No Competitiorii^t =  1) is the probability there is no coverage from out­
siders on company i, $  is the Normal distribution, ■0 is a constant term, Xi t^ includes 
size (proceeds amount in million dollars), six month excess return, industry and quarterly 
dummies. I only include those IPOs for which there is a recommendation from insid-
As potentially all firms covered by insiders can also be covered by outsiders, it is interesting to estimate 
the effect of lack of coverage by outsiders on all IPOs, thus estimating the average treatment effect.
33 Or conditional on the propensity score, which is estimated using such observable variables.
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ers. Then, I estimate the average effect of not having coverage from outsiders, on the 
recommendation issued by the insider, by matching IPOs according to the probability 
that outsiders do not issue a recommendation, so as to create a sample of IPOs that are 
covered by both insiders and outsiders, but that have characteristics similar to those of 
IPOs covered by insider analysts only '^ .^ Formally I estimate the following:
r =  Prob{recci =  ‘^ Strong Bwif' | P {X i) ,N o  Competition =  1)
—Prob{recci =  '^‘Strong Buy^^  | P {X i) ,N o  Competition =  0) (3.30)
where r is the effect of exposing insider analysts to no competition from outsider analysts 
on the probability an insider analyst issues a “Strong Buy” recommendation, recci is the 
recommendation on company i, P{Xi)  is the propensity score and units (companies) i are 
matched according to their propensity score. The term r is different from zero if insider 
analysts are able to assess whether outsiders cover the stock or not, and modify their 
behaviour accordingly.
Table 3.8 in Appendix 2 reports results for the estimation of the propensity score. It 
can be seen that size is negative and highly significant, and both the six month excess 
return and the return in the first day of trade are negative and significant, suggesting that 
outsider analysts tend to cover stocks that have larger returns^^. Table 3.9 in Appendix 
2 shows summary statistics of the propensity score. The estimated propensity score 
satisfies the balancing property, meaning that for the estimated propensity score, IPOs 
for which there is coverage from outsiders have the same distribution in terms of size, 
returns, industry and time of the IPO, as IPOs for which there is no coverage from 
outsider analysts. Finally, I estimate the average effect of no coverage from outsiders, on 
the recommendation issued by insiders, matching observations on the basis of propensity 
scores, using the method of nearest neighbour. Table 3.10 in Appendix 2 reports results. 
The first line reports the average treatment effect estimated as in Abadie and Imbens
(2002), while the second line reports the bias adjusted estimator of the average treatment 
effect^®, where the adjustment is performed on size and excess returns. In both cases,
Ideally the effect should be estimated by comparing, for the same IPO, the recommendation provided 
by the insider analyst facing no competition with the recommendation provided by the insider analyst 
facing competition. However, the recommendation issued by the insider analyst on each IPO is either 
under competition from outsiders, or under no competition. Then, the counterfactual is obtained by 
matching each IPO for which there is a recommendation by the insider and no coverage from outsiders, 
with an IPO for which there is a recommendation by the insider and coverage from outsiders. Matching is 
implemented by using the IPO which has the closest propensity score, i.e. the closest probability that the 
outsiders provide coverage. Again a critical assumption is that insiders should have rational expectations 
about outsider analysts coverage. In fact, it is needed that insiders know that taken two firms with similar 
propensity score, on one there will be coverage from outsiders, while on the other there will be no coverage.
®^I tried other more parsimonious specifications for the propensity score, excluding quarterly or industry 
dummies, and including a coarser definition of industry and results (available upon request) are robust.
^®See Abadie and Imbens (2002).
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the effect is negative and statistically significant at about the 5 per cent level. The effect 
is also quite large. Using different matching algorithm (caliper or radius matching) does 
not affect results.
3.8 D iscussion
3 .8 .1  E m p ir ica l e v id e n c e
The evidence provided suggests that insider analysts behave differently according to 
whether there are other analysts providing information about a firm. The effect of com­
petition could act either on incentives for opportunistic behaviour, or on favouring the 
updating of optimistically biased behefs on part of insider analysts. Updating is not found 
in the data as shown in section 3.6.2. An important implication of these results is that 
the “psychological” explanation for insider overoptimism is inconsistent with the evidence 
documented in This chapter. On the contrary, the empirical evidence is consistent with 
the “opportunistic view” for analyst overoptimism. This conclusion has important pol­
icy implications: if insiders overoptimism was caused by a psychological bias, changing 
insiders incentives might have a limited effect on the information they provide. On the 
contrary, if their behaviour is driven by existing incentives, then that should be the focus 
of policy makers.
It is useful to discuss further the possible role of selection by thinking about what the 
results are suggesting. If insiders are more optimistic when no outsiders are issuing a 
recommendation because the firm is intrinsically better when they face less competition, 
then outsider analysts would tend to cover firms that have worse perspectives ex-ante. 
This hypothesis is difficult to defend: financial information can be thought of as an 
experience good. An investor appreciates the quality of an analyst recommendation if she 
invests in the company recommended. She would not do so if the recommendation is not 
very positive. It is difficult to think that investors track a stock they did not purchase 
in order to evaluate whether the negative recommendation of the analyst was correct. 
Thus, if anything, outsiders should, on average, cover a company with better ex-ante 
prospects. Then the fact the insider faces less competition would be negatively correlated 
with the quality of the company. In such a case the results of this chapter would even 
more strongly suggest that insiders behave opportunistically and that competition has a 
beneficial role in disciplining insider analysts. This is what is suggested in Table 3.1. Six 
month excess returns are lower for IPOs that receive no coverage from outsiders. However, 
insider analysts tend to issue especially optimistic recommendations for such IPOs.
Chapter 3. Competition and Opportunistic Advice of Financial Analysts 107
A last point concerns the decision to issue a recommendation: this has not been modelled 
formally, and it was assumed that insiders always issue a recommendation. However, 
this is not necessarily the case. It is not clear what the incentives of the insider are in 
such situation: he might prefer to say nothing rather than issue a bad recommendation. 
Then, the market should discount this fact and interpret no recommendation as a bad 
recommendation, thus reducing the incentives to keep silent. Under an empirical point 
of view, this means there is no recommendation by insiders about the worst companies. 
This can justify why insider recommendations are, on average, more optimistic than 
those of outsiders, but has no effect on the differential behaviour of insiders as a function 
of whether outsiders issue a recommendation. A possibility is that insiders decide not 
to issue a recommendation because they know there will be competition from outsiders 
and the cost of lying, in terms of reputation, will be larger. In such a case, we would 
observe insiders issuing a recommendation when outsiders provide coverage, for better 
companies only, and for both good and bad companies when there is less competition. 
Then, again the larger degree of optimism of insiders when they face less competition, 
would be underestimated.
3 .8 .2  T h e o r e t ic a l m o d e l
This subsection provides a discussion of the main assumptions of the theoretical model. 
The model assumes that the insider moves first. Removing this assumption does not harm 
the results in this version of the model, but may create interesting effects if also outsiders 
may have conflict of interests with investors. In this case an outsider may have incentives 
to wait for the recommendation of the insider. On the other hand, if he has reputational 
concerns, he might want to pool with non - careerist and issue a recommendation before 
the insider to show the market he just cares about reporting his information. This is an 
interesting problem that, however, does not seem to alter the main mechanism highlighted 
in this chapter.
The model would also yield predictions about the effect of reputation on incentives. For 
example, as in other models of reputational incentives, truthtelling incentives decrease as 
more information about an analyst type has been revealed, because much learning about 
the analyst type has occurred and further reputational gains are low^ .^ These aspects have 
not been emphasized in the discussion as I could not gather information about analysts’ 
reputation.
In order to clarify the modelling strategy, the role of the main assumptions is summarized
See, among others, Holmstrom (1982 - II).
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below:
• The greater precision of insider signals is introduced for the sake of realism, but 
plays no specific role for the results and could be dispensed with.
• The assumption that insiders do not issue a bad report when observing a good 
signal, determines the fact that the investor decision does not depend upon ana­
lyst reputation when observing an unfavourable report because the signal is fully 
credible. The assumption considerably simplifies the analysis and its removal would 
modify the equilibrium of the game. However, the effects of competition highlighted 
in the model will still hold, although further effects may arise.
• The assumption about the timing of the game is needed to simplify the analysis. 
Without this assumption each analyst would choose optimally the timing to issue a 
recommendation. However, assuming this does not happen does not seem unrealistic 
as the data do not show any specific pattern. Furthermore, insider analysts cannot 
issue a recommendation earher than 25 days from the IPO (this was extended to 
40 days since July 2002), so they have a relatively hmited choice. Even allowing 
for strategic timing of information transmission, the basic insight about the role of 
competition would remain valid.
• The assumption that analysts always issue a recommendation when they receive 
information about a company is made to simplify the solution of the model. Allowing 
for strategic “silence” would not alter the basic insight of the model, it would add a 
further strategic choice to careerist insiders. This assumption, however, might have 
consequences for the empirical work: if analysts strategically choose to avoid sending 
a recommendation, the sample might be biased. This possibility was discussed 
further in sections 3.7 and 3.8.1.
•  The model assumes that recommendations take a binary form. In practice, however, 
recommendations can be considered as partitions over the space of company states. 
The dataset used in the empirical analysis codifies recommendations in 5 intervals. 
The assumption of binary recommendation allows to improve the tractability of the 
analysis, without a great loss of generality.
• The model assumes there is one outsider only. This is not restrictive at all. It just 
helps reducing the computational and notational burden. In a more general set up, 
the insider and the outsiders will form beliefs about the hkelihood other outsiders 
issue a recommendation, and how many of them are likely to do so. Hence the 
predictions of the model are suitable to be tested on data where more than one 
outsider issues a recommendation.
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• The presence of only one insider is slightly more restrictive. The presence of mul­
tiple insiders complicates the analysis, but not the conclusion: in fact, insiders will 
now form beliefs about the chances other insiders issue a recommendation, but the 
intuition of the model will not be overturned.
• Career concerns in this model are not related to talent, but to some moral charac­
teristics. A talent model, in which more talented analysts observe a more precise 
signal of the state of the world, can yield similar predictions. An important dif­
ference, however, will be in the behaviour of outsiders: the latter would always 
use the information contained in previous recommendations of insiders (as long as 
these are credible) because they will try to guess the true value of the firm using all 
available information. In fact a talent model would assume that talented types are 
more hkely to observe a correct signal. Then, the reputation of outsiders for being 
talented raises if they issue a correct recommendation. Therefore outsiders will use 
all the available information (including the recommendation issued by insiders) to 
guess the correct realization of the quahty of the company.
3.9 C onclusion
This work investigates whether competition helps mitigating biases in recommendations 
issued by affiliated analysts. Competition is measured as the strength of coverage of a 
stock from unaffiliated analysts. I develop a theoretical model to assess the effect of 
competition on the incentives of affihated analysts who are motivated by reputational 
concerns. The theoretical model shows that coverage from non affiliated analysts is ex­
pected to increase truthtelling incentives. This hypothesis is tested empirically using 
data on recommendations about IPOs on the US market. The main result is that ana­
lysts working for the bookrunner of the IPO tend to be more optimistic when there is less 
coverage of the stock from other analysts. Moreover, the disciplining effect of competition 
is weaker for larger IPOs for which conflicts of interests are likely to be larger. Even when 
competition is stronger, affihated analysts tend to issue too optimistic recommendations, 
suggesting that competition mitigates, but does not fully solve, the problem and that 
policy intervention may be warranted.
These results are consistent both with the possibility that affiliated analysts overoptimism 
is induced by incentives and with the possibility that affiliated analysts overoptimism 
is induced by psychological biases. In the first case competition would be reducing the 
short run gains from issuing an overoptimistic report making reputational incentives more 
effective. The evidence on the weaker effect of competition for larger deals seems to
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confirm this hypothesis. In the second case, competition would provide affiliated analysts 
with more unbiased information useful to update their optimistically biased prior beliefs 
on the company. Exploiting the presence of competition from non afl&liated analysts 
can help devising a test to distinguish between these competing hypotheses to explain 
affiliated analysts overoptimism. In fact, it is possible to test whether affiliated analysts 
use the information contained in recommendations from non affiliated analysts. The 
empirical results suggest this is not the case, providing evidence against the psychological 
bias hypothesis to explain affihated analysts overoptimism. Hence, these results provide 
indirect evidence in favour of the hypothesis that affiliated analysts overoptimism is driven 
by incentives, and therefore have important implications for the design of appropriate 
regulatory intervention.
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3.10 A ppendix  to  Chapter 3 - Proofs
P ro o f o f P roposition  3.1. As argued in the text, in equilibrium either U t < Ul and 
q* =  0, or U t =  Ul and q* G (0,1). Define the function S{q) =  U t — Ul- The analyst is 
indifferent between reporting the truth and lying when U t =  Ul, or S{q) =  0. Then, for 
a unique equihbrium to exist, it is necessary that the function S{q) be monotonie in q. It 
is possible to show that the function S{q) is monotonically decreasing in g. In fact,
Ut  — Ul =
gE[a  I s ,j]  +  i[aF(A«'+) +  ( l - a ) V ( A ® - ) ] -  
{gE[a  I 6, 2] +  «[aF(A®'-) +  ( l-o )y (A ® '+ )]}  (A3.1)
the term gE[a  | s,z] is independent of q, as a sell recommendation is taken at face value.
Then, as — —  < 0, — —  < 0, and are monotonically decreasing
dX^~ dX^'^
in g, as V is a continuous and increasing function of A. As —-—  > 0, —-—  > 0,
oq oq
V{X^’~) and y(A '^"*') are increasing in g, but have a negative sign in S{q). Furthermore,
d E {a  \b ,z)  d a  , .
> 0 as > 0 and the derivative
dq dp
dp ( 1 - A f ) ( 2 a - 1 )
dq [1 +  (1 - A t ) ( l - g f )]2 >  0 (A3.2)
as a > Therefore, the function S{q) is monotonically decreasing in q. Thus the function 
attains its maximum when q =  0 and its minimum when q =  \. It can be seen that 
5(1) < 0. This follows because in such a case, there is perfect pooling of types and 
— \-l-i “  ~  \ + i  =  At, so that
5 ( 1 )  =  gE[a  | s ,  z ]  — gE[a  | 6, z] <  0  (A3.3)
Then, there are two cases: if 5 ( 0 )  <  0 ,  then g  =  0  is the unique equihbrium because by 
raising g ,  the function 5  decreases even further and there is no value of g  G ( G ,  1 )  ensuring 
that 5 ( g )  =  0 ,  or Ut  =  Ul  so that the analyst is willing to randomize. On the contrary, 
if 5 ( 0 )  >  0 ,  there will be a unique g  G ( 0 , 1 )  such that 5 ( g )  =  0 ,  because 5 ( 1 )  <  0  and 5  
is continuous because of the continuity of E{a)  and V, and monotonically decreasing in 
g .  Notice that the same result holds if the investor (short) sells the stock after observing 
one or two sell recommendations. In such cases either a(p®’®), or a(p®’^ ), and possibly 
a{p^’^ ) or a{p^’^ ) are negative and the gains for the analyst are nil.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  3.2. Insider analysts randomize in equilibrium as long as U t =
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Ul , or
gE[a  I 6, z] -  gE[a | =  (A3.4)
(5[ol {^A®'+) +  (1 -  a)y(A®’-)] -  {i[oT^(A®•-) +  (1 -  a)V(A®'+)]}
If the difference gE[a. | 6, z] —gE[a | s, z] decreases in z, in equilibrium, the right hand side 
also needs to decrease. In order for this to be the case, g, the equilibrium probability of 
truthtelling must increase (as shown in the proof of Proposition 3.1). Then, I investigate
how gE[a | 6, z] and gE[a | s, z] behave when z changes.
=  f f(a -h b -  2ab)[a{p^/) -  a(p^)] +  ga{p^/) -  ga{p) (A3.5)
= 9 { a F b -  2ab)[a{py^) -  0 '(p®’'')] 4 -gaipl'^) -  g a { \  -  a) (A3.6)
in order for the diflFerence g{E[a  | 6, z] — E[a  | s, z]} to be decreasing in z, a sufficient
condition is that <; Q and > Q. Under Assumption 3.1, a  linear in p.
Then, it is possible to see that
< 0 ^  (a +  6 - 2a6) < =  pb +  {1 -  p ){l  -  b)
oz p j  -  p j
pb -|- (1 — p) (1 — — (u +  6 — 2a6) =  (u +  p — 1) (26 — 1) > 0 (A3.7)
as p >   ^ in equilibrium, and a > ,^ 6 >  ^ by assumption. Moreover,
dE [a \s^z]  (26 — l)a ( l  — a) (26 — l)a ( l  — a)
dz  a6 +  (1 — a )(l — 6) n6 4- (1 — u)(l — 6)
=  0 (A3.8)
and therefore competition increases truthtelling incentives, as it reduces the expected gains 
from misreporting information. If the optimal holding a  were negative after observing one 
or two sell recommendations, some of the terms a(-) would be zero. It is easy to see that 
results would be unchanged, as a(po®) <  a ( l  — a) < a(po^), and a(po^) <  a(p) < a{po’^ ). 
Thus, if, say, oc{po )^ <  0, then 3^ E[a\s,z] _  p|(a +  6 —2a6)o:(po^} — a(I — a)] > 0. Similarly, 
it can be verified that results hold in all other cases.
This proof underlines that the conditions < 0 and > Q cannot be satisfied
for all possible functions a. For example, if the term a{po'^) is very large, which can 
happen when investors strongly increase their demand for the stock upon observing two 
buy recommendations, then the first condition is unlikely to be satisfied. Typically, when 
the function a{-) is either very convex, or very concave, the condition < 0 and
^ 0 will not be satisfied.
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3.11 A ppendix  to  Chapter 3 - E stim ation  R esu lts
Table 3.5 The effect of No Competition from Non AfBIiated Analysts on
Recommendations
Recommendations issued by analysts on IPOs are analysed in order to investigate whether 
analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO are more hkely to issue optimistic 
recommendations than non affiliated analysts and whether this effect is mitigated by 
competition. The dependent variable is the probability the recommendation issued by an 
analyst (both affiliated and non affiliated) in the first 45 days after the IPO is a “Strong 
Buy”. The variable No Competition is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if only 
the analyst affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO issues a recommendation on 
that IPO in the first 45 days after the stock began trading, thus facing no competition 
from other analysts. The variable Dumins is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if 
the recommendation is issued by an analyst affiliated with the lead underwriter of the 
IPO. Size is the logarithm of the proceeds amount from the IPO in million US Dollars. 
First Day is the return in the first day of trade. Six month excess return is the difference 
between the return on the IPO in the first six months after going pubhc and the return 
on the CRSP value weighted index during the same period. Returns are in US Dollars. 
Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level are indicated by ***, **, and * 
respectively. Z - Statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst 
level in the Logit model that does not control for analyst unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent Variable: Probability (Recommendation^ “Strong Buy”)
Logit Fixed E f fe c t s  Logit
Random E f fe c t s  
Logit
(1) (2) (3)
N o Competition 0.347773 0.58460 0.6417182(2.02)" (1.80)* (2.36)**
Dumins 0.114643 0.945471 0.6912686(1.12) (4.71)*** (4.43)***
Size -0.083949 0.255103 0.0253668(-1.75)* (2.44)** (0.32)
First Day -0.443601 -0.417957 -0.6047654(-4.42)"* (-3.16)*** (-5.31)***
Six Month Excess Return -0.039027(-1.07)
0.0245549 -0.001182
(-0.03)(0.72)
Quarterly dummies yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes
Analyst f ixed  e ffec ts no yes no
Observations 
Pseudo R  — Squared
3163
0.0574
1229 3164
Log — Likelihood 
Number o f  clusters
-2057.6804
1275
-403.51627 -1720.5621
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Table 3.6 The Effect of Coverage from Non Affiliated Analysts on Recommendations
from Affiliated Analysts
Recommendations issued by analysts aflBliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO are 
analysed in order to investigate whether analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter of 
the IPO are more hkely to issue optimistic recommendations when the coverage on the 
IPO from non affihated analysts is weaker. The dependent variable is the probability 
the recommendation issued by an affihated analyst in the first 45 days after the IPO is 
a “Strong Buy”. The variable Numbout is the logarithm of the number of analysts non 
affihated with the lead underwriter of the IPO issuing a recommendation on the IPO in the 
first 45 days after the IPO. It represents a measure of competition. Size is the logarithm 
of the proceeds amount from the IPO in million US Dollars. The variable Numbout*Size 
is an interaction between the two variables just described. First Day is the return on the 
first day of trade. Six Month Excess Return is the difference between the return on the 
IPO in the first six months after going pubhc and the return on the CRSP value weighted 
index during the same period. Returns are in US DoUars. Coefficients significant at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent level are indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. Z- Statistics in 
parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at the analyst level in the Logit model that 
does not control for analyst unobserved heterogeneity.
Dependent Variable: Probability(Recommendation= “Strong Buy”)
Logit
(1)
Fixed E f fe c t s Random E f fe c t s
Logit
(2)
Logit
(3)
Numbout -2.053483 -1.78016 -2.647442(-3.01)*** (-0.91) (-2.37)**
Size -.283014 0.324747 -0.294397
(-1.55) (0.64) (-1.03)
Numbout * Size .433780 0.4165162 0.6006212(2.66)*** (0.89) (2.19)**
F irst  Day -1.12741 -1.680675 -1.650082(-5.17)*** (-3.53)*** (-5.52)***
Six Month Excess Return -0.009792(-0.17)
0.0145249 -0.0346514
(-0.54)(0.21)
quarterly dummies yes yes yes
industry dummies yes yes yes
analyst f ixed  e f fec ts no yes no
Observations 1042 310 1047
Pseudo R  — Squared 0.1214
Log — Likelihood -634.49421 -77.34829 -590.04642
Number o f  clusters 588 588
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Table 3.7 The Effect of Recommendations from Non Affiliated Analysts on 
Recommendations from Affiliated Analysts
The table reports results for recommendations issued by analysts affiliated with the lead 
underwriter of the IPO (Insider) after having observed at least a recommendation from 
an analyst not affiliated with the lead underwriter of the IPO (Outsider). The dependent 
variable is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if an Insider issues a “Strong Buy” 
recommendation. Estimates are from a Probit model for the probability that the insider 
issues a “Strong Buy” recommendation. The variable Outopt(avg=4-3) is an indicator 
variable taking the value 1 if the average recommendation issued by Outsiders in the 
three days prior to the date the Insider issued his recommendation is larger than 4.333. 
The latter is the median of the average recommendation issued by Outsider analysts. 
Outopt(best=5) is an indicator variable taking the value 1 if at least one Outsider issued 
a “Strong Buy” recommendation in the three days prior to the date the Insider issued his 
recommendation. Size is the logarithm of the proceeds amount from the IPO in million 
US dollars. First Day is the return on the first day of trade. Six Month Excess Return 
is the difference between the return on the IPO in the first six months after going public 
and the return on the CRSP value weighted index during the same period. Returns are 
in US Dollars. Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level are indicated by 
***, **, and * respectively. Z - Statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are clustered at 
the analyst level.
Dependent Variable: Probability (Recommendation from Insider= “Strong Buy”)
Outopt{avg >  4.333) 
Outopt{best =  5)
Size
Firs t Day
Six Month Excess Return
Observations 
Pseudo R  — Squared
0.1023
(0.39)
0.0426
(0.16)
0.049 0.0464
(0.38) (0.36)
-0.4898 -0.4971
(-2.04)** (-2.06)**
0.07569 0.0748
(1.21) (1.19)
101 101
0.0448 0.0440
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Table 3.8 Estimation of the Propensity Score
The table reports the estimation of the probability an analyst affiliated with the lead 
underwriter of the IPO (Insider) is the only analyst issuing a recommendation on the 
IPO, thus facing no competition from non affiliated analysts (Outsiders). The probability 
is estimated through a Probit model. Size is the logarithm of the proceeds amount from 
the IPO in million US dollars. First Day is the return on the first day of trade. Six Month 
Excess Return is the difference between the return on the IPO in the first six months after 
going public and the return on the CRSP value weighted index during the same period. 
Returns are in US Dollars. Coefficients significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level are 
indicated by ***, **, and * respectively. Z - Statistics in parenthesis. Standard errors are 
clustered at the analyst level. The estimated probability that the insider analyst faces 
no competition from outsider analysts is the propensity score, which is used to match 
observations to estimate the average effect of exposing insider analysts to no competition 
from outsiders controlhng for the possible presence of selection bias.
Prob{No Competition =  1)
Size -0.33708(-4.64)***
F irst Day -0.51529(-2.84)***
Six Month Excess Return -0.17932( - 2.66***)
quarterly dummies yes
industry dummies yes
Observations 1128
Log likelihood -443.689
Pseudo R2 0.1638
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Table 3.9 Summary Statistics of the Propensity Score
The table shows details of the distribution of the estimated propensity score. The propen­
sity score estimates the probability that there is no coverage on the stock from outsider 
analysts. The balancing property, necessary condition to employ the propensity score to 
compute a matching estimator, is satisfied. This means that for the estimated propensity 
score, IPOs for which there is coverage from outsider analysts have the same distribution 
in terms of size, returns, industry and time of the IPO as those IPOs for which there is 
no coverage from outsider analysts.
Percentile
1% 0.000021
5% 0.00617 Obs 1020
10% 0.018224
25% 0.0714092 Mean  0.2059
Std.Dev. 0.16081
50% 0.180271 Skewness  0.80710
Kurtosis  3.2278
75% 0.307142
90% 0.442346
95% 0.512471
99% 0.613357
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Table 3.10 Estimation of the Average Effect of No Competition from Outsider Analysts 
with Nearest Neighbour patching based on Propensity Score
The table presents estimates of the average effect of not exposing analysts affiliated to 
the lead underwriter of the IPO to competition from analysts not affiliated with the lead 
underwriter of the IPO. The estimate is displayed in the column labelled as ATE. The 
column labelled as STD Error reports the standard error of the estimate. The column 
labelled as Z, reports the Z-Statistics. The column labelled as P >z represents p-values. 
Finally, the column labelled as Confidence Interval reports the 95 per cent confidence in­
terval, The first line contains estimates obtained by nearest neighbour matching based on 
propensity scores. The second line contains the bias adjusted estimate obtained by near­
est neighbour matching based upon propensity score, following the procedure proposed 
by Abadie and Imbens (2002). Significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level is indicated 
by ***, **, and * respectively.
ATE STD Error Z P>z Confidence Interval
Abadie — Imbens 0.14803 0.08018 1.85* 0.065 [-0.00912,0.3052]
Bias Adjusted 0.14873 0.08022 1.85* 0.064 [-0.00855,0.30603]
Number o f  Observations : 1020
C hapter 4
Sorting, R eputation and Entry in 
a Market for Expert A dvice
4.1 Introduction and M otivation
This chapter provides new insights on the workings of the market for professional (expert) 
services. A key feature of such markets, which is often overlook, is the important role 
of client sorting on the incentives of experts to provide the service at a high standard. 
Most of the literature focussed on the role played by the coexistence of experts with 
different reputations. Investment banks of different reputation compete in the market 
for financial services. In the medical practice, patients can be treated by luminaries or 
general practitioners. Legal assistance can be provided by Perry Mason, as well as by 
unknown members of the Bar. However, clients can be widely heterogenous too: merging 
firms can be of different size, so that a merger between two large multinationals can 
involve greater complexity than one involving two small local firms, patients can require 
sophisticated operations, or more standard treatments, defendants can go to court facing 
a complex murder accusation or a trivial quarrel with neighbours. Heterogenous clients 
derive a different utility from hiring experts of different reputation, so that a firm with 
a very promising project might value more the services of a famed investment bank in 
the going pubhc process than firms with less promising investment plans. A patient 
with a rare illness might benefit more from the expertise of a luminary, than a patient 
needing to fix a broken arm. Thus, heterogenous clients may find it optimal to sort into 
experts of different quality who are motivated by reputational concerns. This chapter 
identifies three channels through which sorting affects the incentives of experts to exert 
effort. The first channel is that the way clients sort into experts determine the balance
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between the demand and the supply of services for experts of that reputation, and thus 
may impact on the premium that clients pay in equilibrium to be served by more reputable 
experts. This is turn affects the value to build a reputation and thus incentives to exert 
effort. I dub this the “/ees channeV .^ The second channel is that the sorting of cUents 
may influence the informativeness of a success as a signal of talent. If the type of a 
client provides information on the difficulty of the service to be provided, then if an 
expert serves successfully clients who are on average “more diflBcult”, she will build a 
reputation more quickly. This channel can be quite relevant in practice: the reputation 
of a lawyer winning a complex trial, or an investment bank successfully advising a very 
big and complex acquisition will get an especially large boost. I dub this the '^‘signalling 
channeV' . The third channel is related to the previous one: if the type of a client affects 
not only the learning process about the expert’s talent, but also the likehhood the expert 
provides the service successfully, then the way clients sort affects the number of successful 
clients, and thus the rents from being successful. Winning a complex trial can provide a 
strong boost to a lawyer’s reputation, but winning such a trial may be especially difficult: 
thus, the premium for being successful may increase, but the hkelihood of being successful 
may be reduced. This in turn reduces the measure of successful experts and raises the 
premium for being successful. I dub the latter the "toughness channeV\
This setting is especially useful to analyse the effects of entry of expert on the incentives 
to exert effort and raise the likelihood the service is provided successfully (or is provided 
with higher quality). This important issue is at the core of the debate about the desir­
ability of increasing entry in the market for audit services. As increased entry of experts 
affects the sorting of clients, this impacts on the incentives to exert effort through the 
three channels identified above (or through some of them). Thus the chapter shows how 
increased entry can modify the incentives of experts to exert effort. It also provides em­
pirical predictions about the way fees for the services of experts of different reputation 
behave after entry occurs. Finally, the chapter discusses welfare effects of increased entry 
and policy implications.
4.2 R elated  Literature
There is a large hterature on reputational incentives and on expert advice. The role of 
reputational incentives (career concerns) has been firstly modelled in the seminal paper 
of Holmstrom (1982) who spurred a large literature emphasizing different aspects and 
applications. Another important paper which clarifies the nature and the mechanics of 
reputation is Mailath and Samuelson (2001). They underline the notion of reputation as 
an asset and show the importance of maintaining uncertainty on a player’s type in order
Chapter 4. Sorting, Reputation and Entry in a Market for Expert Advice 121
for reputation to play an incentivizing role. Most of the contributions on reputational 
incentives for expert advice (or firm behaviour) focus essentially on one expert only and 
do not really deal with the effects of competition and entry. An important exception 
is Horner (2002) who shows that competition among firms acts as a strong discipline 
device and allows to sustain an equilibrium with repeated play of high effort, even when 
reputational concerns fade out due to learning about firms’ type.
This work shares with these contribution the idea that reputation is an asset whose value 
is affected by the behaviour of the expert. The main difference with these papers is the 
fact that none of those investigate how the sorting behaviour of clients into experts affects 
the value of building a reputation and incentives for effort exertion.
There is a large hterature investigating the role of competition in markets for expert 
advice and credence goods. DuUeck and Kerschbamer (2006) provide a thorough survey 
of the literature and of the most relevant issues; They underline what are the critical 
assumption that sustain the different results presented by the literature. Using their 
terminology, this work does not impose either the verifiability assumption (as I assume 
clients cannot verify the type or quahty of service) or the hability assumption (as I assume 
that clients cannot fine experts for malpractice). However, I assume the quahty of the 
service is observed by the market, that experts are characterized by a different ability in 
providing a good service and they live more than one period, so that reputational concerns 
provide incentives for the provision of a good quahty service (or for avoiding fraud). At 
first sight, this chapter describes a setting which is not entirely specific to the credence 
goods market, as I assume experts perform a service whose quahty depends stochastically 
on the effort exerted by the expert, and I assume all clients need the same service, they 
know the service they need (e.g. advice on how to successfully conclude an acquisition, or 
assistance to sue a person or an organization) although they differ in their valuation of a 
high quahty service. Thus, it seems I overlook the problem of mistreatment and of over­
charging. On the other hand, what I define as quahty of the service can be interpreted 
as the provision of the correct service for the need of the chent, and then what would 
really be missing in my set up is a distinction between the diagnosis stage and the service 
provision stage. I discuss this point at some further length in section 4.5. In general, the 
focus of this chapter differs from that of most of the hterature on credence goods, as I wish 
to investigate the effects of clients sorting on incentives for the provision of a good quahty 
service, and the effects of entry on such incentives through its influence on the sorting 
behaviour of clients. An important paper on the market for credence goods is Wolinsky 
(1993). He shows that customers’ search may induce specialization and investigates the 
effects of search cum diagnosis costs on experts’ incentives. He also deals with the effects 
of reputation. However, that is not hnked to expert characteristics (intrinsic talent, type)
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but is modelled as a Folk Theorem result, thus it is not conform to the idea of reputation 
as an asset that I use in this chapter and that, in my opinion, is more appropriate. 
An early reference is Pitchik and Schotter (1987) who show that experts do not always 
provide their advice correctly in equilibrium. In their model advice is cheap talk. They 
derive their result in a setting where prices are exogenously given. Other contributions 
in this area that are relevant for this work are Emons (1997), Pesendorfer and Wolinsky 
(2003), Park (2005) and Fong (2005), Emons (1997) analyzes a set-up where experts 
offer a credence good and shows that customers can infer the seller’s (expert’s) incentives 
from the observations of market data. He also shows that non fraudulent equihbria 
exists, and a critical element is the presence of cheating costs, Pesendorfer and Wolinsky
(2003) discuss the role of second opinions in a market for expert advice. They analyse a 
situation where experts make a diagnosis and then clients can decide whether to purchase 
the service or look for a new diagnosis. They show that the possibility of consulting 
other experts reduces incentives to exert effort and the equilibria fail to achieve even a 
second best outcome. However, experts in both papers are identical, have no intrinsic 
quality and there is no role for reputation (at least for the idea of reputation as an asset). 
Park (2005) investigates the effects of competition in a model where expert advice is 
cheap talk. He shows that reputation (intended in a Folk-Theorem sense) helps ensuring 
truthful information transmission, but competition may reduce such incentives. However, 
a customer can extract full information by consulting a panel of two experts. Finally, 
Fong (2005) examines a setting where customers are heterogenous on dimensions that are 
independent from the type of problem they may have. He shows that monopolistic experts 
cheat customers on some identifiable heterogeneities such as the extent to which customers 
suffer from the problem, or the difficulty in treating the customer problem. This aspect 
is related to this work because clients heterogeneity is shown to have important effects 
on the incentives of experts to provide a good treatment. However, the channels through 
which this occurs are totally different as sorting affects incentives to exert effort through 
the effect on the equilibrium fees, through the informativeness of a success as a signal of 
talent and through changes in the difficulty of the problems experts are hired to solve. In 
Fong’s model selective cheating is a way to price discriminate, which is feasible as experts 
are monopolists. Therefore, another key difference is that I consider a competitive set up.
This chapter is also related to the hterature analysing the role of middlemen. An early 
reference is Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1987), The authors show that middlemen help re­
ducing time to find a suitable partner for exchange in a search and matching framework. 
However, in this model there is no scope for moral hazard or adverse selection, and the 
only role of middlemen is to reduce the costs related to time consuming search for suit­
able partners, Biglaiser (1993) introduces adverse selection and shows that middlemen 
have stronger incentives to acquire specific knowledge and specialize in monitoring the
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quality of products. Such incentives are further raised by reputational concerns. Lizzeri 
(1999) discusses the strategic information revelation of intermediaries. He shows that 
intermediaries find it optimal to reveal only whether quahty is above a certain standard, 
but competition among intermediaries may lead to the existence of full revelation equi­
libria. Another interesting contribution is Faure Grimaud, Peyrache and Quesada (2006) 
who investigate a market for certification intermediaries (rating agencies) and show cir­
cumstances in which contractual arrangements which give clients the option to hide the 
information contained in the ratings arise in equilibrium. They also show that in this 
way competition among rating agencies reduces the amount of information revealed by 
the rating agencies. Finally, Strausz (2005) investigates the way reputation (in a folk 
theorem sense) is effective in ensuring capture of certifiers does not occur in equilibrium. 
In his paper, clients are homogenous, and there is no scope for sorting.
This work dijffers from this literature in two main respects. Firstly, I analyse experts 
providing a service to clients who value the service in itself, and not as a function of 
the interaction with another class of agents (final consumers, investors, etc.). However, 
there is some relation as the distribution of clients of the intermediary have important 
consequences on the incentives of the intermediary to report her information fully and/or 
correctly. Secondly, this hterature does not investigate the effects of entry through 
changes in the sorting of clients.
The analysis of the chapter is tangential to the hterature on competition and incentives. 
A key contribution in this area is Raith (2003) who showed that tougher competition 
raises incentives to exert high effort. Raith derives the results in a context where firms 
provide explicit incentives to managers in order to induce them to exert effort in reducing 
production costs. The mechanism at work here is different; firstly there are no exphcit 
incentives to motivate experts to exert effort to provide a high quahty service and secondly 
tougher competition affects incentives through the sorting behaviour of clients.
This work is also related to some interesting papers on investment banking. An important 
contribution is Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994). The authors derive a model showing 
how reputational concerns affect investment banks standards of evaluating IPOs. They 
also sketch the effects of sorting of clients, but this has not really a direct impact on 
experts incentives. Furthermore they do not analyse the effect of entry of new experts 
in the market. Puri (1999) is broadly related as she investigates the effect of entry of 
commercial banks in the investment banking market. Commercial banks may have an 
informational advantage in the underwriting market as they may already hold financial 
claims of firms going public. She shows different underwriters specialize and can coexist 
in the market. The logic and the focus of this model is clearly quite different. Fernando, 
Gatchev and Spindt (2005) investigate the matching between issuers and underwriters of
Chapter 4. Sorting, Reputation and Entry in a Market for Expert Advice 124
IPOs and SEOs. They show that the equilibrium features positive matching as better firms 
hire more talented underwriters. However, they do not investigate how such matching 
impacts on the incentives of the underwriters to provide their service carefully.
The chapter develops as follows: section 4.3 contains the description of the model set 
up, section 4.4 derives the equilibrium and contains three subsections which investigates 
the three different channels through which changes in the sorting of chents, induced 
by increased entry, can affect incentives to exert effort. Section 4.5 discusses results, 
assumptions and extensions and section 4.6 concludes. The appendix contains proofs of 
propositions and lemmas.
4.3 T he m odel
The model captures a situation where heterogenous clients decide the expert whom to 
apply to, chents bid for expert services, fees equate demand and supply, and clients are 
then matched to experts who provide them the service.
Players and actions: the economy is populated by a continuum of experts and clients 
and has an overlapping generation structure. Experts are heterogenous both as they are 
characterized by a different reputation for being talented and as they are of a different 
vintage: experts live for two periods, and in each period there are young and old experts. 
There is measure ^ of each so that, overall there is measure 1 of experts. Clients live 
one period only and there is measure M > 1 of them. Clients observe the distribution 
of experts, bid up for the service and fees are determined in equilibrium. Experts have 
a capacity constraint, so that if the total measure of experts is smaller than the measure 
of clients, then some clients are rationed^. Each chent willing to pay for the service is 
matched to an expert who performs the service. Experts can exert unobservable effort 
which increases the likelihood the service provided will be of high quality.
Inform ation structure: Clients are characterized by a parameter 6, representing how 
they value the service. Such parameter can represent the quality of a firm, the gravity 
of an illness, the complexity of a judicial case, etc. There is a set of types 0  =  [0,9] 
where 0 < 9 < 9. I assume client’s type is private information^, while the distribution 
of types is common knowledge. Clients are distributed according to the function G, so
^In equilibrium, fees determine those clients who are better off not purchasing the service.
^This is not strictly necessary for the results. I can assume the type of clients become known to an 
expert after being matched with the chent. Then, some of the effects unveiled by the model will stiff be 
valid. Further discussion of this point will be provided in Section 5.
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that Jq g{6)d9 =  M, as there is measure M  of clients^. Experts do not learn the type of 
chents^. Experts can be talented or not talented and this is symmetrically unknown. All 
players know the current reputation of an expert which is denoted by A*, indicating the 
probability, conditional on the information available at time t, that the expert is talented. 
The outcome (for example, the quality) of the service performed is observed and the 
market is able to update behefs about expert’s type. I will consider three cases. In the 
first the type of a client only aflFects her valuation for the service. In this case, sorting 
can only affect incentives through the fees channel. In the second, the type of clients also 
affects the probabihty of success of a talented expert, as follows
Fi{success I talented, 6) =  k(6) (4.1)
while Pr(success | not talented, 6) =  z (6) (4.2)
where J |  > 0 and | |  < 0. The term z{6) can adjust so as to leave the total probability of 
a success unchanged. When that happens, sorting of clients determines a mean preserving 
spread in the total probability of success, so that facing higher types is more informative 
about the expert’s talent, but does not raise the likelihood of a success. If 0 represents the 
complexity of a case for a lawyer, this condition says that a success on a more complex 
case is more likely to come from a talented expert, or that a successful LBO involving a
firm with a very troubling balance sheet situation, is a stronger signal that the advisor
investment bank is reputable. The market does not observe exactly the type of each client, 
but knows, in equilibrium, the distribution of types being served by a given expert^. In this 
case, sorting affects incentives both through the fees channel and through the signalling 
channel. The third case allows for the possibility that the (expected) type of the client 
affects the likelihood of success: providing the service successfully is more likely for certain 
types of clients. In the latter case sorting affects incentives also through the toughness 
channel, together with the fees channel and, possibly, the signalling channel.
Tim ing; the model has an overlapping generation structure. Experts live two periods, 
clients only one period®. Each period a cohort of experts and clients drawn from the same
^Therefore, technically, the distribution G is not a probability distribution as it integrates to M. 
However, it represents the mass of clients over a certain set of types. For example, take two types 6* and 
6** with 6** < 6*, the mass of chents with type 6** < 9 <  6* is given by g{9)d9 =  G{6*) — G{9**). 
To obtain the probabihty distribution it is necessary to normalize the distribution G.
^Tbis assumption plays a role only when I assume that the type of the chent affects the hkelibood 
of a success, or using the terminology of the paper, only when the thoughness channel of sorting works 
(together with the other two channels). Even in that case, ah results bold as long as the expert observes 
a noisy, but not perfect, signal of the chent type.
®And by all other experts with the same reputation.
® Alternatively, chents can hve foreover, but theb type changes. The main idea is that the characteristics 
of the problem of a chent, which are summarized in a chent's type, are not constant, but change period 
by period.
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distribution replaces those who exit the market, so that the distribution is stationary. 
Clients observe the distribution of experts and bid for their services. Then, they get 
served, until there are idle experts. If some clients cannot be served, they get an outside 
option of zero. When chents are matched to experts, the latter exert effort and provide 
the service, whose outcome is observed by the market which updates behefs about experts’ 
reputation. Then chents exit the market and the period ends. The fee can be paid up­
front, or after the service has been provided, but it caimot be made contingent on the 
observed outcome.
Technology; the service provided by experts generates a high or low outcome depending 
upon the talent and effort choice of the expert, and in some cases, also upon the intrinsic 
quality of the chent. Talented experts, by exerting effort e can raise the chances of 
providing a high quahty service. The cost of effort is a function c(e) where Cgg > 0, 
so that the cost of effort is strictly convex. Untalented experts generate a good quahty 
outcome with a fixed probabihty independently of effort and of the quahty of the chent. 
Formally, I assume that the expected value for a chent of type 6 of the service provided 
by an expert of expected talent A is given by
V(X,$,e)  (4.3)
where
a V i ^  > 0, > 0 i /  talented and g H & M  =  Q otherwise
oX oe oe
d^VjXAe) '  d^V{X,e,e) '  
dXde ’ dXde
> 0 i f  talented, =  o, otherwise
oeou oeou
This says that the expected value of the service is increasing in the expert’s talent, it is
not decreasing in effort, and the inequality is strict when the expert is talented, otherwise,
effort has no effect Secondly, the preferences of chents satisfy single crossing over talent
and effort. This implies that if a chent of type 9 is indifferent between a combination of
talent A and effort e, over another combination (A,e), then either all chents with types
o' >  6 prefer (A, e) over (A,e), or all chents with types O' < 0  prefer (A, e) over (A,e) but
it cannot happen that both a chent with type 9 >  0 and a chent with type 9 < 9  prefer
(A, e) over (A, e). Also, the service provided by more reputable experts is more valuable to
higher types and the marginal value of effort is increasing in client’s types, at least when
the expert is talented. There can be many examples of such functions. A very standard
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one is:
V(X,9 ,e) =  e{[A(e* +  7 ) +  +  [A(l -  (e* +  7 ))  +  (4.4)
where A is the probability the expert is talented, (e* + 7 ) is the probability that the service 
provided is of high quality conditional on the expert being talented and exerting expected 
effort e*, and 7 is a parameter ensuring that a talented expert is valuable even if she 
exerts no effort^. The term indicates that the probability of a success if the expert 
is not talented (which occurs with probabihty 1 — A) is The terms W and tt indicate, 
respectively, the value of a high and of a low quality service, I also assume a talented 
expert exerting effort is valuable, therefore, (e* +  7 ) > at least for the equilibrium 
value of e. This function is such that the value of a talented expert lies in the larger 
probability of producing a high quality outcome. Moreover, more talented experts are 
more hkely to produce a good quahty outcome if they face higher types. Alternatively, 
it could happen that the value of a talented expert resides in the way the service is 
performed, and not in the chance of success. In an extension of the basic model, I also 
assume the hkelihood of success is affected by the type of the chent in the same fashion for 
talented and untalented experts. When this occurs, I assume that a high quahty outcome 
is generated with probabihty -^^(A(e +  7 ) +  where E{6) is the expected type of 
the chent.
P layers payoff: experts get a fee F  for the service they offer and sustain an unobservable 
cost of effort c(e), where c is a continuous and convex function. The period payoff for an 
expert is then given by F  — c(e). However, experts hve for more than one period and they 
also take into account the continuation payoff when choosing effort optimally. Therefore 
the full payoff for an expert is Ft — c{et)+5EW {Xt+i)  where J <  1 is a discount factor and 
E W { \)  is the expected continuation payoff, function of future behefs about the expert’s 
talent. Chents obtain expected value Vt{X,6,e) from the service and pay the fee Ft. The 
latter is set competitively as chents bid for experts services. Notice that experts cannot 
offer screening contracts, both because there is a continuum of measure A of experts with 
the same reputation, so that it would not be possible, in equilibrium for such experts to 
provide rents to different types of chents in order to induce them to reveal their type, and 
because experts have only one instrument, the fee, to screen chents.
S trategies and beliefs: chents bid for experts services, then fees are determined in 
equilibrium and chents choose the type of experts from whom to purchase the service. 
Chents have an application strategy, p{9) : {0 x A x F x e*} [0,1], which is the probabihty
of applying to an expert of reputation A, which is function also of the type of the chent.
^This is useful because the model has two periods and in the last period experts exert no eflFort as they 
do not have any reputational concern. Then, if 7  =  0, experts in the second period would be valueless. 
An alternative is to assume that 7  =  0 and that experts in the second period still have a continuation 
payoff increasing in their quality, so that they will be motivated to exert effort.
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the equilibrium fee, and the expected equilibrium effort e*. Applications determine the 
balance between demand and supply and in this way, equilibrium fees. Then clients are 
matched to available experts and the latter chooses optimally her effort level, as a function 
of their beliefs about their talent and the expected fees in the future period, denoted as 
Ft+i. Formally, e : {Ff+i, A} —» [0,1 — 7], where the latter condition is needed to ensure 
there is no success with probability larger than 1. Beliefs about experts’ talent are updated 
according to Bayes rule, I consider three cases, in the first the (expected) type of clients 
does not affect the likelihood a talented expert succeeds. Therefore
Fi{Talented  I Success, e) =  Xt,-, = -----—5— (4.5)
Af(e +  7) +  i ^
as the probability of a success conditional on being talented and exerting effort e, is given 
by (e +  7 )®, while the probability of a success conditional on the expert being untalented 
is If the service provided turns out to be poor, the reputation of the expert is lowered 
to
Pr{Talented | Failure, e) =  A^, = -----—— (4.6)
A , [ l - ( e  +  7)] +  ^
Thus in each period there is measure  ^ of newly born experts with reputation A, measure 
[A(e +  7 ) +  5 of old experts that were successful in their first period and thus have
reputation A^^, and measure [1 — A(e +  7 ) — of old experts who were unsuccessful
in their first period and thus have reputation A^^.
I also allow for the possibility that the type of the client provides information about the 
likelihood a talented expert succeeds in providing a high quality service, beliefs about the 
talent of the expert evolve as follows:
Pr{Talented | Success, 6, e) =  A^j =
Xt{e +  i  +  k { E{ e \ \ ) ) )
At(e +  7 +  k[E{6 I A))) +  (1 — Af)(2 4- z{E{9  | A)))
(4.7)
as the probability of a success conditional on the expert being talented, exerting effort e, 
and facing clients of expected quality E{9 \ X) is [k{E{9 | A) + 6  +  7], while the probability 
of a success if the expert is untalented is  ^+  z{E{9  | A)). The total probability of success 
can be unchanged if
At(e +  7 +  k{E{9 I A))) +  (1 — Af)(- z{E{9 \ A))) =  A*(e +  7 ) H  —  (4.8)
The effort level e is the market expectation of the effort exerted by the expert.
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which occurs when
z{E{e  I A)) =  (4.9)
If the service provided turns out to be poor, the reputation of the expert is lowered to
Pr{TaleTited | Failure, 9, e) =  =
<^ <[1 — (e +  7 +  k{E{9 I A))]
At[l — (e +  7 +  k{E{6 | A)))] 4- (1 — At)(^ — z{E{9  | A)))
(4.10)
In this case the measure of successful experts in period t+ 1  is [Xt{e-\-'y+k{E{9 | A)))4-(l — 
Xt){^-\- z{E{9  I A)))]^, while the measure of unsuccessful experts is A([l — {e-\-'y-\-k{E{9 | 
‘^ )))] d- (1 — At)(^ — z{E{9  I A))).
4.4  Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is Perfect Bayesian Equihbrium. Clients choose optimally their 
application strategy and experts choose optimally their effort level. Beliefs are confirmed 
in equilibrium, and updated according to Bayes Rule. I firstly study the most simple 
model, where the type of clients does not affect either the learning process about experts’ 
talent, or the likelihood that a talented expert succeeds in providing a high quality service.
4 .4 .1  T h e  b a s ic  m o d e l
I firstly study the behaviour of experts with different “vintage”, then I will turn to derive 
the equilibrium fee and analyse the application policy and sorting behaviour of clients. In 
this model, as in other career concerns models, there can exist equilibria where the repu­
tation of experts is not valued by the market. I will focus on equilibria where reputation 
always has a value.
Lem m a 4.1 Experts exert zero effort in their last period, while they can exert positive 
effort in their first period.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 4. ■
This result is standard in tile hterature. The novel part of the analysis lies in the strategic 
behaviour of clients and in its consequences. Thus, I now derive the preferences of clients 
over experts with different expected reputation. This allows to determine the equilibrium
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composition of the sample faced by experts of different reputation, and thus the equi­
librium fees. The latter will depend upon the value clients attach to the service, which 
in turn determines chents bids, and the balance between supply and demand. Therefore 
they will be function of the reputation of the expert, the expected effort level exerted 
(e*), and of the expected type of chent applying to experts of that reputation. Thus, 
equihbrium fees will be functions F : {X,E{6 | A), e*} —> R.
The fact that experts do not exert effort in the last period has interesting imphcations for 
the preferences, and thus the sorting behaviour, of chents. It is obvious that all chents 
prefer new entrants to old unsuccessful experts, as the latter both are less talented and 
exert no effort. In fact, the assumptions of the model imply that
v { x , e , e ) > v { x - , e , o ) , \ f e  (4.11)
as A >  A”  and e >  0. It is less obvious how do chents rate successful experts relative to 
new entrants. Experts who are successful in the first period have a larger value for chents, 
as they are more hkely to produce a good quahty service. On the other hand, they do not 
exert effort, while new entrants do, and therefore the latter might provide a service whose 
value is larger than that offered by more reputable experts. In fact, it is not possible, a 
priori, to tell whether
y ( A + ,  e, 0) >  v{x,  e, e) o r  y (A + , e, o) <  v{x,  e, e) (4 .12)
because the increase in value from applying to a more reputable expert can be more than 
compensated by the decrease in value due to the lower effort level exerted by an expert 
with no career concerns. Notice that this effect is always present, even in an infinite 
horizon model, as incentives to exert effort fade out as learning about an expert’s type 
become more precise. I solve the model adding a simplifying assumption which does not 
change the qualitative results®.
A ssum ption  4.1; for all 9, either V'(A"*',0,O) >  V{X,9,1—7 ), or y(A "'',^ , 0) <  V{X,6,1 — 
7)-
This implies that preferences over expert talent and effort are the same for all clients. 
Notice that e =  1 — 7 is the maximum level of effort, as the total probability of success is 
given by e -|- 7 for talented experts. Then, two cases must be distinguished:
C ase 1: V(A‘'',0 ,0) > V(A, 1 — 7 ). This situation is likely to occur in services for 
which the talent of the expert is extremely relevant, thus I call this situation the "Went
I discuss this is greater detail in Section 5.
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intensive” case. In equilibrium clients bid for the experts services. In any period t 
all clients would prefer to be served by experts with reputation X^, but there is only 
measure [At_i(eJ‘_i +  7 ) +  them, as talented experts succeed in period t — 1
with probability e t- i  4- 7 and untalented with probability while clients are of measure 
M  > 1 >  [Xt-i{ef_i  +  7 ) +  Thus the equilibrium fee for the services of experts
of reputation must be such that aU experts are busy and therefore demand for the 
services of experts of that reputation equals supply, and clients have no incentive to 
deviate. Those clients that are not served by the most reputable experts, get served by 
new entrant experts with reputation At. Finally, part of the remaining clients are served 
by the least reputable experts, and some chents get no service at all, as M,  the total 
measure of clients, is larger than 1, the total measure of experts. The model is stationary, 
so, in order to ease notation, I wiU drop the reference to period t, and instead denote 
current period variables without subscript, previous period with subscript —1 and future 
period with subscript 4-1. The discussion above is formahzed in the following:
P roposition  4.1 In equilibrium, the set of clients is partitioned in four subsets. Clients 
of type 9 G [9*, 9] are served by experts of reputation A"^ , clients of type 9 G [9**,9*\ 
are served by experts of reputation A, clients of type 9 G [9***,9**\ are served by experts 
of reputation A” . Finally clients of type 9 G \9_,9***] do not get served. The thresholds 
separating the three subsets satisfy 9*** <  9** <  9* and
+  =  M - G ( n
i  =  G (e * ) -G (r * )
I A - i ( l - ( e ! . i + 7 ) )  +  i ^ ^ ] i  =  G(0 -G (^**')
M - 1  =  G{9***)
equilibrium fees satisfy the following equalities
V { X + , e \ 0 ) - F { X + , E m  I A + ] , 0 )  =  y ( A , e * , e * ) - F ( A , £ [ ( 9 ) | A ] , e * )
V ( X , e " , e ' ) - F ( X , B m  I A ] , e * )  =  F ( A - , r * , 0 ) - F ( A - , B [ ( e ) | A - ) , 0 )
y ( A - , e " " " , 0 ) - f ( A - , g [ ( e )  | a - ] , o )  =  o
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 4. ■
Figure 4.1 iUustrates the equilibrium^®.
In figure 1 clients are distributed uniformly.
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Figure 4.1 Equilibrium
Experts 
A A"
M
Clients
This proposition shows that chents sort into experts, so that highest types purchase the 
service from the most reputable experts, intermediate types purchase the service from 
experts with intermediate reputation, lower types purchase the service from the experts 
with the lowest reputation, and finally very low types do not get served at all, as they 
value the service too little, Equihbrium fees ensure that demand equals supply for the 
services of experts of different reputation and chents have no incentive to deviate,
I now turn to analyse the effects of entry. Increased entry of new experts raises the supply 
of experts with intermediate reputation. Then, the equihbrium thresholds for clients’ 
sorting are modified and this impacts the types who are indifferent in equihbrium, and, 
in this way, the incentives to exert effort. This discussion is formahzed in the following
P rop osition  4.2 Entry modifies the sorting behaviour of clients both in the current and 
in the future period. The former has no effect on the incentives to exert effort. However, 
the change in sorting behaviour of clients in the future period impacts on the premium 
that clients are willing to pay to be served by the most reputable experts in a way that 
unambiguously reduces incentives to exert effort.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 4 ■
This proposition shows that it cannot exist an equihbrium where effort is larger after 
entry occurred. This follows because increased entry in the current period tends to raise 
both the measure of successful and of unsuccessful experts in the future period. Effort 
can increase if and only if the premium paid for being served by a more reputable expert^^
'The difference Ft+i{^+„ E+i[{e) | A + J ,0) -  F t+i(A ;i, E+i[(0) | A ;J],0 )
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increases. The latter can occur if and only if the type who is indifferent between being 
served by the most reputable expert or by a new entrant is a type with a higher valuation. 
However for the latter to occur, effort must be lower, as the measure of “old” experts will 
be larger in the future period due to increased entry in the current period.
I now describe how the indifferent types change. The threshold 6^i can be either higher 
or lower than the corresponding threshold had entry not occurred, while < 6^  ^ both 
because of increased entry and because if 6_^ _^  >  6’^ i, then 9^  ^ < 9’^  ^ otherwise incentives 
to exert effort would induce a larger eflFort level which would necessarily cause 9_^ i < 9 \ i .  
Finally, the fact that 9^  ^ < 9' i^ also implies that 9^i <  Figures 4.2 and 4.3 show 
the eflFect of entry in the current period and in the future period on the threshold types.
Figure 4.2 EflFect of entry, of experts in period t: equilibrium in period t
Period t
Experts
A 1 Q+0.5
M
9*S9
Clients
Entry also affects equilibrium fees both in the period when increased entry occurs for the 
first time, and in future periods.
P rop osition  4 .3  Fees charged by new entrants and unsuccessful experts are reduced in 
the period entry occurs, while the effect on the fees for the service of the most reputable 
experts is ambiguous. A similar behaviour occurs in future periods when, however, the 
premium to be paid to get the service from the most reputable experts must be lower.
Proof. See appendix to Chapter 4
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Figure 4.3 EflFect of entry of experts in period t: equilibrium in period t+1
A+
Period t+1
Experts
A 2Q
M
Clients
This proposition shows that after entry occurs, fees charged by new entrants and by less 
reputable experts are lower. This is due to the downward movement in the thresholds 
9** and 9***. Then, the condition ensuring clients have no incentive to deviate implies 
that fees for new entrants and less reputable experts must decrease. On the contrary, 
the effect on the fees paid to most reputable experts is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
the decrease in the lower thresholds induce all fees to decrease. On the other hand, the 
decrease in equilibrium effort, raises the difference between the value of being served by 
the most reputable expert and the value of being served by a new entrant.
C ase 2: V  (A"^ , 0,0) < F  (A, 0,1 — 7 ). In this case, experts who were successful in the first 
period offer an expected service which is less valuable than that offered by new entrants, 
even if the latter have a lower reputation^T his situation is likely to characterize services 
for which the effort of the expert is extremely relevant, thus I call this case the effort 
intensive” case. Results are essentially the same as in the previous case. In fact, from 
the same reasoning as above, in equilibrium it must be that
[A(e +  7) +
1 
2
1 — A. 1
2 2^ 
1 - A,1
[A(l -  (e +  7 )) +  —^ ] -  =  
M - 1  =
M -  G{9*)
G{9*) -  G{9**)
G{9**) -  G{9***) 
G{9***)
first sight it may seem that new entrants could be better off by not offering the service in the first 
period. That strategy would yield a maximum payoff of F(A, 0). While exerting effort in the first period 
yields a payoff of F(A, 0) +  maxe{e+(A;)li,0) +  (1 — e)F(A^j, 0) — c(e)}. The expression in curly brackets 
is non negative, as the expert can always set e =  0, and it is easy to see that F{X, 0) +  maXg{eF(A!^i, 0) +  
(1 — e)F(A;j!j,0) — c(e)} >  F(A ,0) so that experts always prefer to offer their service in the first period.
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where 0*** <  0** <  9*, and equilibrium fees satisfy
y ( A , g ' , e ' ) - f ( A , g [ ( g )  I A l , e * )  =  V ( A + , e * , 0 ) - F ( A + , £ ( ( e ) | A + ] , 0 )
y ( A + , e * , 0 ) - F ( A + , B ( ( e )  I A + ] , 0 )  =  V ( A - , e " , 0 ) - f ’( A - , S [ ( e )  I A - | , 0 )
y ( A - , 6 i ' " , 0 ) - f ( A - , E [ ( g )  I A - ] , 0 )  =  0
Then, the effect of entry can be immediately verified 
P rop osition  4 .4  Entry reduces incentives to exert effort.
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of proposition 4.2 and is thus omitted. ■
The main difference with the case of talent intensive services lies in the behaviour of the 
fees in the current period. In fact, now all fees must be lower. In fact,
G{9*) =  M - ^ >  G{ T)  =  M - Q  (4.13)
so that 9* >  6 as Q > 5 . Then, this necessarily implies that 9 <  9** and 9 < 9***.
On the contrary, the behaviour of fees in the future period are analogous to the talent 
intensive case.
4 .4 .2  T h e  ty p e  o f  th e  c lie n t a ffec ts  th e  in fo r m a tiv e n e ss  o f  su c c ess  as a  
s ig n a l o f  ta le n t
1 now allow for the possibility that the probabihty of success for talented experts depends 
upon the type of clients. This situation is likely to occur in practice. Think of a lawyer 
winning a class action suit against a large corporation: typicaUy the case will be difficult, 
and a success is a strong signal of talent. Similarly, a surgeon performing successfully a 
liver transplant with an innovative technique will increase her reputation more than if she 
repairs a knee joint. 1 assume that when the probabihty that a successful expert provides 
a service of high quahty is increasing in the client’s type, behefs about the expert talent 
following a success and a failure evolve as follows
Pr{Talented  | Success, 9, e) =  =
At(e +  7 +  k(E{9 I A)))
kt{e +  7 +  k{E{9 I A))) +  (1 — Af)(^ +  z{E{9 | A))) 
Pi{Talented  | Failure, 9, e) — A^ j^  =
_____________^t[l — (e +  7 +  k{E{9 I A))]_____________
At[l — (e +  7 +  k{E{9 I A)))] +  (1 — Af)(% — z{E{9 | A)))
(4.14)
(4.15)
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where k{E{9 | A)) is increasing in 6 and thus in E{B | A), while z{E{9 | A)) is non 
increasing in 6, and thus in E {6 | A). As the market does not know the exact type of the 
chent served by a given expert, beliefs will be updated using the average type applying to 
experts with a certain reputation. Then, sorting of clients generates a further effect on the 
incentives to exert effort: as k{E{6 | A)) moves, a success can be more or less informative 
about an expert’s talent, and in this way, the value of getting the service from a talented 
(and from an untalented) expert changes. In fact, if E{0 | A) is reduced, k{E{6 | A)) goes 
down and A^  ^will be lower, while A^ j^ j will be larger. Thus, V(A^2, 6,0) will be lower and 
V^(A^i,0,O) larger, for all 6. I dub this the ^^signalling effect” of sorting. However, the 
total probability of a success is now At(e +  7 +  k{E{6 \ A))) +  (1 — A()(^ +  z{E{9 | A))). 
If this changes with E{9 | A), then, the measure of successful experts in the future period 
changes, and this can criticaUy affect future period equihbrium fees. I firstly assume that 
chents sorting only induces a change in the informativeness of success as a signal of talent. 
In this case, as shown above,
z{E{8  I A)) =  (4.16)
SO that
Af(e 4- 7 -f k{E{9 | A))) +  (1 — Af)(- +  z{E{9  | A))) — A (^e +  7 ) H------ ^—  (4-17)
Then, it is easy to show that
P rop osition  4.5 When the informativeness of success depends upon the type of clients, 
and the total probability of success is not affected by sorting of clients, entry reduces 
the incentives to exert effort, both through the change in equilibrium fees, and through a 
reduction in the learning process about experts ’ talent.
P roof. See Appendix to Chapter 4 ■
In this case, the sorting behaviour of chents affects the fees both through the increase 
in the supply of expert services, and through the change in the informativeness of good 
performance as a signal of the talent of the expert. In particular, if the average type being 
served by new entrants is lower, then learning about an expert type occurs more slowly 
and less information is released after the market observes the outcome of the service.
The slower learning about an expert type also affects equihbrium fees in the future period. 
Although it is still not possible to tell precisely whether fees for successful experts increase 
or not, slower learning tends to reduce fees, as the value of being served by successful
Chapter 4. Sorting, Reputation and Entry in a Market for Expert Advice 137
experts is reduced because < A^j. On the contrary, the slowdown in learning tends 
to increase the fees for unsuccessful experts, as A^ ^^  > A^j, although it is not possible to 
tell whether this effect more than compensate for the increase in the measure of experts, 
which tends to decrease fees.
It is interesting to discuss what happens if sorting of clients affects the total probability 
of a success. This is a form of the “toughness channeV\ Suppose that Af(e +  7 +  k[E{9 | 
A))) 4- (1 — A()(^ +  z{E{9  I A))), raises with 9^ .^ Then, it is possible to prove the following
P rop osition  4.6 When the signalling effect is at work, entry may lead to stronger in­
centives to exert effort if clients sorting affects the total probability of a success in a way 
that makes new entrants less likely to succeed.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 4 ■
This proposition shows that increased entry may induce new entrants to exert more effort 
in providing high quality services. It also shows the mechanism through which this can 
occur. If clients type affects the hkelihood talented experts succeed, this can also affect 
the total probability of success. Then, clients may sort in a way that can reduce the 
signalling value of a success, and that can also reduce the total likelihood of a success. 
The latter tends to reduce the measure of successful experts in the second period, thus 
raising the premium for being served by a successful expert. This in turn, raises the 
incentives to exert effort. The fact that the total likelihood of success is reduced can 
ensure that the total measure of successful expert decrease, even in the presence of higher 
effort exertion from new entrants. It should be stressed that this proposition only shows 
that it is possible to observe equilibria where new entrant experts exert higher effort in the 
presence of larger entry, and it delineates the channel through which the effect operates. 
The existence of such an equilibrium, should be verified on a case by case basis as a 
function of parameters, chents preferences and of the shape of the distribution of clients 
type.
I now discuss a further variant of the “toughness channel”. I introduce the possibility 
that the type of the client affects the total probabihty the expert is successful, impacting 
on the marginal efficiency of effort. This is a reasonable extension of the previous case: 
a doctor facing a though operation is less hkely to succeed. This may directly impact 
the effectiveness of effort. This can ensure that entry raises the incentives to exert effort.
^^This is a possible form ^Houghness channel” can take. Literally this implies that providing the service 
to higher types leads to larger probabihty of a successful provision of the service. This may not be 
reasonable in all appUcations.
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Formally, I assume that the unconditional probability of a success depends inversely upon 
the average type of the applicant. Then, the payoff of a new entrant expert becomes
Ft{X, Et[{9) I A], e*) — c(e*) +  -g^ [A (ef +  7 ) H  —]F+i(A‘'', Et+i[{9) | A"^ ), 0)-f
(1 -  -  (6f +  7 )) H  —]F+i(A~,F^t+i[(0) I A“ )],0) (4.18)
and the first order condition for optimal effort exertion becomes
^  I I A-)l,0)l
(4.19)
thus, if the expected type applying to new entrant goes down, E{9 | A) is reduced, 
providing incentives to exert effort, as now a success is more hkely. This effect may 
compensate for the signalling and the fees effects, identified in the previous subsections, 
that tend to reduce the incentives to exert effort. In fact, it is possible to prove the 
following
P rop osition  4 .7  When the clients’ type affects the likelihood the service is provided suc­
cessfully, entry may increase the incentives to exert effort.
Proof. See Appendix to Chapter 4 ■
The proof shows that it may exist an equilibrium where effort increases after entry oc­
curs. The reason is that even though competition compresses the gains from building a 
reputation through the effect of sorting on equilibrium fees it can raise the hkelihood of 
a success as new entrants face a pool or relatively “easier” cases. Then, exerting effort is, 
in expectation, more productive. It is not possible to determine in general which effect 
dominates. When the type of the chent affects the chances the expert succeeds in produc­
ing a high quahty service, the sorting behaviour of clients after entry occurs, generates a 
“gentler” environment to new entrants, as they face chents whose needs can be satisfied 
relatively more easily. It should be stressed that, again, this is a possibility result, and 
that the conditions ensuring that entry leads to an increase in the incentives to exert 
effort, depend upon the distribution of types, as well as on technological variables such 
as the cost of effort.
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4.5 D iscussion  and P olicy Im plications
This section analyzes the role of the main assumptions and discusses the policy implica­
tions of the results.
4 .5 .1  A ssu m p tio n s  a n d  fea tu r e s  o f  th e  m o d e l
The assumptions of the model are quite standard, although assumption 4.1 may appear 
a bit restrictive, it is possible that preferences over talent and eflFort are not perfectly 
correlated with the type of the chent, so that V'(A‘^ ,0,O) > V{X,6,e),  0) <
V{X,9,e)  and again V(A''",^%0) > V{X,0',e) ior 9 > 6 > O'. In that case, little changes 
as what matters for the level of the equihbrium fees is how the threshold types 9* ,9** 
and 9***, move. Thus, it will still be possible to identify connected sets of types who 
prefer a more reputable expert even if she does not exert eflFort and connected sets of 
types who prefer a new entrant that exerts positive eflFort. Then, threshold types will be 
identified as those who ensure supply is equal to demand for experts of a given reputation, 
and equihbrium fees will make such threshold types indiflFerent. However, entry can have 
more complex efi’ects, as now new entrants may be able to attract a pool of chents with 
a larger average type. Then the signalling may induce stronger incentives to exert eflFort 
after entry occurs. The role of the eflFects will stih be the same, although their sign may 
be diflFerent without assumption 4.1. The other assumptions that may deserve further 
comment are those about chents preferences. These are reasonable to capture the kind of 
market I have in mind, where chents heterogeneity influences their willingness to pay for 
the services of experts of diflFerent talent.
The model imagines a setting where chents face diflFerent experts as if they were meeting 
in the marketplace. An alternative formulation could have been to think of chents as 
searching for experts. I believe the way of modelling the market for experts used in this 
chapter is reasonable, as somehow a chent has an idea of the difficulty of the problem 
she wants the expert to solve, and thus will look directly for an expert of appropriate 
quahty. The way current period fees are set when the chent is matched to an expert 
would not matter as the critical element is how the value of building a reputation evolves. 
Investigating the eflFect of chents sorting and the eflFect of entry in a search and matching 
framework certainly constitutes an interesting avenue for future research. In a search and 
matching context, it could be interesting to investigate a second task that is typicaUy 
performed by experts: the diagnosis of the problem. This has been investigated in the 
literature^'^. However, less attention has been put on the study of the way sorting impacts
See Wolinsky (1993) and Emons (1997) among others.
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on the incentives to exert effort on the diagnosis as opposed to exert effort on the actual 
solution of the problem. I do not deal with diagnosis in my model, although that is clearly 
an important feature of a market for experts, and this, again, could be an interesting 
extension of this model.
Another aspect which is not dealt with in this model, is that in some instances, obtaining 
the service from very reputable experts, also embeds a signalling value. This is especially 
true when the client purchase the service to interact with other agents who extract infor­
mation on the client’s quahty from the identity of the expert. Think about IPOs, where 
the identity of the bookrunner often provides investors a signal about the quahty of the 
firm. It seems the main insight of this model would still be valid, although this represents 
another relevant issue which would deserve a fuher treatment.
A final point worth discussing is to what extent this can be considered a model for a 
market for professional services. At first sight, there is little in the assumed technology 
that prevents the application of this model to the analysis of the production of any good, 
as long as its quahty were not observable, so that the price cannot be made contingent on 
quahty. The same model could be apphed to the production of a car, or a fridge, etc for 
which chents have an heterogenous valuation. This is less true when I allow chents types 
to affect the signalling value of the expert’s performance: it would be difficult to interpret 
the model as one were a firm produces an homogenous good. Then, the model could 
rather be apphed to the production of a very customised good, but then, this renders 
more transparent why this can be really considered as a model for the provision of a 
service by an expert, and much less a model for a market of manufactured goods.
4 .5 .2  P o lic y  Im p lic a tio n s
The model shows that in some instances entry can reduce incentives to exert effort. Only 
when the type of the chent affects the likelihood of success, increased entry may lead to 
an equihbrium where effort is higher. However, in ah cases entry has a beneficial effect as 
a larger fraction of clients get served. This follows because the increase in the supply of 
experts modifies threshold types, this impacts on fees, and now some chents who preferred 
to get no service at the ongoing fees, decide to purchase the service. Therefore entry can 
generate a higher level of social welfare even if effort is reduced in equihbrium. This can
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be seen formally, as welfare before entry, in the talent intensive case^ ,^ is
nd r6
/  V{X,e,e)dG{e)-c{e)=  /  V{X+,9,0)dG{e)+
J 0*** J 0*
r0* r0**
/  v{x,e,e)dG{e)+ /  v{x-,e,çi)dG{e)-c{e) (4.20)
J 0** J 0***
while welfare in the period entry occurs is
/ I .  », ^àG (0) -  c(ê) =  r  V(X+,  e, 0)dG{e)+
J 0 J o
[T  fS"
_  v{x,0,ê)dG{e)  +  v { x- , e , o )dG{6)  -  c(ê) (4.21)
J o  J o
leaving the cost of effort aside, it can be seen that clients with type 9 £ [9 ; 9***] now
get a service of value y(A"", 0), while they were getting zero before entry occurred.
Moreover, as 9 < 9**, types 9 Çl \9 ’,9**] get a service of value while before
entry, they were getting a service of value V'(A“ ,0,O). On the other hand, those clients 
with type 9 G [9*\9**] are still served by a new entrant, but now get a service of value 
V{X,9,e) < V{X,9,e),  as e < e. The effect on welfare in the period after entry occurred 
is similar, although the slower learning about old successful and unsuccessful types may 
reduce welfare^®.
A possible way to avoid the potential adverse effect of entry on the incentives to exert effort 
is to introduce a test, or a certification system for successful experts. The certificate, to 
be valuable, must be correlated with talent. Then, if only the top end of the distribution 
of experts got the certificate, it would be possible to restore rents from exerting effort 
and succeed in the first period. In fact, even if entry occurs, those who succeed have a 
chance to get into the top league and the premium to be served by top league successful 
experts would be independent of e n tr y S o m e h o w , this kind of institutions seem to 
arise in practice: league tables for investment banks or financial analysts are published 
every year, and that could be a way to preserve the rents from building a reputation even 
if competition is fierce. Entry could still have some adverse effects as the premium for
^®The effort intensive case is essentially analogous.
However, A > A, so those clients who get served by the least reputable experts derive a larger value 
from the service.
Maybe there could be an effect through the probabihty of getting into the top league, but it depends 
on the design of the certification system.
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successful experts also depends upon the whole structure of fees in the market, in fact 
F+i(A +i,B l(e) I A+i],0) - F + i (A;i ,E[(9) | A ;J ,0 ) =
[V(A+i;«;i,0) -  1A(A+I,fl;i,e;i)] +  [V(A+i,e;*„e;i) -  V"(A;i,e;\,0)l
depends upon y and F(A^i, 0). However, “rationing” 
the supply of the most talented experts could help to boost the benefit from increasing 
entry in a market for expert services.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how the sorting behaviour of clients aflFects the incentives of 
experts motivated by reputational concerns. The model shows that sorting can affect 
incentives in three ways: firstly through a change in the equilibrium fees, and thus in the 
diflFerence between the fees charged by most reputable experts and the fees charged by less 
reputable ones {fees channel)] secondly by affecting the informativeness of a successful 
provision of the service by the expert: if successful provision of the service for certain 
type of the clients is more likely to be delivered by talented experts, then, the pool of 
clients applying to an expert affects the updating of beliefs about an expert talent when 
performance is observed {signalling channel)] finally, if the type of the client aflFects the 
likelihood an expert succeeds, facing “tougher” types could reduce the total probability 
of success {toughness channel), even if the signal provided by a success would be stronger. 
I analyze the effect of entry in this framework. Entry affects the sorting behaviour of 
clients in a way that reduces incentives to exert eflFort when the fees and signalling channel 
operates while the toughness channel does not. When also the latter is at work, there 
can exist equilibria where equilibrium eflFort is larger after entry occurs. In general, even 
if entry reduces equilibrium effort, it can lead to higher welfare as more clients get access 
to the service. The model also provides a rationale for the use of league tables, or other 
certification mechanisms aiming at “constraining” the supply of more reputable experts: 
these are beneficial as they preserve the rents from building a reputation.
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4.7  A ppendix  to  Chapter 4 - Proofs
P ro o f o f  Lem m a 4.1. The payoff of any expert in the last period is given by Ft — c(et), 
where Ft cannot depend upon the effort level et, nor on realized performance. Thus, 
current period effort et does not affect the revenues from providing the services, while 
it costs c{et), therefore =  0 is the unique optimal effort choice for oldest vintage 
experts. The behaviour of experts in their second (penultimate) period is more interesting, 
although the logic is still quite standard. Payoff for experts in their first period is
Ft +  [X{et +  7 ) +  — -^■]Ft+i{success)+
[A(l -  {et +  7 )) +  ^ -j^ ]F t+ i{fa ilu re)  (A4.1)
and the first order condition for effort exertion is 
dc{et)
det
=  X[Ft+i{success) — Ft+\{ failure)]  (A4.2)
and now exerting effort in period t, raises the chances of obtaining in period t +  1 the fee 
conditional on being successful in the period t. Incentives to exert effort increase in the 
premium for being served by an expert who has been successful in the first period, and 
thus improved her reputation. As the cost of effort is strictly convex, the expert exerts a 
strictly positive effort in equilibrium if reputation has value.
P r o o f o f  P rop osition  4.1. All chents prefer the services of experts with reputation 
A'*'. Then, fees raise so that demand equal supply and there is no incentive to deviate. 
As higher types are more willing to pay for the services, when fees go up they will still 
be willing to pay for the services of most reputable experts. As there are [A_i(e!_^ +  
7 ) +  experts with reputation A"*" this represents supply, while M  — G{9*) is
demand. The latter follows because the valuation for experts services is increasing in 
clients’ type. Fees then must make the marginal client indifferent between applying to 
experts of reputation A'*' and applying to experts with reputation A. Then, it can be seen 
that all clients with $ >  0* do not want to deviate. In fact, by getting the service from an 
expert with reputation A"*" they get V'(A"'‘,0,O) — F{X'^,E[{6) | A‘*'],0) and by trying to 
be served by an expert with reputation A they get V{X, 9, e*) — F{X, E[{9) \ A], e*). Then 
it must be true that:
y(A +,9,0) -  f  (A+,£[{9) I A+],0) >  V{K9,e*)  -  F{X,E[{9)  | A|,e*) (A4.3)
or
y (A + ,9,0) -  V{X,9, e') >  y (A + ,«*,0) -  y (A ,«♦,e*) (A4.4)
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or
y(A + ,e ,0 ) -  V (A + ,r ,0 ) >  V{X,e,e*) -  V { X , e \ e ' )  (A4,5)
I am considering case 1, y(A"*", ,^ 0) > V{X,0^e*) for all 0^  and by assumption Vex >  0, 
therefore the inequahty is verified as 6 >  6*. Then, types 6 > 9* have no incentive to 
deviate and cannot do better than pay F{X^,E[{6)  | A‘*'],0) and being matched to an 
expert with type A'*’. A similar reasoning applies to clients of type 9 G [9**, 9*]. They get 
served by an expert of reputation A. By applying to an expert with higher reputation 
they would get V'(A'^,0,O) — F(A"'', £ [^(0) | A"""], 0). Then it is possible to show that
y(A +,9,0) -  F (A +,£[(e) I A+1,0) <  V{X,9,e' )  -  F(A,B[(e) | A],e*) (A4.6)
as
y(A +,g,0) -  V{X,9,e*) < V{X+,9*,0) -  V{X,9 \ e*)  (A4.7)
by the same reasoning as above and noting that 9 < 9*. In the same fashion it is possible 
to show that also the other types of clients have no incentive to deviate. To complete 
the proof, I can show that experts cannot do better: experts would prefer to compete for
types with higher valuation. However, clients types are unknown and rents have to be
left to induce clients to separate and reveal their type. Experts competing for the best 
types will have no rents to leave, and therefore no separating contract will be feasible in 
equilibrium. Moreover, experts can only set fees to screen clients.
P ro o f o f P roposition  4.2. I denote with a hat the variables after entry occurs. There­
fore 9 is the threshold 9* after entry occurred. Suppose after entry in period t there is 
now measure M  — ^ > Q > ^ o f  new entrants^® with reputation A, I firstly illustrate how 
the equilibrium changes in period t, even though this has no effect on the incentives to 
exert effort. In equilibrium, in period t
[A -i(e li +  7) +  ^ l ^  =  M - G { T )
Q  = g (? * ) - g (5")
[ A ( l - ( e  +  7)) +  i ^ l J  =  G ( r ) - G ( r * )
M - 1  =  G{T**) (A4,8)
It can be seen that 9 =  9*, so that there is no change after entry, in the current period. 
However, this implies that 9 is now lower. In fact 9 is unchanged, while there is now 
measure Q >  ^ entrants, and G{9 ) =  G{9 ) — Q implies that 9 is lower. This also 
implies that 9 is reduced. This, however, would have no effect on the incentives to
18Assuming the measure of new entrants is Q > 1 would change very little.
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exert effort, as the latter depend upon future period fees. However, entry in period t, also 
implies that there will be a different measure of experts in the second period. Successful 
experts will be
W ?*+ 7) +  i ^ l «  (A4.9)
and unsuccessful experts
[A {l-(é*  +  7 ) ) - l ^ ] Q  (A4.10)
where e* is the level of effort after entry occurs. Thus, the measure of successful and 
unsuccessful experts depends both upon the measure of entrants, Q, and endogenously 
on the new equihbrium effort level e*. The measure of successful, unsuccessful experts, 
and entrants in period -f 1, determine the thresholds for indifference and the
equilibrium fees in that period. The latter are critical for effort exertion in the previous 
period. The first order condition for effort exertion is given by
=  A{F+i(A+i,£;+i[(e) I A + ,) ,0 )-F + i(A ;„ E + i[(g )  | A ;J |,0 )}  (A4.11)
exploiting the equilibrium conditions it is possible to show that
f+ ,(A + „E + it(g ) I A+,),0) =  [y(A+,;@ ;„0) -  y(A +i,
[y(A+i, e ; ,)  -  v (a; i , o)] +  y (A ;„  e;*,*, o)] ,(A4.i 2)
and
so that
f+ i(A ;„ £ + i[ (e )  I A ;,)],o) =  v (a;„ « ;* i' . o) (A4.13)
F +i(A +i,e[(0) I  A +],0) -  f+ i(A ;„ E [(g ) I A ; ,1,0) =  (A4.14)
F ( 4 i ; ^ : i ,0) -  y (A + i,e ; i ,e ; i) ]  +  -  v (A ;„e;* i,o )]
Then, incentives to exert effort can be increased if and only if this expression raises after 
entry occurs. From the assumptions about preferences, both
-  V (A + i,e ; i ,e ; i) l  (A4.15)
and
(^{A+i, e;*i, e ; , )  -  v (a; „  »;•„ 0)] (A4.i 6)
increase in 6. Thus, as the thresholds 9*,9** move, the equilibrium fees move. First of all,
consider 9j^ .^ The only way this can be larger than 9*, the counterfactual threshold had
increased entry not occurred, is that [A(e* + 7 ) +  <  [A(e* + 7 ) +  However, as
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Q > ^, this can only occur if ê* < e*. The threshold can increase, in principle, if and 
only if raises sufficiently to compensate for the increase in the measure of entrants. 
In fact, — Q and Q > .^ However, in order to have 9^i >  9^  ^ it must
be that 9^  ^ > 9’^ -^ , but then this implies ê* < e* and for this to happen in equilibrium 
it must be that F+i(A^i, | ~  ^+i('^+u-^[(^) I decreases after entry
occurs. Effort, could increase if the expected effort of new entrants in period t +  1 is low 
enough. In fact the te r m sV (A + i, and V { \ + \ , 9  which enter in the first
order condition respectively with a negative and with a positive sign, are both reduced but 
the former can be lowered so as to more than compensate all other effects. However, in 
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, there cannot exist beliefs supporting an equilibrium with 
new entrants in the current period exerting higher effort and new entrants in the future 
period exerting lower effort, given they have the same objective function. Therefore, effort 
must be unambiguously lower after entry.
P ro o f o f P roposition  4.3.
The previous proposition showed that, when entry occurs in the current period:
T  =  9 \ T *  < 9*\T **  < 9*** (A4.17)
so that 9* is constant, while 9** and 9*** are both reduced. Equilibrium fees are as follows
F{X-,E[{9)  I A -),0) =  y ( A - , r \ 0 )  < F { \ - , E m  | A"),0) =  y ( A - ,^ - \ 0 )  (A4.18)
in fact,y(A“ ,0 ,0) is lower than before entry, as 9 < 9***. Then,
F(A ,£[(e) I  X),e) =  V { \ e  , e * ) - V ( A - ,e  ,0) +  V (A -,e  ,0 ) <
F(A,F[(«) I A),e) =  [ y ( A ,r * ,e ) - y ( A - ,f i” ,0)] +  V (A -,r** ,0)] (A4.19)
as F{ \ ,  E[{9) I A), e) is reduced because the difference V (A, 9**,e*)—V{X~,9**,0) increases 
in 9**, but after entry 9 <  9**, and both e* and V{X~ ,9 ,0) are lower. Finally,
F(A+,£P) I A+),0) = [F{A+;« ,0)-F (A ,g  ,e)]+ 
\ v ( \ , e  , e ) - v ( \ - , e  ,o)] +  y(A-,s , o ) ] g  
F(A+,£[(9) I A+),0) = (y(A+;e*,0) -y(A,e*,e)]+
[y ( A, 9", e) -  y  ( A-, 9", 0)] + y  (A-, $•••, 0)1 (A4.20)
denote all variables with a hat to stress that I am now considering the value for clients after increased 
entry of new experts occurred. However, notice that A =  A, as the prior probability an entrant is talented 
does not change. On the contrary, A^i and A+i are changed through the change in ê*.
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as F{X^,E[{9)  I A‘*'),0) moves in an ambiguous way. In fact, the terms [V(A,  ^ ,e) — 
V{X~,6  ,0)] ,0)] are reduced, while [V{X^;6 ,0) — V(A,^ ,e)] raises as 6
is unchanged, and e* is lower, so that V { \ , 6  ,e) is lower. Fees in future periods behave 
similarly, as the thresholds in period +1, behave essentially in the same way, with the 
exception of 9^i  which can be either larger or smaller than 9*, although this would not 
alter the (absence of) prediction about F{X'^,E[{9) \ A‘^ ),0).
P ro o f o f P roposition  4.5. As z(E{9 | A)) =  sorting of clients does not
affect the total probability of providing the service successfully. Then, the effect on the 
indifferent types 9* ,9** ,9*** is the same as in Propositions 4 and 5. The further effect 
of the change in the informativeness of a success on fees follows easily, as in equilibrium 
either
F + i(A + i,B + i[(0 ) I A + i|,0 ) -  F + i(A ;„ E + i[ (e )  | A ; J ,0 )  =  (A 4.21)
[v^(A+i;«;i,0) -  +  [y (A + i,e ; \ ,e ; i )  -  v (A ;„e;*„o))
when y(A'"',$, 0) >  V(A, S, e*), or
F + i(A + „ S + ,( (e )  I A + i ] ,0 ) - F + i ( A ; „ £ + i [ ( e )  | a; , ] , o) =
0) -  V (A ;„ e ;* i,O ) (A 4.22)
when V {X'^  ,9 ,0) < F  (A, 9, e*). When entry occurs, both in the talent intensive (V (A"^ , 9 ,0) >  
V(X,9,e*))  and in the effort intensive (F(A‘'',0 ,0) < V(X,9,e*))  case, the difference
F+1(A+ ,F + 1[(0 ) I A + J ,0 ) -  F + i (A ; i ,F + i [(9) | A ; ,] ,0 )  (A4.23)
is (further) reduced as X^i <  A^j and A^  ^ > X^  ^ because k{E{9 | A) < k{E{9 | A) as 
9 =  in the talent intensive case and 9 < in the effort intensive case, while 9 < 9**
in both cases (what matters for informativeness is the distribution of types in the current 
period). Then, incentives to exert effort are reduced. As z{E{9 | A)) =  
sorting of clients does not affect the total probabihty of providing the service successfully.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  4.6. The effects unveiled in Proposition 6 will still be at work. 
However, now, the total measure of successful experts, in period +1, after entry occurs in 
the current period (period 0) is given by
[Xt{e +  7 +  k{E{9 | A))) +  (1 — A f)(-  +  z{E{9  | A)))]Q (A4.24)
Then, it is possible to have 9 > 9 * ,  and e* > e*, because, E{9 | A) < E{9 | A). I
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distinguish the talent intensive case from the effort intensive case. In the former,
F+i{A+i,B+i[(e) I A+il,0) -  F + i(A ;i,B + i[(e) | A ;,],0) =  (A4.25)
-  F (A ,« ; i,e ; i) i  +  [v (A + i,e ; \ ,e ; ,)  -  v^ (A ;„e;\,o)]
A raise in the threshold type $ , so that $ > 6*, induces an increase in the difference 
y  (-^+1; ^+1)0) — y  (A, ^+1, with respect to the pre-entry situation. On the other hand, 
^ 1  ^ ^+1 inoves the difference in the opposite direction. The effect of sorting on A+i is 
ambiguous. In fact, as the total probabihty of a success is smaller, it is possible either that 
A^i < or that > A^j. If the latter situation occurs, that raises the hkelihood 
that an equihbrium with increased effort after entry exists, while if the former situation 
occurs, that is less hkely. If 9 > 0*, it is also possible to have 0 > 6**. In the latter
case [V(A+i,^!j.*i,e;!|.j) — V(A]|; ,^ 0)] can be larger than in the pre-entry case because
9 >  9**, > e*j^ -^ . Therefore, it is possible to have an equihbrium where new entrants
exert larger effort after entry occurs. In the effort intensive case,
F+i{A+i,F+i[(«) I A + i] ,0 )-F + i(A ;i ,B + i[(e ) |A ; ,] ,0 )  =
V (A +i;«;i,0 ) -  y (A ;„ g r i ,0 )  (A4.26)
then, again, if  ^ > 9*, the premium for being successful may raise, even when A^  ^ < A;|^  ^
and A_|_i > A^ .^ Thus, also in the effort intensive case, there can exist an equihbrium 
where new entrants exert higher effort after entry occurs.
P ro o f o f P rop osition  4.7. Entry reduces all thresholds 9\^, 9*^ ,^ 9*^i. This implies that 
the difference F+i(A''',E+i[(0) | A‘'')],0)—F+i(A“ , E+i[(0) | A~)],0)] is reduced after entry 
occurs. Moreover, the change in E{9),  may increase the measure of successful experts, 
reinforcing the effect of entry on 0+1, However, effort can still be larger due to
the decrease in E[9),  which raises the marginal efficiency of effort. The exact condition is
I A + ) , 0 ) - ( 1 - - ^ ) F + i ( A - , S + x [ W | A - ) ] , 0 ) 1 >  
E{9 I A) E{9 I A)
( l - ; g ( / p ; j ) ^ ’+ i(A -,£;+ i[W  I A -)],0)1 (A4.27)
which can be verified as E{9 | A) < E(0 | A).
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